Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-92-023
Tuesday
4 February 1992

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-92-023 *4 February 1992*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An • indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

FRONT PAGE

ALBANIA

Foreign Minister Bocka on Prague CSCE Meeting *[Tirana Radio]* 2
People's Assembly Discusses Electoral Law *[ATA]* 2
Berisha on Democratic Party Policies *[ATA]* 3

BULGARIA

Repair of Kozloduy Sixth Reactor Continues *[Sofia Radio]* 5
Further Incidents at Kozloduy Cause Concern *[AFP]* 5
Illegal Smuggling of Nuclear Fuel Denied *[BTA]* 5
Former Security Man Calls Markov 'Triple Agent' *[DUMA 29 Jan]* 6
Zhelev Pardons Journalist Held for Spying *[BTA]* 6
Army Reform, National Security Discussed *[DEMOKRATSIYA 29 Jan]* 6
Government's Economic Policy Criticized *[PODKREPA 29 Jan]* 8

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

3 Arrested in Holysov for Trying To Sell Semtex *[Prague Radio]* 10
Trade Minister Baksay on Arms Export Rules *[VEREJNOST 1 Feb]* 10
Arms Trade Operates 'Uninhibited by Any Controls' *[RESPEKT 27 Jan-2 Feb]* 10
Diplomatic Ties With Ukraine, Belarus Established *[CSTK]* 17
Russia To Supply 7.5 m Tonnes of Oil in '92 *[Bratislava Radio]* 17
Havel on Domestic Issues, Ties With Hungary *[NEPSZABADSAG 1 Feb]* 17
Vavrousek Discusses Bohunice Plant With Austria *[Vienna DIE PRESSE 3 Feb]* 18
Federal Assembly Asks for Human Rights Report *[CSTK]* 18
Secret Information From Screening Commission Leaked *[CSTK]* 18
Leak Stirs Up Controversy *[CSTK]* 19
Rules on Use of Privatization Coupons Passed *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 31 Jan]* 19
Czech Government Meets on Privatization Funds *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 30 Jan]* 20
CSTK Becomes TKSR In Slovak Republic *[Bratislava Radio]* 20
Slovak Defense Capability Views Outlined *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 24 Jan]* 20

POLAND

Germany's Genscher Begins Visit to Warsaw *[Berlin ADN]* 22
Meets With Walesa *[Warsaw Radio]* 22
Meets With Skubiszewski *[Hamburg DPA]* 22
Further on Skubiszewski Meeting *[Berlin ADN]* 22
Russian Forces To Pay for Food, Energy *[Warsaw TV]* 23
Treaty With CSFR Criticized on Minority Issue *[PAP]* 23
New PAP President Named, Future Plans Viewed *[PAP]* 23
National Trade Union Accord Ready for Talks *[Warsaw Radio]* 24
PSL Urges Sejm To Concentrate on Economics *[Warsaw Radio]* 24
Poll on Popularity of Past, Present Leaders *[Warsaw TV]* 24

ROMANIA

Importance of Romanian-Hungarian Agreement Viewed *[TINERETUL LIBER 30 Jan]* 25
Nastase on 'Concrete Issues' Discussed With Moldova *[AZI 29 Jan]* 25
Moldovan Popular Front Leader To Run in Elections *[Moscow INTERFAX]* 26
Vatra Romaneasca Favors Reunification With Moldova *[ROMPRES]* 26
National Union Council Calls For Reunification *[ROMANIA LIBERA 25-26 Jan]* 26
Republican Party Leader Addresses Election Rally *[ROMPRES]* 27
Opposition Urged To Spur Campaign Against FSN *[ROMANIA LIBERA 30 Jan]* 28
Pro-Bessarabia Council Issues Election Appeal *[ROMANIA LIBERA 28 Jan]* 28
Candidates Warned Against Destabilizing Army *[ROMPRES]* 29

YUGOSLAVIA

International

EC Lifts Sanctions; Serbia Excluded *[TANJUG]* 30
CSCE Delegate Maksic Sees Patience Waning *[TANJUG]* 30
NATO Parliamentary Delegation Arrives *[TANJUG]* 30

Interrepublic

Babic States Reasons for Peace Plan Refusal *[TANJUG]* 30
Says Krajina Ministers 'Threatened' *[Belgrade TV]* 31
Hopes for 'Lasting Peace' *[TANJUG]* 31
Jovic Says Babic's Behavior 'Uncivilized' *[Belgrade Radio]* 32
Kostic Considers Babic 'Irresponsible' *[Belgrade Radio]* 33
Babic's Refusal 'Means War' *[Belgrade TV]* 33
Slovene, Croatian Trade Accord Under Way *[Ljubljana Radio]* 34
Croatian-Slovene Relations 'Complicated' *[TANJUG]* 34
Gligorijevic on Serbian-Croatian Conflict *[BORBA 18-19 Jan]* 35
Serbian-Slovene Talks 'Beginning To Thaw' *[DNEVNIK 23 Jan]* 36

Federal

Government Accuses Croatia of 'Genocide' *[TANJUG]* 36

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Mostar Attacked; Hopes of Sovereignty Questioned *[Zagreb Radio]* 40
Citizens Erect Barricades, Protest JNA *[TANJUG]* 40
Croatian Party Leader in Bosnia Resigns *[Sarajevo Radio]* 40
Government Releases Food Reserves To Market *[TANJUG]* 41

Croatia

UN Silence on Eviction of Croats Protested *[Zagreb Radio]* 41
Cease-Fire Violations Reportedly on Increase *[Ljubljana Radio]* 41
Tudjman Holds News Conference in Zagreb *[Zagreb Radio]* 41
Babic on Plan To Unite All Serbian People *[BORBA 20 Jan]* 44

Macedonia

Turkish Envoy Sides With Republic, Recalled *[TANJUG]* 49
Republic Prepares Defense Concept *[TANJUG]* 49
Controversial Referendum of Macedonia's Albanians *[BORBA 13 Jan]* 49

Serbia

Economic Cooperation Discussed With ROK *[TANJUG]* 51
Tudjman's Aims 'Charm Campaign' at U.S. *[TANJUG]* 51
Smuggled Arms Shipment Discovered in Priboj *[TANJUG]* 52
Croatian 'Terrorists' Reported Near Sombor *[TANJUG]* 52
Draskovic Predicts Monarchy in Serbia *[Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 3 Feb]* 52
'Myopic' Political Views Diminish Serbia *[BORBA 18-19 Jan]* 54
UN Deployment Divides Serbian Political Parties *[BORBA 22 Jan]* 54

Slovenia

Slovene Envoys Recalled From Embassies Abroad *[TANJUG]* 55
International Business Exchange Program Starts *[DELO 7 Jan]* 55
Government Hopes To Curb 'Hyperinflation' *[DELO 8 Jan]* 56

Yugoslavia

International—The EC has officially lifted economic sanctions on all of the former SFRY republics with the exception of Serbia. According to TANJUG, the EC foreign ministers decided to continue economic sanctions against Serbia until Serbian leaders resolve "the latest strains in political relations" over the UN troop deployment. "Sources" close to EC delegations are dissatisfied "that Croatia will not observe conditions regarding minorities." The lifting of sanctions on Croatia "need not be final," TANJUG reports.

Milivoj Maksic, the head of the Yugoslav delegation to the CSCE meeting in Prague, returned to Belgrade warning that "time is short" for the Yugoslavs to find "honorable and just" solutions. TANJUG quotes Maksic as saying: "If we do not take adequate decisions about ourselves and our future, we will face a risk of having our fate decided by others."

Interrepublic—TANJUG reports that Serbian "Republic of Krajina" President Milan Babic's refusal to agree to the terms of the UN peace plan has resulted in strong reactions by other republics. According to Babic, the SFRY Presidency warned that "it would stage a military coup" if he did not agree to the UN peace plan. Branko Kostic, vice president of the SFRY Presidency, denied Babic's allegations that threats of a military coup were forwarded. In an interview with Belgrade radio, Kostic stated that if "we had intended to do this, we could have arrested the government and Mr. Babic here in Belgrade." He went on to characterize Babic's stance as "irresponsible" and later told Belgrade TV that "Babic's option means war."

The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry has recalled Ambassador to Turkey Trajan Petrovski. TANJUG reports that the envoy publicly stated his loyalties to Macedonia and placed himself at the republic's disposal. The Yugoslav Presidency ordered Petrovski's recall because he "disregarded instructions received from the SFRY Foreign Ministry and acted against the norms of a single Yugoslav policy."

Czechoslovakia

Prague radio reports that three men were arrested in Holysov on 3 February "trying to sell Semtex 1a." According to the report the explosive was stolen in Blansko on 31 January.

In an interview with VEREJNOST, Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Minister Jozef Baksay said that he gave his personal approval for the sale of T-72 tanks to Syria "to assist the conversion process... where there are grave unemployment problems."

The newspaper RESPEKT publishes a comprehensive article on the arms trade in Czechoslovakia which it says operates "uninhibited by any controls." The article details recent arms deals with Yugoslavia, Iran, China, and Pakistan. It discloses Nigeria as an intermediary for re-exports and the Libyan connection, pointing out: "CSFR ties with al-Qadhdhafi's regime have a rich tradition" in arms as well as explosives.

Bulgaria

Sofia radio reports that repairs are continuing on the Kozloduy nuclear power plant's sixth reactor. Recent technical failures at the plant have "scared" Bulgarians, according to AFP, and the Bulgarian media has continued to "fan the flames with detailed chronicles of all the plant's past failures." Bulgarian officials "insist that breakdowns similar to those at Kozloduy occur in every nuclear plant, and that the danger has been vastly exaggerated."

Foreign Minister Bocka on Prague CSCE Meeting

AU0302172192 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Interview with Foreign Minister Ilir Bocka by Lirim Ibrahimi; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Ibrahimi] Mr. Minister, the foreign ministers of the CSCE member-states, assembled in Prague, approved a document that gives details of the proposals for stronger action at all levels of the CSCE's activities. How would you describe the drafting of this document?

[Bocka] The Prague meeting was a further step in the consolidation of the CSCE process. The meeting mainly dealt with the drafting of principles and the definition of the architectural shape of the new Europe. Of course, the Prague meeting taking place at this moment was obliged to also deal with the admission of many other republics that have emerged from the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and with the acceptance as observers of two former Yugoslav republics, Croatia and Slovenia. In general, the meeting expressed concern over the problem of security. It therefore concentrated on the consolidation of a new security structure, a defense structure, that will operate within the CSCE framework. This was because the problem of security has recently come to the fore, especially bearing in mind the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This country had a significant nuclear potential that is now partially beyond international control.

The meeting also concentrated on the deterioration of the Yugoslav crisis, which shows that the CSCE has still not been perfected as a system of principles on which the new architecture of Europe may be built. The meeting also attached great importance to problems of preserving the dignity of national minorities, other problems relating to the avoidance of conflicts, and issues mainly relating to continuing cooperation and security on our continent.

[Ibrahimi] Mr. Minister, as far as we aware, the Prague meeting also adopted a proposal made by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker for a new economic forum in order to help the new members in East Europe. What does this economic forum envisage?

[Bocka] This was a new idea prompted by recent developments in Europe and is intended to reduce tension and to involve these countries in many processes of European cooperation, helping them to integrate as well as possible in European structures and to move gradually to a market economy. The forum has been envisaged as a form of collective assistance to these countries to enable them to negotiate the period of transition as painlessly as possible.

[Ibrahimi] Mr. Minister, in recent days there have been new initiatives that give hope for the recognition of the Republic of Kosovo. I am thinking here of the statement by the Croatian foreign minister and the U.S. initiative speaking out in the interests of the Albanian cause. How would you assess these initiatives?

[Bocka] I would always assess them with a diplomat's caution, not falling victim to euphoria, but appreciating them all as part of the great mosaic of the Albanian cause. I met Croatian Foreign Minister Separovic in Prague, and we discussed at length the problem of the recognition of the Republic of Kosovo. The foreign minister spoke to me about the invitation extended to Mr. Bukoshi, the prime minister of Kosovo, to go to Croatia this week, and we are now waiting to see what the results will be. Likewise, there were initiatives on the U.S. side, from senators and representatives who have raised their voices in support of the Albanian cause. There is therefore a difference now, because people now talk about recognizing the Republic of Kosovo where they used to talk about protecting human rights in Kosovo. This is a step forward, and we hope that it will be followed by other more positive steps in this direction, because the role and position of the United States in international politics are well known.

[Ibrahimi] One more question, Mr. Minister. What do you think of the future of the process of Balkan cooperation and understanding that has been shaken by the Yugoslav crisis?

[Bocka] We are very interested in continuing the process of Balkan cooperation that has been shaken by the Yugoslav crisis and appears to have stalled. It is in the interest of all Balkan countries, and I discussed this in Prague with Turkish Foreign Minister Cetin, Romanian Foreign Minister Nastase, and Greek Foreign Minister Samaras. We think that this process will resume after various issues arising from the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation are settled.

[Ibrahimi] I thank you, Mr. Minister, and wish you success.

People's Assembly Discusses Electoral Law

AU0302151692 Tirana ATA in English 0904 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Tirana, February 3 (ATA)—It is three days that the People's Assembly is discussing in parliamentary groups and in plenary sittings on the Draft-Law on Elections to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania.

In course of the sittings of February 2, the Assembly examined the articles of the second chapter of this draft-law, dealing with the system of elections.

The deputies adopted by majority of ballots the 6 articles of this chapter. According to them the People's Assembly is composed not less that 140 deputies, out of which 100 are directly elected through one-name lists, whereas the compensating additional mandates are given to the candidates of the subjects on country scale, according to the proportion of the votes attained in the first rounds.

Elected deputy to the People's Assembly according to the one-name list is the candidate which wins more than half of all the valid votes in that constituency.

Also in the two sittings of February 2, the deputies discussed extensively on the Article 13, regarding the definition of the election subjects. Numerous debates were staged on this issue, where the floor was taken by many deputies. The deputies of Omonia demanded that their organisation has its candidates for deputies throughout Albania. This was opposed vehemently by the deputies of the SP [Socialist Party] and the DP [Democratic Party].

In general they backed up the contributions and arguments of the Deputies Abdi Baleta and Elvira Shapllo on the form of the representation in the parliament of the national minorities. Many deputies of these parliamentary groups condemned the stand of some Greek chauvinist circles and of certain leader of Omonia organisation which runs counter the national interests of Albania. In conclusion of the debate, this article was passed by majority of votes with the following formulation: Every citizen that enjoys the right to be elected to the People's Assembly might be presented as candidate for deputy to the People's Assembly as representative of every party, of a party grouping or independent candidate. Every candidate cannot be presented more than in one one-name constituency. Every candidate in a one-name list election constituency might be presented at the same time as a candidate in the list of the respective subject. The candidate who wins in an election constituency is deputy of the constituency and is removed from the list on country-scale of his subject.

The assembly continues the proceedings with the examination of the other articles.

Berisha on Democratic Party Policies

AU0202154292 Tirana ATA in English 0902 GMT 2 Feb 92

[Text] Tirana, February 2 (ATA)—The Democratic Party [DP] of Albania gave a press conference for journalists of various press organs at the Palace of Congresses in Tirana on February 1, at noon.

Present were also heads and functionaries of the diplomatic representations accredited to our country.

The briefing was opened by the spokesman of the DP, Mr. Genc Pollo, who said among others that the topic of this briefing is the country's political situation on the threshold of the elections from the viewpoint of the Democratic Party as well as an information on the recent visit to France of Mr. Berisha. Based on the situation at home, he said that the DP is convinced of its victory and of the opposition bloc in the coming elections. He pointed out that during this period the DP realised the majority of the promises made in the last elections and many of its ideas are now used by the SP [Socialist Party] for this election campaign, as on the land issue, the granting of the dwelling houses free of charge, etc.

In continuation, the chairman of the Democratic Party of Albania, Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha, responded to the numerous questions of journalists. Replying to the question whether the DP will accept the proposal of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and the RP [Republican Party] to forward common candidates in the coming elections, he said that the DP is studying this proposal and our opinion is for a joint strategy.

Tomorrow while in power, he said, we are for a government coalition with the opposition parties and will stimulate every intellectual, despite his party pertaining. To the question whether in case of presidential elections he would present his candidature for president, Mr. Berisha responded, "I prefer to be a free citizen of a free Albania." With regard to his visit in France and the contacts he had with senior representatives of the West European governments, Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha pointed out that during these contacts I have availed myself of the opportunity to brief them on Albania's dramatic situation and ask them for raw material so that industry begins functioning, working means and chemical fertilizers for the Albanian countryside, and I have taken concrete promises from them regarding the beginning of a serious aid for Albania, especially for the countryside by both the EEC and the U.S. Administration to begin this spring. With regard to the solution of the Albanian issue in the former Yugoslavia, he said that the DP stands for the unification of the Albanian nation or for the solution of the Albanian issue within the existing frontiers of former Yugoslavia. We ask from Europe, Prof. Berisha underscored, to recognise the rights of three million Albanians living on their territories in former Yugoslavia, for self-determination, just like it recognised those of the Croatians and Slovenes.

Regarding the question that there are rumours that the DP is heading an anti-Greek campaign, Mr. Berisha responded that the DP has not headed and will never head such a campaign. We are for good neighbourliness among our two peoples, who are the most ancient in the Balkans, he said. But we shall raise our voice for the national cause, the defence of human rights, and believe that the democratic Greek circles will well welcome this stand. Another question was about DP's opinion for the participation in the elections of the Omonia organisation, for which he said that we abide by the stand that Omonia should have the right to forward candidates for deputies in the areas where the population is compact, as any other minority should have the right. To the question on DP stand towards the Cam issue, the chairman of the DP, Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha, responded that we do not have any border problems with the Greek state, but we will insist on the fact that the Greek Government recognises the Cams the right to property and inalienable right to return to their territories, on the basis of the international documents which Greece has signed. With regard to the question that there are rumours that the SP will

demand coalition with the DP, he responded that we shall not accept coalition with the SP due to the fact that the first coalition failed.

To the question on the accusations made that with the victory of the DP, a new dictatorship will be established at home, Prof. Berisha responded that these accusations are made by people who have served dictatorship for democracy and democracy for dictatorship.

With regard to the question whether the world will help Albania if the SP wins in the coming elections, he responded that Europe and the world will not help the structures of the communist system, because at present Europe calls for democratic pluralism in Albania. The SP, he added, will not win, because a people is not mistaken for a second time. Regarding the stand of the DP towards the countryside, Mr. Berisha said that it insists that the peasants be given land certificates for the land they take from the implementation of the law on land, whereas the former owners be given damages, but they do not take the land any more. In continuation he said that the DP will organise this election campaign in the Albanian countryside for its liberation from the leftovers of the communist ideology. To the question regarding the debate in the press and the RTV [Radio-Television] on Ismail Kadare, he said that he considers the debate free, but it is not in the interest of democracy to attack the Albanian personalities. Ismail Kadare, he said, is a collosus of Albanian literature. To the question which would be the first task to be performed by the DP after the victory in the elections, Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha said that first it will begin with the legislation, the Constitution, the restoration of order, the resumption of production, the aid for the countryside and national conciliation.

Likewise, Mr. Berisha responded to many other questions.

Repair of Kozloduy Sixth Reactor Continues

AU0402092092 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 4 Feb 92

[Veselin Angelov report from Vratsa]

[Text] The work related to eliminating the defect in one of the safety systems pumps at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant sixth generating unit continues. The safety systems can function independently, but to ensure maximum safety the repair work must be completed first. It is expected that the repairs will be completed within 14 days, although experts think that the work could be completed in 10 days. This means that the generating unit could be connected to the country's power supply system by 14 February.

Further Incidents at Kozloduy Cause Concern

AU0402080292 Paris AFP in English 0749 GMT 4 Feb 92

[Report by Vessela Sergueva]

[Text] Sofia, Feb 4 (AFP)—A recent series of technical failures at the contested Kozloduy nuclear plant has Bulgarians scared—both about nuclear safety and more power blackouts. The plant had been deemed unsafe by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which obtained the shutdown of its Number 1 and 2 reactors last September and has also strongly urged the closure of the Number 3 and 4 units. But the authorities have been balking at the measure because the Chernobyl-vintage plant supplies the country with the bulk of its energy.

Bulgarians were shaken last Thursday [30 January] when a control panel serving the plant's number 3 and 4 reactors caught fire. Then the breakdown of a pump Friday slashed production by half at the more powerful and modern reactor 5, capable of churning out 1000 megawatts.

In another blow, reactor 6 was shut down the same day because of a breakdown in a pump in its security system, less than two weeks after a previous shutdown. Reactors 5 and 6, both 1000 megawatt units, are considered Kozloduy's most reliable.

Officials have insisted the latest incidents have not resulted in any radioactive leakage.

The Bulgaria media meanwhile have continued to fan the flames with detailed chronicles of all the plant's past failures, and warnings by Western experts of the enormous danger posed by Kozloduy. In a hoax, a satirical TV program recently announced a serious accident at the plant, causing a mini-panic among the population. Bulgarian nuclear experts insist that breakdowns similar to those at Kozloduy occur in every nuclear plant, and that the danger has been vastly exaggerated. Some have even hinted that public opinion here is being manipulated by powerful Western firms which would like to to sell their equipment to Bulgaria.

Most Bulgarians actually fear power shortages more than a Kozloduy accident, for the blackouts every three hours have here turned daily life here into an ordeal. Stores are forced to close before nightfall, while restaurants offer their dwindling numbers of customers cold food served by candelight. Unlit cities have meant huge increase in car accidents and petty crime. Bulgarians have to time their evening meals and TV viewing around power shutdowns.

Still, the spectre of the 1986 Chernobyl accident in Ukraine continues to haunt the population here. U.N. statistics revealed after the collapse of the communist government showed that Bulgaria was one of the countries most affected by that nuclear catastrophe. Two former communist officials were given jail sentences last year for telling Bulgarians they had nothing to fear from Chernobyl.

Meanwhile, the government is faced with another headache—what to do about a new nuclear plant under construction in Belene, located like Kozloduy on the banks of the Danube. Under pressure from the Ecoglasnost ecology movement, parliament in 1990 voted to stop work on the Belene plant because of its site, in an earthquake zone. A reactor core arrived for Belene arrived last week in the Bulgarian port of Lom, but authorities have hesitated to bring it onshore. Angry townspeople in Svichtov, near Belene, have threatened to take firm action to halt work on the plant.

Illegal Smuggling of Nuclear Fuel Denied

AU0302130592 Sofia BTA in English 1231 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 3 (BTA)—In connection with the statement of Mr. Norbert Gansel, foreign political spokesman for the Social Democratic Faction in the Bundestag, about illegal export of nuclear fuel from N-plants in Eastern Europe, Bulgaria in particular, today's press carries statements of competent Bulgarian officials. "FAKS" quotes the new director of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, Mr. Kuzma Kuzmanov, as saying that those allegations can only be described as "provocation." "The export of nuclear fuel without a license from the IAEA is illegal," Mr. Kuzmanov explains. "IAEA experts have installed special videocameras which record every piece of nuclear fuel brought into or taken out of the plant. The tapes are checked several times a year," he adds.

"TRUD" carries a commentary by Mr. Yordan Kharizanov from the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. He is in charge of the control of nuclear fuel in Bulgaria. "We are not exporting nuclear fuel, on the contrary, we are even trying to get rid of it but there is no interest abroad," he explains. Mr. Kharizanov confirms that the IAEA is exercising strict control over nuclear fuel which makes smuggling simply impossible.

"24 CHASA" quotes a high-ranking Interior Ministry official as saying that "no cases of smuggling nuclear

material have been recorded by the Security Services." The daily explains that according to Bulgarian experts, the German politician had probably meant red mercury. Mr. Khristo Kraychev, spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior, explains that three consignments of red mercury have been seized so far: One at the border with Romania and two inside the country. The most probable supplier is the Soviet mafia and Bulgaria was used as a transit point, the daily writes.

Former Security Man Calls Markov 'Triple Agent'

AU0302134992 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 29 Jan 92 p 1

[Nikolay Zhelev report from Varna: "Georgi Markov Worked for Three Intelligence Services at Least, a Former State Security Official Presumes"]

[Text] Yanko Stefanov, former chief of the Varna State Security Service, stated in an interview with the private weekly CHERNO MORE [Black Sea]: Georgi Markov worked for at least three different intelligence services. I assume that his death should most likely be attributed to natural causes, but some people, in the pursuit of specific goals, are making a fuss about it.

There has been a great deal of talk about the alleged existence of documents on the assassination. They could hardly be found, Yanko Stefanov points out. If a decision was really made on the matter, it was confidentially discussed between two or three people. You should not assume that a protocol was drafted on the subject. Mr. Stefanov defines the rumors that two Varna citizens are among the names cited as Markov's possible killers as petty provincial gossip. He cannot assume that the murderer was a Bulgarian, considering that the assassination took place on Todor Zhivkov's birthday. [sentence as published] No intelligence service whatsoever would leave behind such obvious traces.

I recently heard my own name mentioned as a suspected killer. This piece of news was reported to me by a Bulgarian politician, the former Security Service official stated. He added that he worked in it before the assassination attempt.

Zhelev Pardons Journalist Held for Spying

AU0302213092 Sofia BTA in English 2019 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 3 (BTA)—President Zhelyu Zhelev has signed a decree pardoning former BTA correspondent in Spain Vladimir Ignatov, who is serving a sentence on charges of "anti-state activity and embezzlement." Mr. Valentin Stoyanov, spokesman for the president, told BTA that the pardon decree will be published later on.

Mr. Ignatov was arrested on July 17, 1989 after a complicated operation carried out by the former State Security. An "urgent" meeting in Bulgaria of all BTA correspondents served as a decoy. Vladimir Ignatov's wife, Nurai, is of Turkish descent. He was accused of spying for the Turkish Intelligence and of embezzlement. During the investigation proceedings he made a full confession and later on, in a statement for the press, he said he had been a Bulgarian counter-intelligence agent since 1975. The former BTA correspondent was sentenced to 17 years' imprisonment. In 1990 the sentence on "political charges," i.e. charges of spying, was quashed.

In late January a group of Bulgarian journalists published an open letter to the president in "24 CHASA," requesting that Vladimir Ignatov be pardoned. On the following day President Zhelev received two of them and heard the motives for their request.

Army Reform, National Security Discussed

AU0302213592 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 29 Jan 92 p 3

[Nikolay Slatinski article: "The Bulgarian Army and the New European Thinking"]

[Text] Lately, the daily DUMA and other pro-communist print media are shedding hot tears over our (in their opinion) disintegrating national security. Whining parliamentarians and angry generals, launching reprimands and heavy accusations of high treason and crimes against the people and the motherland, cause additional anxieties to our poor Bulgarian citizens, who are already suffering under the pressure of economic hardships, and trouble their minds with a new dose of fear and sinister forebodings.

The problems of our borders' inviolability, of reliable guarantees against foreign aggression, of combat readiness, and of the psychological atmosphere in the Army are particularly sensitive subjects. For this reason, precisely, all sorts of speculations, disinformation, and deliberate distortions of the truth for the sake of specific political interests are despicable, to put it mildly. The Bulgarian Army, which earned so much glory and patriotic pride for our country in the past, lost a considerable portion of its authority and moral prestige during the years of the totalitarian regime. Having been transformed into an accessory of the Communist Party and of the East European repressive military machinery, it became the most conservative institution in our country. It was no coincidence that the Ministry of Defense was the only ministry that the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] categorically refused to give up under Dimitur Popov's coalition government; the fact that the reforms in that same ministry were considerably delayed and encounter particular hostility today is no coincidence either. The representatives of the present opposition are virtually against every measure the civilian minister of defense and his young, but ambitious, team are adopting, accusing them of creating chaos, of acting like amateurs, and of course—of exerting "blue" [[SDS, the Union of Democratic Forces] totalitarianism. As a matter of fact it

requires great courage, a clear concept, and professional skill to start a reform in a ministry that is notoriously authoritarian (and Red!). Let us not forget that Army General Mutafchiev, the former minister, did not do anything for the renewal of the Army in accordance with the democratic processes underway in our country and in accordance with the changes that occurred all over Europe following the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the bipolar block confrontation. This should not mean, however, that we underestimate Mr. Mutafchiev's credit in seeing to it that the Army remained loyal to the state leadership and refrained from interfering in the dramatic confrontation of political passions by playing the role of a mediator.

The transition from totalitarianism to democracy is connected with numerous problems and complications in a small country such as ours. Our disgraceful state as a satellite was compensated by reassurances of allegedly guaranteed national security in the past. Today we are expected to pay for the results of our fraternal closeness to the USSR and our affiliation with the Eastern bloc by considerable reductions of our armaments on the basis of the Vienna Treaty, while our southern neighbors are allowed to maintain their enormous superiority over us as regards the number of troops and the accelerated modernization of their combat equipment. In addition to this, while in the recent past our enemy was geographically determined, today we are literally obliged to keep our eyes open and look in all geopolitical directions. Although no real military danger threatens Bulgaria today, we should not forget that we are living in an explosive and dangerous area of the world, which is additionally threatened by a dangerous lack of coincidence between geographical and ethnic borders. For this particular reason, Bulgaria should constantly seek effective guarantees for its national security. These guarantees are not solely, and not even chiefly, of a military nature, they are increasingly political. The necessary steps in this direction can be described as follows: Development of bilateral relations with the neighboring countries; establishment of a regional security system; and gradual integration with the European political structures, which assigns a particularly important role to NATO and the new Council of North Atlantic Cooperation. Despite the fact that we are a small country, and perhaps precisely for this reason, we should also be guided by the priorities of our national interests. Only a pragmatic policy that is based on healthy patriotism and a well-balanced respect for democratic Europe can guarantee our state sovereignty and our territorial integrity to a sufficient extent.

The aforementioned arguments are not aimed at underrating the importance of the Bulgarian Army as a protector of our country's national security. As a matter of principle, however, our Armed Forces are incapable of totally guaranteeing our national security without the interference of any exterior, balancing and protective mechanisms. In this context our Army should be sufficiently mobile, flexible, well-equipped, and strong, so that it is capable of opposing optimal and prolonged resistance to any armed aggression from the outside. The reforms under way by no means interfere with these vitally important tasks and do not affect our national security under any circumstances. The initiated restructuring of the defense system, the upcoming redeployment of units and groups of units, and the transition to an organization based on the corps and brigade system, as well as the gradual reform of the Army on a professional basis, all this should make it possible for us to develop an Army based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency, in accordance with our country's economic, demographic, and geographical situation. A sensible social policy, the consistent enhancement of the officer's social prestige, a humane approach to the problems of war invalids, and the integration between the Orthodox Church and the Army—all these reforms are likely to change the attitude to the Army and restore the people's respect and confidence in the Armed Forces.

However, the reforms in the Bulgarian Army have encountered violent opposition. Is this caused by nostalgia for the primary party organizations and for the political organs, or for the generals and officers of the Defense Ministry, the Auxiliary Defense Organization, or the Central Sports Club of the Bulgarian Army? Perhaps, someone misses having military intelligence, or does not accept the fact that the present minister of defense not only is not a Politburo member of the Bulgarian Communist Party, but a civilian on top of everything? Or, perhaps someone regrets the independence granted to the Army's General Staff and the opportunity of finally taking over the leadership of the Army and its specific military functions and tasks? These are ridiculous tears shed for an irrevocably bygone past!

I am not trying to say that everything accomplished so far at the Ministry of Defense is brilliant. As a member of parliament, and especially as a member of the National Security Commission, I cannot fail to express regret that relations between the ministry and the commission are still very weak. It is evident that the executive power is still more dynamic than the legislative one. It is evident that the traditions of parliamentary and public control over the activities of military institutions were for a long time interrupted in our country, but this does not mean that parliament should learn from the media about changes in the Army and that it should almost exert pressure in order to obtain information, so as to exert its effective control. We are now trying to introduce new moral standards, new forms of social behavior, and it is up to all of us to make sure that close contacts, based on openness, transparency, mutual confidence, and cooperation are established between the Army and parliament, between the Army and society. The responsibility for the decisions lies with the politicians, but the military is assigned the role of implementing the decisions. It is expected to carry out its obligations, to defend our national security, and not to interfere in political life, which—just like war—is a much too serious matter to be entrusted entirely to it.

In our days of dynamic transformations, in our days of dramatic changes in public life, when social problems are likely to develop into a danger threatening to disrupt order and stability—the Army is an object of particular attention. We are trying to find the outlines of our national security concept in the spirit of the new European thinking, guaranteeing our survival as a nation. In normal states it is customary that the different political forces reach a consensus on the problems of national security. Every society that has decided to assume the responsibility for its own destiny, for conducting an independent policy, and for reforming its key institutions—is assuming a risk. Some people regard this risk as a duty, as an act of dedication and patriotism. For others, it presents a welcome opportunity for screaming bloody murder and engaging in a fierce demagogic campaign. Time will put everyone in his right place—there is no doubt about this.

Government's Economic Policy Criticized

AU0302201392 Sofia PODKREPA in Bulgarian 29 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Asen Michkovski and Valentin Karabashev commentary: "Resignation of Two Instead of Resignation by All"]

[Text] The fact that the Podkrepa Labor Confederation has focused Bulgarian public attention on the failures of the economic reform, before the situation in economic life worsens severely and unexpectedly, is evidence of the trade union's principled stand, which has recently given rise to much persistent talk that the union has turned into an official government organization. This accusation is only true insofar as the Podkrepa Labor Confederation was the main constructive element of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and in this sense defends the cause of democracy in Bulgaria.

As a result of its social position, Podkrepa has assumed protective functions vis a vis broad strata of the population and the process of changing the system. Now Podkrepa is implementing the same functions regarding the government of the political force that won the elections with the decisive help of the confederation's structures. There is nothing immoral or reprehensible in this because a political force's viability is always judged on its ability for self-renewal.

The SDS government has been in power for two and a half months, but its economic team has been present in the country's administration for significantly longer. At a decisive moment for our country, Messrs. Pushkarov and Kostov showed economic insight and sound political will when they broke with the system of a centrally planned economy and set in motion the economic reform in Bulgaria. With the abolition of administrative control on prices, the introduction of a normal policy on finance, interest rates, and currency, and the reduction of the redistribution functions of the state budget, they created the general conditions for developing market relations and for achieving relative financial equality.

However, the transition from a centralized socialist economy to a market economy in terms of it being an exceptionally complex and unknown process in the world requires a clear conception, a consistent and well-thought-out program, coordinated to the specific character of the socioeconomic situation in the country. After the first successful steps of the economic reform in anything relating to its financial aspects, preconditions were not created for an actual structured transformation of the economy. The SDS, distracted by its election campaign efforts and the excitement of political passions, did not at the same time succeed in coordinating its economic policy, which also found expression in the activities of the government's economic team.

In his strivings to accomplish the difficult task of restructuring the Bulgarian economy, Mr. Pushkarov's ministry achieved an enormous centralization of economic power, something that is hardly compatible with the principles of the market economy. In addition to its tasks in the field of state regulation of industry and trade, the Ministry of Industry and Trade also assumed the administration of state property, as well as transformations, privatization, and also recently foreign economic relations.

The demonopolization and decentralization carried out in accordance with Decree No. 54 from the Council of Ministers and later the transformation in essence of a large proportion of state companies with the so-called small privatization law were put into practice without any serious analysis of their technological, financial, or market potential. As a result, constant requests are received from the transformed commercial companies and commercial collectives for canceling financial credit agreements that they had inherited and for lifting restrictions on manufacturing production development.

During the transformation process the interests of the workers in the state companies were not considered very deeply. The reappointment was allowed of a large proportion of the cadres of the nomenclature who had already proved their inability to manage at the time of the centralized planned economy. Extensive dismissals of inconvenient trade union members and activists began. Under another guise, the start was in actual fact given to a secret and unsanctioned privatization, the pouring of state funds into the private pockets of the nomenclature. As a result of this policy, social tension increased and today we are witness to a dangerous level of confrontation between, on the one hand, Mr. Pushkarov's ministry, and on the other, economic leaders and the trade unions. The economic leaders and the trade unions, led by their common interests related to profitable production and appropriate wages, often assume common positions.

At the time of Mr. Popov's coalition government it was often emphasized, with justification, that the economic reform was impeded by parliament's legislative activities. After the 13 October elections this obstacle disappeared. The government and its economic team already have every prerequisite and possibility through its right

of legislative initiative to become the generator of the country's new economic legislation. However, this unfortunately has not yet happened. In reality, the National Assembly adopts laws that are written by individual members of parliament or groups of them. This is something that suggests a lack of government strategy and a clear program in the economic field. The government's team has not proposed a comprehensive program for dealing with the fundamental question of privatization. The two bills dealing with these problems, submitted within a two week period, are alike only in their conciseness; they propose in practice the development of privatization without legal instruction, without any staff preferences, without the intention of establishing social security funds, and without taking into account Bulgaria's reality.

At the end of January the country is still without a budget; nor are there the long-awaited laws on the new tax system, social security, and the separation of the municipal budgets from the state budget. Elementary support was not guaranteed for the country's budding private businesses toward whom we are looking for a revival in production and an alleviation of the unemployment problem. The situation with the country's foreign debts and its mutual relations with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are not clear.

This is the truth and whoever tries to hide it does not honestly consider the interests of Bulgarian democracy and the blue idea [refers to the SDS, the Union of Democratic Forces].

3 Arrested in Holysov for Trying To Sell Semtex

LD0402111192 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 4 Feb 92

[Summary] The criminal police from Domazlice detained three men from Blansko yesterday in Holysov who were trying to sell Semtex 1a. They had almost six kg of the explosives in their car, as well as 210 g of marijuana seeds. The spokesman of the district police directorate in Domazlice says that the three men stole the explosive in Blansko on Friday night. The case is being investigated.

Trade Minister Baksay on Arms Export Rules

AU0402111792 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 1 Feb 92 p 1

[Interview with CSFR Foreign Trade Minister Jozef Baksay by Vlado Gajdosik; place and date not given: "Our Tanks on a German Ship"]

[Text] The report that German naval units have intercepted a German ship in the Mediterranean carrying 16 of our T-72 tanks has perturbed the public.

[Gajdosik] Mr. Minister, this is an ordinary commercial matter....

[Baksay] The tank shipment was officially announced and the sale was carried out by the Slovak Unimpex company. I gave my personal permission for these tanks to be exported in order to assist the conversion process in ZTS [Heavy Machine Tool Enterprises] Martin where there are very grave unemployment problems. As far as the German side's intervention is concerned, the tank shipment was organized by Omnipol via the British firm Meridian Transport. With all probability—at least, according to our information—the German ship that undertook to transport the aforementioned tanks is to blame. Its crew, obviously, circumvented the FRG's domestic regulations. It is apparent from all this that our side did not violate any regulations, either domestic or international, concerning the arms trade.

[Gajdosik] Arms production and exports were "aired" on television this week. Would you like to add something to this?

[Baksay] I would say that the arms trade is proceeding on two levels. First, how can certain kinds of arms—ammunition, pistols, artillery, tanks—leave our country? Second, who may conduct trade in these arms? The first issue is covered by laws that specify precisely to whom and how an export license is issued and who makes this decision. Of course, contrary to what RESPEKT, for example, has claimed, Mr. Glezgo does not make this decision. It is made by an interdepartmental commission whose members come from the State Defense Council, the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Trade Ministry, the Interior Ministry, the Economy Ministry, and the republican economy and industry ministries.

[Gajdosik] How do you classify the countries to which Czechoslovak military technology may be exported, may be exported only with restrictions, or may not be exported at all?

[Baksay] There are three groups of states. States that, for understandable reasons, I cannot name belong to the first group, that is, countries to which arms cannot be exported under any circumstances. This classification is based on UN agreements and our other international obligations. It is an element of state secrecy, but a considerable number of countries are involved here. The so-called regions at risk comprise the second group. This does not involve one or two countries as RESPEKT writes, but involves many countries. The interdepartmental commission makes decisions on arms exports. The third group is made up of countries to which exports are considered on an individual basis, that is, each shipment is considered separately. No across-the-board licensing rules apply here. All licenses must comply with the end user rule, that is, a ban on re-exports. Since the beginning of January every single license has had to contain my signature.

[Gajdosik] Thank you for the interview.

Arms Trade Operates 'Uninhibited by Any Controls'

AU0302102992 Prague RESPEKT in Czech No. 4, 27 Jan-2 Feb 92 pp 5-7

[Ivan Lamper, Vladimir Mlynar article: "Klondike; Czechoslovak Trade in Arms"—passages are published in English]

[Text] A debate on conversion has been under way in Czechoslovakia for two years. President Havel and Foreign Minister Dienstbier keep repeating that we are determined to put an end to arms deliveries to suspicious regimes and areas of conflict. The reality is somewhat different, however. Behind the veil of grand words, the trade continues as before. The only difference is that everything is less restrained because the ideological straitjacket has burst and the trade network, which has been preserved, operates uninhibited by any control.

Yugoslavia: $1.5 Billion

"Dear Sirs,

"We would like to inform you that we have a contract for the delivery of goods to Nigeria. Enclosed you will find a list and the end-user certificate No.129 BL 94126."

This is the opening of a letter that Miroslav Louma, director of the Slovak Unimpex Ltd., sent to Technika Budapest, a Hungarian foreign trade company, on 15 October last year.

"The material specified in the list," the letter continues, "should be gathered at the Budapest *green line zone* from where it could be delivered by air directly to the end user. The merchandise will be brought to Budapest by trucks from the Romanian-Hungarian border. Herewith

we request that you secure for us a transport license from the Hungarian border to the *green line zone* and other requisites."

It is unusual for a Czechoslovak delivery to be shipped to Nigeria via Romania and Budapest. There is a much shorter and logical route—via Hamburg or Frankfurt. Unimpex did, however, have a very good reason to opt for this roundabout way. This is explained, in part, by the list of the supplied "material" itself.

The certificate No. 129 BL 94126 (issued by the Ministry of Defense at Lagos on 21 June 1991) was signed by Major L. Ogando, officer of the General Staff responsible for the Nigerian Army's armament. It is a so-called *end-user* certificate, that is, a paper certifying that the recipient will not lease, lend, sell, or give the merchandise in question to any third party. The list contains 16 items, including:

500,000 AK-74 submachine guns (Kalashnikov)
200,000 pistols, models CZ-75 and CZ-85
200,000 UZI submachine guns
100,000 automatic rifles, model M-16
200,000 hand grenades
10,000 mortars
10,000 anti-tank missiles, etc.

Based on the price list of the private E.M.I. company, a competitor of Unimpex, the bill for the Kalashnikovs alone adds up to $625 million. The whole shipment is worth more than $1.5 billion. Such gigantic deals are usually struck only at times of war. The other circumstances of the contract reveal that a war is, indeed, involved.

Purchase Via Nuremberg

Nigeria is one of the best-known intermediaries in the world arms trade. The civil servants in Lagos are not overly fussy about compliance with the terms of the certificate and are known to be willing, for an appropriate commission, to re-export arms shipments to virtually anyone. It is not even necessary for the merchandise even formally to touch Nigerian soil. This is why the certificate No. 129 BL 94126 contains a highly interesting note: "We also confirm that our exclusive purchaser for this transaction is the A I Trading GmBH company."

A I Trading is based at 19 Aldringenstrasse, Nuremberg, and is not unknown to the representatives of Unimpex. Last spring Mr. Louma offered it "on the basis of a previous exchange of letters" 30,000 submachine guns, model Scorpion ($480 apiece), and 10,000 pistols, model CZ-75 ($350 apiece).

It is hard to imagine that Germany, which is the world's sixth largest arms exporter, needs to reequip its army with Czech submachine guns. The whole shipment is therefore, most likely, intended for a third country. The country of destination is best known to the man who was the recipient of Unimpex's offer on behalf of A I Trading. He is the bearer of a melodious German name: Ivan Alilovic. Apparently, he would also be in a position to explain why hundreds of thousands of submachine guns and grenades "for Nigeria" are being amassed at Budapest, via Romania, so close to the Yugoslav border.

There Is Nothing We Can Do

The Prague office of Unimpex refused to comment on the Lagos contract and the ties with A I Trading. We were merely told that Miroslav Louma is on an extensive tour of duty outside the republic. Stefan Glezgo, director of the KOVOM [stands possibly for Kontrola Vojenskeho Materialu—Military Material Control] department at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, who issues permits for arms exports, is aware of Unimpex's contract with Nigeria. "I know about it but, thus far, no one has submitted to me the request for a license," he says. In his opinion, a transaction of such incredible dimensions is probably just a cover maneuver that is designed to attract the authorities' attention and divert it from a large number of smaller deals with the same partner—the Yugoslav Federal Army. "Of course, we will not permit that contract, but that is not the problem. The problem for us is to be able somehow to punish the people who are planning such deals, including their arrest. If we fail to do that, in a while this country will turn into a Klondike. Regrettably, we are now powerless. We will refuse to rubber stamp the contract but we are not even able to initiate criminal proceedings."

Another high-ranking government official, who does not wish to be named, was even more pessimistic: "I doubt that people who are capable of concluding such a huge deal will be deterred by one missing stamp. They know the ropes and have extensive contacts. Unbelievable sums of money are at stake in this branch of business. We are empty-handed as there is a total legal vacuum. There exists no law that would provide a clear framework for arms exports. What we have is only a hodgepodge of government decrees that are internally inconsistent, override each other, and, most important of all, carry absolutely no weight."

A Single Person Decides

In the past the arms trade used to account for almost eight percent of our annual gross national product. Under the communist government, the export rules were governed by instructions from the party apparatus, which had consulted every decision in Moscow. The sole exporter was the Omnipol foreign trade company, whose director used at the same to be time deputy minister of foreign trade.

In 1990 the situation changed radically. Two export organizations were established in Slovakia—Martimex and Unimpex. After Jozef Baksay took up the post of minister at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade, Unimpex pushed through the well-known delivery of 250 tanks to Syria and quickly became Omnipol's main domestic competitor. At the same time dozens of private

companies were established that deal in arms. Very often, a key role is played in them by former Czechoslovak Army generals as well as people who have been dismissed from Omnipol or the StB [secret service].

For any company to be able to deal in arms, it first needs a permit from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade. These are issued by Stefan Glezgo, chief of the ministry's KOVOM department. This 36-year-old man, formerly head of department at the Rimavska Sobota District National Committee, not only occupies a high-ranking position at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade but he is also a deputy to the Federal Assembly for the Public Against Violence movement and a member of the parliament's Defense and Security Affairs Committee. In other words, executive and control powers are vested in the hands of a single person.

A total of 28 companies in Czechoslovakia, almost 20 of them private, are today in possession of the permit to sell arms. A company that is the holder of a permit from Mr. Glezgo can negotiate, with the manufacturers or with the Army, the procurement of weapons and offer these weapons freely for sale. If it succeeds in concluding a contract and obtains from the recipient of the shipment an *end-user* certificate, it can apply at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade for an export (or, as the case may be, import) license. It is, once again, Mr. Glezgo who decides who will get a license. The background material for his decisions is processed for him by Engineer Fritzl, the pre-November [1989] director of Omnipol. With the license in its pocket, nothing stands in the company's way and it can go ahead and carry out the transaction.

Libya: License for "Tank Experts"

Czechoslovakia's ties with Al-Qadhdhafi's regime have a rich tradition. Under the communist government we exported to Libya a formidable amount of weapons, as well as the ill-famed Semtex explosive (700 kilograms of it), with which this country has been supplying all kinds of terrorist organizations all over the world. Moreover, a number of Czechoslovak companies built in the people's Jamahiriyah turnkey plants, complete with technological equipment. One of them is a facility 80 kilometers south of Tripoli, the construction of which was organized by Omnipol. It bore the working title "TAZ." The contract provided for the construction of buildings and the supply of equipment, including spare parts.

The contract for TAZ, which was signed in the early eighties, diplomatically refers only to a "heavy vehicles repair plant," which, translated into comprehensible language, means a plant for overhauling heavy military equipment. This is also confirmed by Czechoslovak workers who worked at the construction site under Libyan Army's supervision. They all testify in unison that the real purpose of the whole project was clear even then: a factory for overhauling and assembling tanks.

Prague-Tripoli Air Bridge

Even though the Czechoslovak Government clearly declared a change in its policy toward Al-Qadhdhafi's regime (among other things, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade included Libya among countries, to which the export of Czechoslovak arms is banned), on 30 April 1991 Mr. Kaderabek from Omnipol signed another contract. Within the framework of this contract 667 "tank assembly workers" will depart for Libya, whose assignment it will be to finally put the completed TAZ plant into operation. As Stanislav Kozeny, general director of Omnipol, confirmed, his company had no trouble getting the requisite license from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade. Political consultations and the consideration of international risks, issues that were discussed by Vaclav Havel at a news conference only one day prior to the signing of the contract, were evidently bypassed: The government does not know about this contract, not to mention the president.

Aside from this contract involving experts, deliveries of formerly contracted spare parts for TAZ machines continue. The thus far last shipment left our territory last year. As the war in Yugoslavia had blocked the traditional sea route, toward the end of last year the Libyans had sent their own planes here to pick up the remaining part of the shipment. At about the same time the IDOP company, based at Martin [in Central Slovakia], supplied to Libya spare parts for tanks. Even this transaction was carried out quite undisturbed—neither the government nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been informed. The piquant aspect of the whole matter is that to this day Al-Qadhdhafi's regime has not paid the bill for the merchandise already delivered. The reason that the 667 "assembly workers" have not yet departed is similar—Libya has not opened a bank letter of credit. On paper, however, the path for the tank experts remains open and, as soon as the requisite financial guarantees are provided, they will be able to leave to join those Czechoslovak engineers who have been in Libya for a number of years already, ensuring that Czechoslovak simulators for training pilots remain in good shape. Given these facts, it comes as no surprise that the commercial counselor at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Tripoli, Mr. Kurka, was an Omnipol employee of long standing. The same is true of Mr. Krizanovsky, our current commercial counselor in Syria.

Commission

The intolerable situation concerning arms exports was to be resolved by last year's decision of the federal government to establish an interdepartmental commission that comprises representatives of the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and foreign trade, and a member of which is also General Cadek, secretary of the State Defense Council. In theory, this commission is to assess, and decide on, politically contentious contracts. In practice, however, the situation is such that it is Mr. Glezgo who decides what the commission will discuss. It is in Mr. Glezgo's hands that all the applications for the issuance

of a license come together and it is up to him alone whether he considers these applications to be "problematic" or not. The commission does not have the power to decide and can only recommend that no license be issued.

Even though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has at its disposal a list of countries to which the export of arms is politically unacceptable (such as Cuba, Libya, North Korea, China, and Ethiopia) or "not recommended" (Pakistan), it does not have the right of veto in the commission. Moreover, the commission's internal rules of procedure specify that deliveries to countries that are not in areas of conflict are discussed by the commission only if the value of the transaction exceeds $50 million.

One high-ranking state official who deals with the problem of arms exports told us about this: "The present situation is unacceptable. It is inadmissible for exports of special equipment, which is merchandise with a great international impact, to be decided by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade because it views weapons from a purely commercial point of view. Our foreign policy, on the other hand, cannot take into consideration only the economic benefits arising from contracts under preparation. We must think through to the end also the international political implications, which can be more damaging to us than arms deliveries that are not implemented."

Iran: A Consolation

When the Vienna disarmament conference started, the Czechoslovak Army owned 3,315 tanks. The talks resulted in an agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces, known as the Conventional Disarmament Treaty. Under this treaty we undertook to take 1,880 vehicles out of service. Of the total number of tanks taken out of service, we are duty bound to scrap 362 units and are free to sell the remaining 1,518 units. Omnipol attempted this in a contract of October 1990. Iran wanted to purchase 1,500 tanks, plus a production line. This was unacceptable to our government for foreign policy reasons and nothing came of the deal. In the meantime, we have managed to sell only some 200 tanks to Peru.

After the cancellation of the contract, the Iranian side felt deceived and made all civilian deals conditional on the delivery of the promised weapons (Tehran had reportedly promised us orders worth a total of $2 billion). The crisis in mutual relations lasted several months, before it was finally resolved by Minister Baksay's visit to Iran. During the visit, the delegation advanced the offer of a different attractive merchandise: the TAMARA system.

TAMARA, the exact name of which is MCS-90, is a passive radar system capable of identifying all types of aircraft, including the Stealth "invisible bomber." At first sight, the equipment looks like a normal large barrel, which, however, conceals within itself state-of-the-art technology that monitors the electronic equipment on board an aircraft. This system is almost 100 percent effective, even at great distance, and identifies with certainty the type and location of an aircraft. Linked to special equipment, it should, moreover, be capable of homing in on a missile on an aircraft. TAMARA is available in various versions and, depending on the configuration, costs between $14 and $20 million. The whole equipment is a Czechoslovak patent and is manufactured by the Tesla Pardubice company. For the time being, only some former Warsaw Pact countries have TAMARA. A few years ago we sold its less perfect predecessor, the RAMONA system, to Syria.

There is great interest in TAMARA throughout the world. Although it is a defensive system, in a modern war waged with so-called smart weapons it has much greater value than all the 1,500 outdated tanks together. Therefore, it is a very good consolation for Iran. The whole contract is still in the preparatory stages but the responsible authorities are showing no major resistance to it. It will probably go through the interdepartmental commission without problems because it is a defensive and not a deadly weapon. Military experts do, however, have doubts about the project under preparation. One of them commented on the whole matter as follows: "The government should realize what the sale of three TAMARA systems to Iran means. The whole system will be copied and, later on, will get into the hands of other countries. Moreover, MCS-90 is the only weapon we produce in which NATO countries are interested. It would be highly risky to squander their interest by striking a deal with Iran."

Without Law

Until the beginning of this year, the mechanism of permits and licenses described above was backed by law. Since 1 January 1992, however, the existing legislation has been the subject of confusion and diverse interpretation. This has been caused by the adoption of the Commercial Code, which has replaced a number of existing legal provisions and completely liberalized foreign trade. The term "permit" does not even figure in the new Code, not even with regard to the export of special equipment. True, the federal government resolution on rules governing trade in arms, which enshrines the institution of licenses, remains valid but it is of little help because a resolution is a sub-legislative norm and cannot supplant a law.

Stefan Glezgo told us about this: "The requirement to obtain a permit to engage in trade has really faded away at the beginning of this year. However, to actually sell arms the exporter must still obtain a license from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade. The confusion will be eliminated by the planned law on the export of special equipment (the draft has been ready for months but it has run up against power-sharing disputes), which should set precise rules for the issuance of permits and provide for the punishment of 'unauthorized' offers to sell arms and contracts." The lawyer of a company engaged in arms trade claims, however, that a license

from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade is not needed as there exists no law that would lay down this obligation. According to this man, "people who are in this business will scoff at some government resolution."

[At this point in the article there are three charts that provide statistical data on Czechoslovakia's arms trade. The first chart, which gives as its source the 1989 issue of "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers," provides figures on the volume of the Czechoslovak arms trade in the years 1984-88. It shows that in 1984 Czechoslovakia exported $950 million and imported $900 million worth of weapons. The figures for 1985 were $1.5 billion and $900 million respectively; for 1986 $1.3 billion and $1.1 billion; for 1987 $1.2 billion and $925 million; and for 1988 $850 million and $210 million. The second chart, based on a "Report of the CSFR Ministry of Economy, 1991" provides data on the decline of Czechoslovak arms sales between 1989 and 1990. It shows that in 1989 Czechoslovak manufacturers sold 6.802 billion korunas worth of weaponry to domestic customers and exported 12.195 billion korunas worth of weaponry—11.179 billion worth of it to "former socialist countries" and 1.016 billion korunas worth to "other countries." In 1990 they sold 7.2 billion korunas worth of weaponry to domestic customers and exported 7.907 billion korunas worth of weaponry—6.306 billion worth to "former socialist countries" and 1.602 korunas worth to "other countries." The third chart, finally, which is again based on the 1989 issue of "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers," provides data on the major export markets for Czechoslovak-made arms in the years 1984-88. It shows that in this period the USSR purchased $1.9 billion worth of Czechoslovak weaponry; Libya $925 million; Iraq $675 million; Syria $625 million; Algeria $410 million; Cuba $350 million; Poland $290 million; Hungary $130 million; and "other countries" $415 million.]

Pakistan: A Secret Struggle for an Order

Approximately 1,000 people are currently employed on the arms assembly line at the Turciansky Martin Heavy Engineering Works. In a week, they assemble 10 tanks (350 tanks annually). The last order they were supposed to fill was 256 T-72 tanks for Syria. It seems, however, that the termination of the "special production" will not be that simple. It is too profitable a business, and the arms- industry lobby is ardently searching for markets. The Czechoslovak tanks, however, are so antiquated that they can be exported only to the world's hottest areas of conflict. This, of course, leads to political complications. A certain official from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs described it as follows: "If I have a tank, I must think about how to get rid of it. Sales to Libya or Syria represent a problem, and we will not even mention Iran or Iraq. There are only a few countries left, and Pakistan is among them, because it is outside the general interest, and its armament bothers only India." According to this diplomat, Dienstbier's ministry certainly "opposes" any such contracts, but it regularly loses its battles against the businessmen from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade. After all, this was also confirmed during Calfa's recent trip to Pakistan and China.

Of the 36 members of the "trade and industry team" for whom there was room on prime minister's plane approximately 10 were involved in the manufacture or export of special technology. (There was a similar disproportion in the delegation's official accompaniment, although its curiosity is of a different kind: Among the 15 officials, 12 were from the CSFR Government Office and only one expert from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one from the Ministry of the Economy, and one private person—Frantisek Janouch of the Charter 77 Foundation.) The "businessmen's" list includes, in addition to Omnipol General Director S. Kozeny, people like Julius Kostolny (Martimex marketing president—he was struck down by the flu at the last moment and stayed home), Peter Konciar (deputy director of the Dubnica Heavy Engineering Works), Michal Faust Turciansky Martin Heavy Engineering Works marketing president), Stefan Glezgo (arms exports) etc. Engineer Segla, general director of the Turciansky Martin Heavy Engineering Works, unexpectedly joined the delegation. He allegedly joined the tour at the last moment and travelled with the delegation only to Pakistan, where he had several meetings arranged with government officials.

In the three-page report on Calfa's trip submitted to the government, there is not a single word about the participation of the top brass of the Czechoslovak arms industry. Although the document informs ministers about "the revival of links with the world of Islam," "the development of bilateral ties," and the exact output of the power plant Czechoslovakia might build in Pakistan, there is no mention of arms contracts. This is very odd, since, according to confidential reports, in at least one of the countries visited (Pakistan), arms were a subject of the talks. These did not involve, as Stefan Glezgo claims, "only army engineering equipment," but also at least 300 tanks. It is an order that has been in the works since November 1991.

Your Tanks Are Ready

"Regarding the conditions specified by Neil Evans and Gerhard Simon, we confirm that our company, as the only authorized export representative of the Martin Arms Industry Complex, is able to equip the Army of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan with 300 new T-72 tanks through Evair Associates and Simon A.G. Switzerland. We await the relevant order with all the necessary documents from Pakistani authorities enclosed. Sincerely yours—Boris Drzko, marketing president, Unimpex Ltd."

This fax was received by Habid A. Khan, an employee of Sellers International Ltd on 12 November. Four days later, the Pakistani General Staff in Rawalpindi received the following offer:

"Given these conditions, the Evair Associates will supply the following:

"—300 T-72MI combat tanks—new, all systems operational, including all arms which were fired only in testing.

"—Country of origin: Czechoslovakia. The vehicles will be obtained from the warehouse of the state enterprise Martin Heavy Engineering Works through the Unimpex company.

"—All markings and insignia will be removed prior to delivery.

"—A separate contract for a five-year term (with an option for extension) regarding spare-parts service for the purchaser will be arranged by Evair Associates.

"—Payment will be made by an irrevocable divisible [delitelny] letter of credit issued to the Schweizer Kreditanstalt, Zug, Switzerland.

"—All vehicles are available for inspection and should be checked as soon as possible because of possible political reaction to this sale.

"—The price for each T-72MI tank delivered to the port of export is $665,840, the total price is $199,752 million.

"This price also includes the following:

"A—a shipment of 200 T-55M tanks, army surplus, good condition

"B—spare parts for the T-72MI tanks up to 5 percent of the total purchase price

"C—ammunition for T-72 and/or T-55 tanks up to 5 percent of the total purchase price. The purchaser will specify the type.

"Best regards, Richard Neil Evans, president of the Evair Associates."

[At this point in the article the following boxed-in table is carried:]

November 1991 offer by the Bratislava company, E.M.I. Ltd.

grenade RG4 (assault)	approximately $1 (It is exactly the price of one kiwi in New York, ed. note)
grenade F1 (defense)	approximately $3
light machine gun 7.62 mm caliber	approximately $430
armored personnel carriers	
with one 30 mm caliber cannon	
and four rocket launchers	approximately $440,000
T-54, T-55 tanks	approximately $17,000
T-72 tanks with	
anti-nuclear equipment	approximately $700,000
MiG 29 airplanes	approximately $25,000,000
SU 27 airplanes	approximately $33,000,000
masks GP 5 (5 million available)	approximately $25
Tamara MCS 90 (passive radar)	approximately $17,000,000
Scorpion submachine gun	
model 61, 7.65 mm caliber	
at least 40,000 available	
army surplus, practically never used	approximately $380
Scorpion submachine gun, latest model	
equipped with a grenade launcher	
with the breaking-through-walls	
capability—anti-terrorist weapon	approximately $1,200
Kalashnikov submachine gun	
58P model, army surplus	
practically never used	approximately $350
Kalashnikov submachine gun	
AK74 model, anti-terrorist weapon	
12,000 available	approximately $1,250

Omnipol Wants the Deal

On 2 December in Islamabad, Minister Baksay told reporters that the CSFR did not intend to export any military technology or equipment to the Pakistani Republic. It is possible that he was unaware of the Unimpex offer, or—because of the mediator—with a little embellishment, he might have considered these exports as going to Switzerland. Nonetheless, there are some doubts. According to our sources, the state enterprise Omnipol is also trying to get in on the "Pakistani deal." Moreover, the Omnipol proposals were allegedly discussed during Calfa's visit even at government level. Minister Baksay or Stefan Glezgo could hardly have avoided attending these talks. Namely, the Czechoslovak side is not satisfied with the price at which the Unimpex businessmen sell the Martin products. According to an unnamed official, the $665,000 requested for a T-72 tank does not even cover (after the necessary deductions) the production costs. Of course, this does not bother the businessmen—they will get their money anyway—but, because of such contracts, the workers on the arms assembly line at the Martin Heavy Engineering Works work practically for nothing. The state will cover the loss from the "conversion" subsidy funds, and, with no possible advantage, it risks political ridicule. Therefore, the Omnipol offer came on the agenda, for Omnipol allegedly wants to arrange the sale at the price of approximately $950,000 per tank. Of course, whether Omnipol can deliver what it promises is another matter.

China: An Embassy Message

The People's Republic of China is one of the last few states with a totalitarian communist regime. Two years ago, the army massacred peaceful student demonstrators, thousands of political prisoners are in penitentiaries, and the society is controlled by the all-powerful state police. This apparently did not intimidate the Czechoslovak Government delegation that arrived here after the visit to Pakistan. Deputy Prime Minister Pavel Rychetsky did not even mention the fate of the imprisoned Chinese dissidents during the talks with Chinese leaders—allegedly, because no appropriate occasion arose. (see RESPEKT No 50/91)

The specific results of this part of Calfa's visit have not been much publicized. At the end of last year, however, a three-line message came to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Beijing classified as top secret. It said that at a diplomatic reception the Chinese trade minister had praised some unspecified talks on arms shipments from Czechoslovakia.

Stefan Glezgo categorically denies that special technology was discussed during the visit to China. At the same time, however, he admitted that he did not participate in any talks of the arms-industry representatives. "It does not matter," he says, "if there were any offers, I would have known about them." S. Kozeny of Omnipol also claims that he did not discuss arms: "I dealt only with one organization in China, a civil aircraft company. Together with the AERO company director, we discussed the possibility of imports, or joint production of the 19-seat L-410 airplane." Peter Konciar, deputy director of the Dubnica Heavy Engineering Works, describes his Beijing talks in a similar fashion: "I did not discuss arms. In addition to the tank components, our company manufactures, above all, various construction machines. These machines are that what we offered in China."

The unspecific observation by the Chinese minister has not been confirmed from other sources either. According to the participants from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it might have been "a misunderstanding or plain rumors of sensational character." In the light of the arms sale contracts signed by our arms manufacturers last year (Libya, Pakistan, Nigeria), however, one cannot discount this unconfirmed report. People involved in arms sales agree that in the current situation, Czechoslovak arms producers are capable even of such an unacceptable step as a deal with China.

Crooks Have Taken Over

Professionals claim that the arms markets are completely saturated by sales from the former USSR. If the combat tanks are sold east of the Czechoslovak border by weight ($10,000 per tonne), it is a competition we cannot match.

Logically, this fact should help the efforts to achieve a quick conversion, but the pressure from the arms manufacturers is stronger than any logic. Their threats of unemployment and social disaster have achieved their objective. Recently, on the government level, even among the opponents of military exports, such arguments gain prominence as are characterized by a certain Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs official: "We are not in Texas where we could close down a factory and tell people to look for work elsewhere." This is offset by the opinion of his department colleague who says: "We know now that the tanks cannot save our economy. Over the past two years, several billions were invested in the conversion, and now it has been pushed aside. It is the result of successful blackmail by the smart Alecs who continue their wheeling and dealing." According to [Interior] Minister Langos, it is a very dangerous development: "The state has made room for crooks. They are obviously concerned with money, but that is not all. One can feel in the background a great longing for power and political influence."

Thus, the federal government and the president have two options. Either they really check the implementation of their political proclamations—if that is the case, they must immediately issue at least a government decree that would carry the weight of law—or, in the interest of "social peace," they will leave things as they are. If they choose the second alternative, they should speak about it just as openly as they have done so far about the ideals to the contrary.

Diplomatic Ties With Ukraine, Belarus Established

AU0302125592 Prague CSTK in English 1715 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Text] Prague Jan 30 (CSTK)— Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier today signed agreements with his Belarussian counterpart Pyotr Kravchenko and his Ukrainian counterpart Anatoli Zlenko on the establishment of diplomatic ties with Minsk and Kiev.

Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Spokesman Egon Lansky said Czechoslovakia is preparing treaties of friendship and cooperation with the two republics of the former Soviet Union. A treaty with Ukraine could be initialed during a possible visit to Ukraine by Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa at the end of March, Lansky said. Lansky said talks with Belarus at the level of experts are due to take place at the beginning of next month in Prague and that a treaty might be ready for initialing by the end of March.

Russia To Supply 7.5 m Tonnes of Oil in '92

LD0302172692 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] The basic contract for imports of Russian oil to Czechoslovakia in 1992 was signed in Prague by representatives of Chemapol Praha and Soyuznefteks port Moskva companies. It projects oil supplies in the amount of 7.5 million tonnes.

Havel on Domestic Issues, Ties With Hungary

AU0402113192 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 1 Feb 92 pp 1,6

[Interview with CSFR President Vaclav Havel by NEPSZABADSAG Chief Editor Pal Eotvos and Prague correspondent Tibor Kis in Prague, "at the beginning of the week": "We Could Find A Way of Coexistence"]

[Excerpts] Coexistence between Czechs and Slovaks has never been as problematic as it is nowadays. Many people say that the conflicts have become so acute that they even threaten the very existence of the federation. Amid the internal storms, Vaclav Havel seems to be the only reliable point of direction for many Czechs and Slovaks, although some forces—mainly in Slovakia—are trying to undermine his prestige (not without success). However, Vaclav Havel continues to be the most popular personality of the CSFR. Vaclav Havel received Pal Eotvos and Tibor Kis in his study in Prague Castle. [passage omitted]

[NEPSZABADSAG] To an outside observer the current situation in the CSFR seems to be very complicated, so much so that some people even question the continuation of the CSFR as a common state of the Czechs and Slovaks? What basis does this view have? What future do you envisage for the Czech and Slovak coexistence?

[Havel] Of course, I cannot see in the future and there is no complete certainty about the way things will turn out in the future. However, something seems to constantly tell me that we will not fall apart and we will find a way to continue our coexistence, even if we are going to face very bitter moments until then, even more bitter moments than the ones we have already lived through. Every opinion poll shows that most people want to live in a common state, and I do not think it is possible to carry out the separation against the people's will. Moreover, I believe in this country's natural self-defense, namely in the fact that its citizens want to preserve the everyday "order" and this country's "operational mode." It is easy to make declarations about separation, but this would bring an enormous amount of serious problems to both partners, particularly in view of the fact that economic reform is under way today and the economy is a uniform whole. Therefore, separation does not seem to be a plausible scenario for me. I think that our state will continue to exist in some kind of a federation. [passage omitted]

[NEPSZABADSAG] The past two years have brought some disappointment to the Hungarian minority in the CSFR, because they hoped for a rapid improvement of their national minority rights. In their opinion, this hope failed to materialize. On the contrary, a setback occured in some areas, like the legislation on the use of languages in Slovakia. In your opinion, how serious is the national minority issue in the CSFR? What do you regard as opportunities and obstacles to progress?

[Havel] We would like to create a democratic and modern civic society, and it is impossible to achieve this without guaranteeing national minority rights, rights that the everyday customs and "standards" require in a civilized state. This element is an organic part of our program. Just as in everything else, changes are taking place in this area unnecessarily slowly and ineffectively. Some progress has been achieved—like the three Hungarian political organizations representing the interests of the Hungarian minority in Parliament—but the situation is not yet adequate. [passage omitted]

[NEPSZABADSAG] Despite the change in the regime, we have failed to get rid of the elements that have been hindering the development of Czech-Slovak-Hungarian relations for such a long time. The Bos-Nagymaros investment project continues to be an unsolved issue. In your view, what could be done at the high political level to make these close neighbors become closer in the figurative sense of the word?

[Havel] In my opinion, we can only do one thing here, namely to depoliticize the problem you have mentioned and invite top experts from all over the world to get together and decide on the future of this monster.

[NEPSZABADSAG] This is precisely the problem, namely that there have been always people who wanted to depoliticize the issue of the river barrage from the very beginning, but they failed.

[Havel] I noticed that they have failed in this endeavor. [passage omitted]

Vavrousek Discusses Bohunice Plant With Austria

AU0302165992 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 3 Feb 92 p 9

[Michael Lohmeyer report: "Vavrousek: Austria Should Have a Say in Bohunice"]

[Text] Vienna—CSFR Environment Minister Josef Vavrousek has no objections to Austrian authorities having a say regarding the examination of 36 repairs at the Joslovske Bohunice nuclear power plant for their environmental acceptability. This is one of the results of his talks with Environment Minister Ruth Feldgrill-Zankel over the weekend of 1-2 February. Other topics were the controversial Gabcikovo power plant on the Danube, cross border measures, and cooperation in view of the UN conference on the environment and development, which will be held in Rio de Janeiro in June.

Vavrousek told DIE PRESSE that "Bohunice undoubtedly has a cross border threat potential. So it is clear to me that Austria must also have a say regarding safety issues." He said he would meet again with Environment Minister Feldgrill-Zankel within the next few weeks to conclude an agreement where Austria's role in the upcoming examination of environmental acceptability will be defined.

Vavrousek: "Of course, Austrian authorities can have a say in this procedure. Our task now is to define specific details." In any case, the company running this nuclear power plant has time until November of this year to meet the 36 conditions.

"People Already Die of Environmental Pollution"

"Even though I am aware of the dangers inherent in nuclear power, I passionately call upon people not to overassess them. People already die of environmental pollution resulting from the production of carcinogenic vinyl chloride, carcinogenic radon, the 1,600 uranium mines that are no longer used, or the 35 tons of mercury polluting the environment every year." The problem lies in the structure of the economy, which must be reformed, and this will take many years, said Vavrousek.

The minister declined to take a clear position on the disputed Gabcikovo power plant on the Danube. "It is our task now to choose the best of all the bad options. We do not have any other alternative. But we must discuss all possibilities without any preconditions. I am open to all the variants."

It seems that Vavrousek has only a marginal right to bring his influence to bear on the level where the actual decisions are made. On 31 January, the Slovak Government confirmed the decision of last summer that "Variant C"—a power plant without Hungarian participation—will be completed.

The decision of principle was made two weeks before the last round of talks with Hungary took place. So it was not surprising that these talks took place under an unlucky star. "We must get the carriage going again. That requires understanding and the readiness for talks by all sides—by us and by the Hungarians," said Vavrousek. He called upon Austrian experts to act as mediators.

Minister Feldgrill-Zankel will today submit to the Finance Ministry a study on energy saving potentials. This work, which costs 11 million schillings, has not yet been approved by Finance Minister Ferdinand Lacina.

Finally, Feldgrill-Zankel and Vavrousek advocated the idea that the Central and East European countries should cooperate more closely in preparing the UN conference in Rio.

Federal Assembly Asks for Human Rights Report

AU0302125792 Prague CSTK in English 2041 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Text] Prague Jan 30 (CSTK)— The Federal Assembly (parliament) today asked the federal government to add a supplement to its report on the observance of human rights in Czechoslovakia which would take into account international human rights agreements signed by Czechoslovakia.

The federal government is obliged to present a report on the observance of human rights in Czechoslovakia twice a year. Parliament also asked the government to present its guiding policies towards the country's national and ethnic minorities. Parliament is continuing to discuss the final report of a commission entrusted with investigating the events in Prague of November 17, 1989.

Parliament today failed to approve an amendment to the Law on Large Privatization. Deputies for the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) said the amendment was designed to prevent illegal transactions in connection with privatized property.

Secret Information From Screening Commission Leaked

AU0302123192 Prague CSTK in English 0822 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Text] Prague Jan 30 (CSTK)— A TV shot last night confirmed that Deputy Stanislav Devaty had leaked secret information about deputy Jan Kavan from the registers of the former Czechoslovak State Secret Police (StB). The shot, taken by the U.S. Christian Science Monitor television company last December 4, showed Devaty citing from secret StB records about Kavan in the presence of other commission members. Also shown several times was the secret material itself, bearing Kavan's code name "Kato".

Devaty is a member of the parliamentary November 17 commission investigating the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia in late 1989.

In March 1991, Kavan was positively screened by the November 17 commission as having had contacts with the StB in the 1968-1970 period, during his stay in Great Britain. He rejected the accusation and filed a suit against the Czechoslovak Interior Ministry.

Kavan emigrated to Great Britain after the 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. He was active in the student movement and later became the director of the "Palach Press" news agency of Czechoslovak emigrants in London. He returned to Czechoslovakia after the 1989 November revolution.

In reaction to the TV shot, Vladimir Nechanicky of the Czechoslovak Prosecutor General Office confirmed that the documents shown were "certainly secret since they were StB registers." Members of the November 17 commission were bound to consider these documents secret and not to allow their publication. If the current investigation proves that by leaking secret information the offense of threat to state secret was committed, those responsible may face a trial, Nechanicky said.

Chairman of the November 17 commission Jiri Ruml refused to watch the shot, and to communicate with TV reporters in any way. Czechoslovak Interior Minister Jan Langos said last Friday there did not exist any confirmation of Kavan's cooperation with the StB. The spokesman for the November 17 commission, Deputy Petr Toman, told CSTK on Monday that the commission insists on its conclusions concerning Kavan's links to the StB.

Leak Stirs Up Controversy

AU0302123392 Prague CSTK in English 0837 GMT 31 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Prague Jan 31 (CSTK)— [passage omitted] Czech dailies today pay attention to the suspected leak of secret information by Deputy Stanislav Deputy from the Czechoslovak parliamentary commission investigating the events of November 17, 1989, in Prague. The leak was indicated in a TV shot made by the U.S. World Monitor television company last December 4 and shown on Czechoslovak TV Wednesday night.

The daily MLADA FRONTA DNES says the whole matter exposed one fact: "The longer the (former) Secret Police (StB) documents stay secret for an overwhelming majority of society and at the same time accessible to a small privileged part of it, the easier they can become a Trojan horse protecting behind the bulwark of law the unlawfulness and license of an individual."

The independent daily LIDOVE NOVINY envisages attempts to excuse the deeds of members of the November 17 commission and says: "It is important to prove that democracy in Czechoslovakia is strong enough for this case to find the path of law without any political interference in the speed and way of investigation. It is important to prove that law in our country also applies to political prominents," it says.

The daily for Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia CESKY DENIK writes that many deputies believe the whole affair to be a provocation ordered and prepared beforehand. It says that if Jan Kavan (positively screened deputy concerned by the leaked information - ed) is really innocent (as he claims - ed.), he has an excellent opportunity to clear himself by offering to publish his materials (StB documents ed.), best of all by way of a press conference.

Explaining this affair in an interview to MLADA FRONTA DNES, Deputy Petr Toman, the spokesman for the November 17 commission, says: "I want to state it clearly that this is a long-prepared and well-timed action aimed at discrediting the commission." [passage omitted]

Rules on Use of Privatization Coupons Passed

AU0402150992 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 31 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

["jep"-signed report: "Rule 'Ten—Twenty—Forty'"]

[Excerpt] In its session yesterday, the federal government approved an amendment to the government decree on the issue and use of investment coupons, a bill on the stock and securities exchange, a report on the progress of the coupon privatization, and other documents.

According to CSFR Deputy Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, the government decree 383-1991 was subjected to several formal alterations. The important thing is, however, that it introduces a regulation on stock orders through the privatization investment funds [IPF]. The IPF must place their orders so that they include the stock of at least 10 different companies. Furthermore, the amended government decree specifies that the IPF cannot place stock orders that would give them more than a 20-percent interest in in the entire enterprise (i.e., not 20 percent of the shares assigned for the coupon privatization). The third quantitative restriction is a 40-percent limit as the maximum interest in shares of a single issuer (enterprise) to be owned by the IPF started by a single founder (for example, a bank that started several funds concurrently).

The participation of the staff of state bodies in the boards of the IPF has also been limited. In addition, it was defined that the preliminary round is not a part of the actual privatization wave, and it may be started only after the list of all the IPF is published. The preliminary round itself begins on 17 February and, according to the adopted decree, it will be completed when lists of all privatization projects designated for the first wave are known. There was no mention of a specific date. The government will endeavor to keep the average value of property per one coupon book at 30,000 korunas or more. [passage omitted]

Czech Government Meets on Privatization Funds

AU0302145592 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 30 Jan 92 p 2

["(st)"-signed report: "A Complete Offer in the Preliminary Round"]

[Text] At its meeting yesterday, the Czech Government confirmed that it agrees to 17 February as the date on which the preliminary round of coupon privatization will start. It gave this approval on condition that lists of approved privatization projects will be gradually published.

The government is of the opinion that the end of the preliminary round of coupon privatization must not be fixed for a date earlier than two weeks after the last approved privatization project is published. The objective is to ensure that the public is offered an equal chance to select between privatization investment funds and privatization projects of individual enterprises.

Reporters obtained additional information that the government was concerned about the possibility that the preliminary round of coupon privatization, in which only funds would participate, could affect the people's decisions, about which they would feel sorry when privatization projects are published latter on. The discussions of privatization projects are very time consuming. It was originally expected that some 3,000 privatization projects would be put forward in the Czech Republic. However, their number grew to 8,500. According to Czech Government spokesman Vladimir Zelezny, on or about 20 January, ministers in individual sectors were flooded with additional rival projects. Despite the fact that the time for discussing a single project has been cut down to two and a half hours, it is impossible to cope with such a workload.

Tomas Jezek, minister for the administration of national property and its privatization, said at a news conference in the afternoon that, as of yesterday, 40 billion korunas worth of property had been designated for privatization out of the expected 140 billion korunas. The government will work on it until about mid-March.

The government came to the opinion that the funds are not operating in breach of the law. It discussed in detail the laws regulating the funds' activity. It agreed that the extent of operation of a single fund should be limited to ten enterprises, and that one fund should own no more than 20 percent of shares in a single company. In the government's opinion, all the funds belonging to one founder should not own more than 25 percent of a single company (originally 40 percent), which means that they cannot take over more than one fourth of the company's equity. On the board of directors of the funds there will be no officials from central or regional state administration bodies, or officials from the government office. It was also recommended that the federal government draw up a system for supervision of the privatization investment funds before the law on investment funds is passed.

CSTK Becomes TKSR In Slovak Republic

LD3101133792 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Michal Tvarozek and Igor Pokojny report on the 30 January Slovak National Council session in Bratislava]

[Excerpts] The 21st session of the Slovak parliament is continuing in Bratislava for the third day. [passage omitted] A law concerning the Czechoslovak press agency [CSTK] in the Slovak Republic was approved a short while ago. Following the laws on Slovak radio and Slovak television, this law completes the process of changing the mass media into legal subjects with newly drawn rights. The discussion mainly dealt with the agency's title. [passage omitted] Finally the deputies endorsed the title Czechoslovak Press Agency of the Slovak Republic [Ceskoslovenska Tlacova Kancelaria Slovenskej Republiky]. The abbreviation, however, becomes TKSR.

The plenum also endorsed the proposal of deputy Ivan Hudec that from the beginning of 1994 the agency will change its name to the Press Agency of the Slovak Republic of Slovakia [Tlacova Agentura Slovenskej Republiky Slovakia]. [passage omitted]

Slovak Defense Capability Views Outlined

AU3101191192 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 24 Jan 92 p 3

[Peter Svec report: "A Federative State Needs a Federative Army"]

[Text] When drafting the Slovak Republic Constitution it is also necessary to take defense capability, one of the attributes of statehood, into consideration. If the published drafts ignore this factor, it could be because of a lack of information. A seminar entitled "Joint Defense Does Not Mean Unitarian Defense" involving professional soldiers based in Slovakia was held in Poprad on 22 December. Extremely interesting views and suggestions were voiced at the seminar. They could be regarded as a contribution to the discussion on the Slovak Constitution as they were voiced by a considerable number of soldiers based in Slovakia. Readers will certainly be interested in some of the ideas from the seminar.

The majority of soldiers in Slovakia understand that, despite its declared federative nature, the CSFR has an army arrangement befitting a unitarian state. We are the last state in the Eastern bloc to retain the Bolshevist-Stalinist doctrine of an army in a multi-ethnic state. The steps taken by the Czechoslovak Army command arouse suspicion that the issue in our country involves preserving the Brezhnev military doctrine—valid until recently—that proceeds from the principle of curbing the sovereignty of the states of the former Warsaw Pact.

Until recently, the common defense of several nations was rightly dealt with on the coalition principle alone, and the only guarantee of a region's security came from

having a sufficiently deterring military potential. Weaker nations never launch an attack, and a small nation presents no danger of aggression as long as it is not in the tow of superpower interests. The Kosice Government Program [of May 1945] and the defense jurisdiction it guaranteed the national organs may serve as a starting point for constitutional principles in defense capability. This requires the adoption of a pure Slovak constitution with jurisdiction in defense. Subsequently, some jurisdiction may be handed over to a national organ by treaty while preserving constitutional, legal, and other guarantees from possible abuse by the Army. The fundamental philosophy and principles for remodeling the Army may be summed up as follows:

1. It is necessary to find a solution that will eradicate the causes of today's undemocratic situation, that is, a lasting and not provisional or exploitative solution. The fundamental criterion is that the Army will be a dual-republican Army or an Army of two states.

2. The principles for modelling the Army must not proceed from either Czechoslovakism or from Stalinism. Joint defense must not disadvantage the national entities. Single-nation union [spolkove] or federal states, such as the FRG and the United States, cannot serve as a pattern for modelling our army.

3. Defense capability depends more on the structure of defense units and on the self-contained nature of all the different kinds of forces than on numbers. Therefore, the deployment of assault and defense weapons—and their quality—must be the same on the territory of both republics. This would eliminate disputes about discrimination, who pays for whom, and the CSFR's defense capability would improve as a result. The national organs must have a sufficient say in making decisions about the Armed Forces structure.

4. Neither defense capability nor deterrents are guaranteed by plans. Therefore, we must not interest ourselves in plans for the distant future, but in what is happening today and what will happen tomorrow. Plans can be quickly annulled. Trust among nations is based on adequate defense capability, while joint armies controlled by a hegemony have all been misused at least once.

5. Guarantees against the possible misuse of the Army must be ascertained regardless of who wins the elections and regardless of the constitutional and legal arrangement. Therefore, division of jurisdiction between the supranational and national organs, with effective Slovak National Council supervision of the Army, is important.

6. Strategic interest is always a national interest. Joint interest should only be involved if it suits the individual national units. The Danes use NATO to guarantee thier strategic interests in places where they do not have their own resources or where NATO is much more effective. They maintain the right to exercise control and to withdraw from the agreement.

7. A small nation can only have a defensive army where the main doctrinaire military-strategic principle consists of the nation's resolve to defend its sovereignty. In this context, the joint defense policy must not permit weaponry to be concentrated in a small area of one of the republics, as this is an indication of potential mistrust on the part of the neighboring states. Europe's collective security is not endangered by the armies of small states gaining independence, but rather by the instability of unjust multi-ethnic states that are potential focal points of tension and conflicts.

8. To date, mankind recognizes unitarian, coalition, provincial, and interventionist armies. The fundamental principle behind our joint defense must be a dual coalition principle. The CSFR's geographic conditions require this course of action. National armies in fact exist here; the issue merely involves their deployment and ensuring that, because of decision-making outside its organs, Slovakia does not have merely a provincial army (structurally).

9. In principle, each nation finance its defense on its own. The argument that financial overhead increases along with the division of jurisdiction does not stand up at all. There would be fewer centralized federal organs, the command structure would be more flexible, overhead costs would be lower, and—mainly—trust would be greater. In view of CSFR financial regulations and because of the proportionate cost of the Army in Slovakia (much lower), Slovakia is not only defraying the cost of redeployment, but is also financing the Army in the Czech Republic. A nationally administered home guard is the bare minimum that Slovakia can and must demand. National republics in the former USSR were able to form national guards or home guards even though there was a joint Army....

Germany's Genscher Begins Visit to Warsaw

LD0302180292 Berlin ADN in German 1723 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw (ADN)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher arrived in Warsaw on a two-day visit this evening. He is taking up an invitation from his Polish counterpart Krzysztof Skubiszewski, who was at the airport to welcome him. Immediately after arrival Genscher was taken to Belvedere Castle where Lech Walesa was awaiting him for talks. The Polish head of state is expected to pay his first official visit to Germany at the end of March or the beginning of April.

On the program for this evening is a meeting with former Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Chairman of the Democratic Union.

Tomorrow the German foreign minister is to meet Premier Jan Olszewski, Skubiszewski, the leaders of the Sejm and Senate, the parliamentary group of the German minority in the house of deputies and other parliamentarians. The topics are expected to include the intensification of bilateral cooperation, developments in Central and East Europe, cooperation with the EC, and the results of the CSCE foreign ministers' meeting in Prague. Genscher's visit is taking place a short time after the German-Polish treaty on good- neighborliness and the border treaty came into force; the ratification documents were exchanged on 16 January.

Meets With Walesa

LD0302224392 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 2100 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] President Lech Walesa received in the Belvedere Palace today German Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski and Janusz Ziolkowski, secretary of state in the president's office, participated in the meeting. Issues connected with the new political situation that has emerged following the unification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union were the main focus of the discussion.

The president emphasized that Poland's fastest route to Europe leads through Germany. That is why great importance should be attached to the development of mutual contacts at all levels. A situation cannot develop in which after the joint signing of treaties we will not try to shape mutual relations positively. We are not opening ourselves up to destroy later what we are building now, Lech Walesa said.

Minister Genscher also addresses issues connected with the visit of the president of the Polish Republic to Germany in the coming months. The minister stressed that he will be welcomed not only by the president of Germany, by the Chancellor, and by the government but also by the whole united German nation because as Europeans we all share a joint faith. Things cannot go well in the West if they are not going well in the East.

President Lech Walesa stated that the main slogan with which he would like to characterize his visit to Germany is: Business for you, development for us. We have to create conditions so that the difficult road to Europe is traversed peacefully, and that difficulties which appear are solved by mutual dialogue.

Tonight, Hans Detrich Genscher will meet with Tadeusz Mazowiecki, leader of the Democratic Union. Tomorrow, the German guest will participate in plenary talks on broadening mutual relations. He will also be received by the speakers of the Sejm and Senate and by the prime minister.

Meets With Skubiszewski

LD0402092292 Hamburg DPA in German 0801 GMT 4 Feb 92

[Excerpt] Warsaw (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had a meeting in Warsaw on Tuesday, 4 February, with his Polish counterpart Krzysztof Skubiszewski. During his two-day visit to the Polish capital, which began yesterday evening, Genscher wants to get to know the new Polish Government and find out what specific opportunities there are to exploit the treaties between the two countries which recently came into force.

On Monday, Genscher had talks with Polish President Lech Walesa, in particular on the integration of Poland into Europe and the situation on the continent following the unification of Germany and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Further on Skubiszewski Meeting

LD0402132292 Berlin ADN in German 1156 GMT 4 Feb 92

[Excerpts] Warsaw (ADN)—The intensification of German-Polish relations, together with European topics, were at the center of discussions conducted by Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Warsaw on Tuesday. The guest conferred in the morning with his counterpart Krzysztof Skubiszewski, with the presidents of both chambers of the Polish Parliament, Sejm Marshal Wieslaw Chrzanowski and Senate Marshal August Chelkowski, and with the Sejm committee for national minorities. The talks with Skubiszewski were continued over a working lunch at noon. This afternoon Genscher is to meet, among other people, the new head of the Polish Government, Jan Olszewski, the first Western foreign minister to do so. [passage omitted]

The two foreign ministers discussed, among other things, cooperation on border areas and the expansion of border crossings and traffic routes between the two countries as well as regional cooperation in the Baltic area. The Poles expressed their interest in more German investment. Skubiszewski thanked the Germans for their assistance on the question of Poland's EC association, while Genscher reiterated his support for Warsaw's efforts to gain

full membership in the EC. Poland could also become a bridge for closer links between the its eastern neighbors and the EC, he said.

The Federal foreign minister will return to Bonn late on Tuesday evening.

Russian Forces To Pay for Food, Energy

LD0302184792 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Excerpts] The Russians will pay for supplies of food and electricity to their military units stationed on Polish territory, Adam Glapinski, minister of foreign economic cooperation, told the Wiadomosci program on his return from Moscow. [passage omitted]

[Begin Glapinski recording] Here too, I received unambiguous assurances and declarations that are contained in the protocol of the visit, that the sums owed will be paid immediately, and that they will be regulated. So, on my part, I could say that we will not cut off these supplies, because it was my basic position that if they did not start to pay what they owed us, we would cut off the supplies of electricity and food to their military units. [end recording]

Treaty With CSFR Criticized on Minority Issue

LD0302230792 Warsaw PAP in English 2127 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 3—Representatives of the Polish minority in the Czecho-Slovak northern border region Monday [3 February] called on President Lech Walesa to receive their delegation before the Polish-Czecho-Slovak Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Solidarity and Friendly Cooperation is finally ratified.

Stanislaw Gawlik, chairman of the Executive Council of the Coexistentia political movement and Wladyslaw Niedoba, deputy to the Federal Assembly of the Czech Republic told a press conference in Warsaw that the treaty signed by President Walesa last October "failed to take into due account the rights of Poles living in the Zaolzie region and did not guarantee the full realization of their rights as a nationality."

Among the shortcomings of the treaty, the participants in the conference pointed to the lack of clauses about Polish schools, bi-lingual geographical names in the region, and the restoration of once confiscated Polish public property.

There are over 44,000 Poles living in the region of Zaolzie that was a subject of dispute between Poland and Czechoslovakia already after the First World War. The Coexistentia movement representing the interests of national minorities in Bohemia and Slovakia won 17,000 votes in the recent local elections.

The delegation of Polish minority was received by Sejm speaker Wieslaw Chrzanowski and Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Kostarczyk.

New PAP President Named, Future Plans Viewed

LD0302230492 Warsaw PAP in English 2044 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 3—The prime minister Monday recalled Ignacy Rutkiewicz from the post of the president of the Polish press agency PAP and appointed Krzysztof Czabanski to the post.

Krzysztof Czabanski, 44, a journalist and graduate of the Political Science Institute at Warsaw University, cooperated with cultural weeklies KULTURA and LITERATURA in the 1970s, and in 1981 he worked for the TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC weekly.

After the imposition of martial law in December 1981, he was involved in publishing underground papers, among them TYGODNIK WOJENNY (WARTIME WEEKLY), and in the years 1989-1990 he worked again for TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC. He was editor-in-chief of the EXPRESS WIECZORNY evening daily till the summer of 1991. Married with two children.

While assuming his new post, Czabanski announced the introduction of far-reaching structural changes and a transformation of PAP from a government agency into "a normal state agency." "So far the activities of PAP have been based on a 1983 law which made it into a kind of a mini-ministry of propaganda. This is obviously a relic of the past," Czabanski said.

According to Czabanski, the only good solution for PAP would be to transform it into a treasury owned company that would sell part of its shares, but less than 49 per cent so that the agency could keep its status of a state institution. "The trouble is, however, that there is no important home capital, while the sale of a state agency to a foreign partner seems rather improper," Czabanski added.

Asked about the relations between the agency and the government, Czabanski came in favour of replacing the present law with a new one that would define the scope of the political influence of the parliament, the government and the president. "A state press agency must have an official character to some extent, but it also has to be independent," he declared and said that in his view its status should be similar to that of the public television.

The new president comes to PAP with a team of non-party advisers that worked with him during his years as an editor, and says that a possible personnel reshuffle would be a consequence of deep structural changes.

National Trade Union Accord Ready for Talks

LD0302163992 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1400 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] The National Trade Union Accord [OPZZ] Presidium has expressed its readiness to begin immediate talks with the government on compensation for recent price increases in energy and gas. At the same time, the OPZZ Presidium expressed the conviction that assumptions of a government social and economic program should be presented as soon as possible in order to start talks between the government and trade unions on a budget prepared by the government. It was emphasized that matters concerning industry should be resolved urgently.

PSL Urges Sejm To Concentrate on Economics

LD0402120992 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] In a letter addressed to Sejm Speaker Wieslaw Chrzanowski, the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] parliamentary floor group leader Waldemar Pawlak has made a request that immediate meetings of the Sejm be exclusively devoted to economic issues. In the letter, the group expresses concern over too much time and attention being devoted by the Sejm to discussing historical-political issues, while many urgent economic issues await resolution. According to the PSL parliamentary floor group, it does not serve the consolidation of public confidence in the Sejm and distances us from issues in the center of public attention, above all the introduction of fundamental changes to economic strategy.

Poll on Popularity of Past, Present Leaders

LD0302234392 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 2139 GMT 30 Jan 92

[No video available]

[Text] A poll carried out by the Sopot public opinion research center for GAZETA WYBORCZA has produced surprising results. People were asked who of the six political leaders, Edward Gierek, Wojciech Jaruzelski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Jan Olszewski or Lech Walesa led the country best. Nearly half of those polled did not choose any of the politicians as close to their idea on how to lead the country. The most popular choice was Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who gained the acceptance of over 13 percent, mostly representatives of the intelligentsia. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki got over 10 percent, mostly from young people. Wojciech Jaruzelski received over nine percent, mostly from women and farmers, and President Lech Walesa has over eight percent of supporters, mostly from small towns and countryside. Edward Gierek was chosen by nearly seven percent, and Premier Jan Olszewski by over five percent.

The fact that the last place goes to Premier Jan Olszewski, according to the GAZETA WYBORCZA commentator, may be caused by the fact that he has only been in power for a short period and his style of leading the country is not quite known yet. In reply to other questions, nearly half of those polled considered the present premier as an outstanding politician.

Importance of Romanian-Hungarian Agreement Viewed

AU0302183992 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 30 Jan 92 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "A Step Forward To Overcome the Psychological Barriers Between Romania and Hungary?"]

[Text] Talks on the draft of the basic agreement between Romania and Hungary were held in Budapest on 28 and 29 January 1992. The talks were held in a positive and professional climate of tranquility and cooperation that showed a mutual political willingness.

The negotiations on the level of experts held in Budapest inaugurate an important process within the context of relations between Romania and Hungary. It is an important and difficult process, if we take into consideration some of the positions of the two sides. In this respect, a brief retrospection would be useful. The Romanian draft treaty was handed over to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 11 May 1991. The draft Hungarian agreement was handed over to the Romanian side on 15 November 1991. While in the Hungarian draft agreement there is no reference made to borders, the relevant text in the Romanian draft specifies the following: ..."The two states declare that they do not have any territorial claims toward one another and they will not have such claims in the future either." This text is similar to clauses referring to the observance of existing borders that can be found, as a matter of fact, in agreements between other European countries as well.

The positions regarding the need and the usefulness of the agreement differ. Recently, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, who was talking about the agreement in an interview, said he considered it an important factor of a positive nature, but that Romania attaches an exaggerated importance to it. In accordance with his statement, the Hungarian experience proves that good relations of cooperation can exist between the two countries on the basis of the international law and of European principles and documents, also without a basic agreement.

The Romanian side considers that the agreement will create the foundation for relations between the two countries in various areas and, at the same time, that it will offer the necessary means to overcome the psychological barriers that exist in relations between Romania and Hungary.

In spite of these differences, the talks at the level of experts open up a process of major importance in Romanian-Hungarian relations by displaying a mutual political willingness.

Nastase on 'Concrete Issues' Discussed With Moldova

AU0302220092 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 29 Jan 92 p 8

[Interview with Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase by Ruxandra Silvian; place and date not given: "I Am an Optimist by Nature"]

[Text] As usual, the agenda of the Romanian minister of foreign affairs is very rich. Therefore, we asked Mr. Adrian Nastase for a "lightening" interview on Romania's latest diplomatic initiatives, which he kindly agreed to grant us.

[Silvian] Mr. Minister, how do you assess the political significance of the recent summit in Ungheni [between Romanian President Ion Iliescu and Moldovan President Mircea Snegur on 25 January 1992]?

[Nastase] Relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova are of extraordinary political and sentimental significance. Therefore, dreams, expectations, and hopes develop around them, as well as many failures and frustrations. All this creates a most complicated environment, which, in my opinion, can only be dealt with step by step, in a coherent way. That is why I believe that the Ungheni visit was a very good opportunity to emphasize the relationship between the tactical and strategic dimensions of these ties. On the other hand, I do not believe in shouting slogans, but rather in gradual steps that pave the way for the next stage. Therefore, I would say that the essential aspect of the meeting was the fact that talks were held on concluding a treaty of brotherhood, creating a free trade area, improving and easing border crossings, setting up cultural centers, settling the framework of activity of the respective embassies in Bucharest and Chisinau [Kishinev], and developing ways and means to promote Moldova's interests at the international diplomatic level. One can say that we discussed many concrete issues.

[Silvian] Since your Lebanese counterpart [Foreign Minister Faris Buwayz] is currently in Bucharest, what is your opinion about the future of Romanian-Lebanese relations?

[Nastase] Our foreign policy must strive to identify areas outside Europe that are interesting for us from a political and economic viewpoint. In my opinion, Lebanon is part of such an interesting zone. Why? Because Lebanon was an extraordinarily rich country, which was destroyed by 15 years of conflict and which is currently starting a recovery program with the help of the more than 10 million Lebanese, some of them very rich people living abroad. Therefore, Lebanon can be a fantastically attractive market for us, offering special opportunities for selling products made in our country, such as equipment, machine tools, and so forth. Therefore, I believe that the Lebanese dignitary's visit can have very important results, particularly for some of our economic enterprises, provided that they can make efficient use of this opportunity.

[Silvian] With what hopes are you going to the World Economic Forum scheduled to take place at the end of the month in Davos, Switzerland?

[Nastase] This is more of a tour, which will last for a whole week. I will go first to Prague, for the CSCE ministerial meeting. From there, I will go to Davos for one day as guest of one of the debates of this great international meeting, which will be attended by more than 1,000-1,500 prominent political and economic figures. Afterward, I will spend another day in Istanbul, where the foreign ministers of several countries are going to initial a statement on economic cooperation in the Black Sea. From there, I will leave for a two-day visit to Spain to participate in the proceedings of the joint Romanian-Spanish commission.

[Silvian] Apropos Davos... in view of the fact that the Romanian economy is in a difficult state and the support of the West is pretty modest, are you optimistic about Romania's chances of arousing the interest of investors?

[Nastase] I am quite optimistic, but that does not make our difficulties any less harsh. The Davos meeting, which will also be attended by President Ion Iliescu, will be a very good opportunity to discuss the needs of the Romanian economy and to arouse the interest of investors in a market that I consider to be one of the most interesting ones in Eastern Europe in the medium term.

[Silvian] Thank you.

Moldovan Popular Front Leader To Run in Elections

OW0102003192 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1613 GMT 31 Jan 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The newspaper "Free Romania" opposing Romanian President Iliescu reported Friday that leader of the Moldovan Popular Front Mircea Druk intends to put forward his candidacy for general elections in Romania to be held in May. The newspaper did not specify for what post Druk would run. Presidential and parliamentary elections will be held simultaneously in Romania. Observers suggest that Druk has gained popularity among the Romanian population thanks to his persistent struggle for Moldova's incorporation into Romania. The only condition for his participation in the elections is Romanian citizenship.

Vatra Romaneasca Favors Reunification With Moldova

AU0302130192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1235 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 3/2/1992—On Saturday and Sunday Lugoj Municipality in Timis County hosted the national conference of the Steering Committee of the Vatra Romaneasca Union. The participants—heads of county branches of the union, a large number of guests—debated inter alia aspects concerning the stage of the relations with the Romanians abroad, the implication in the local elections, the way in which the union's activity is seen by the press. Also present was Prof. Josif Constantin Dragan, honorary president of the Vatra Romaneasca Union.

A communique adopted at the end of the proceedings specifies the necessity of stopping the application of the privatisation law which is considered as unpopular, ambiguous and risky for the national wealth and it proposes its reformulation by the new parliament. To maintain the Romanian characteristic of the communities abroad the Vatra Romaneasca Union proposes the stimulation of cultural relations and the cultivation of the mother tongue by the training in Romania of pupils and students, by organising post-university courses for the teaching staff. The communique also shows the contribution that could be made by the Romanian Orthodox Church to the strengthening of Romanian communities.

It expresses the worry over the current disintegration of the Romanian political forces into about 200 parties which prejudices the national unity. In such conditions the Vatra Romaneasca Union suggests its members and partisans to orient their electoral preferences towards those parties supporting the nation's fundamental interests as they are formulated in the union's programme.

In Vatra Romaneasca's opinion Bessarabia's return to the motherland is a complex, objective and necessary process which should be neither hurried nor delayed. The Romanians on both banks of the Prut are called to join their efforts in fulfilling this act of historic justice, the communique reads in conclusion.

National Union Council Calls For Reunification

AU3101185792 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 25-26 Jan 92 p 1

["National Union Council Proclamation" issued at the National Convention of the Council in Iasi on 24 January]

[Text] One of the ideals for which the Romanian nation has fought throughout its millennia of history was to achieve its national and statal unity. The aspirations to unity have continued to be present in the entire economic, political, and cultural life of our nation, and stemmed from the uninterrupted cohabitation on the same territory and from the many-sided and uninterrupted ties that have existed throughout centuries in all Romanian regions, and from the awareness of the unity of origin, nation, language, habits, and the Christian faith.

The creation of the national unitary state in 1918 crowned a process with deep roots, that has found its supreme expression in the union of the three Romanian states in 1600 by Mihai the Brave and in the creation of the modern Romanian state in 1859.

The rendering into two parts of the Romanian national state in 1940 by the implementation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact caused great suffering for the Romanian people. The elimination of the consequences of this act of violence against Romania's sovereignty and territorial integrity can be achieved only by fulfilling the wish of the whole Romanian people to achieve unity and national independence.

Gathered in this convention, on this holy day of the union anniversary, the National Unity Council addresses to the entire Romanian nation the following proclamation:

On the basis of the people's right to self-determination and national unity,

Understanding the need of re-establishing the Romanian National State within its natural borders of 1 December 1918, recognized by international treaties,

Being aware of the opportuneness of the favorable historical moment to eliminate the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and of the Soviet aggression against Romania—as a result of which Bessarabia, North Bukovina, and Herta District were removed from the country's body—acts that brought about the exodus of over 800,000 Romanians and the extermination and mass deportation of the Romanians who remained under the Soviet occupation, the systematic destruction of the national being, of the Christian belief, and of the nationality awareness, and the settlement of allogenic population in the annexed territories was aimed at dissolving and achieving a total assimilation of the ethnic Romanian element, that has always been masters of those territories,

Knowing the harmful effects of the colonialist policy over the resources and the economy of those regions, that resulted in Bessarabia and North Bukovina remaining in a permanent state of underdevelopment, reducing them to the condition of sources for raw material—a situation that generated an average standard of living under the poverty line,

We believe that the Romanian nation has the holy duty before God and the people to eliminate the historic injustice that has been committed and through the act of national will to reunite Romania within its natural borders. Only such a decision assumed by every Romanian being in complete solidarity through overcoming any type of internal differences and the inferiority complex in relations with neighboring countries can bring the day of the homeland's reunification closer. Only in this way can we avoid the disastrous effects on the economy and quality of life, but also the danger of a military conflict with the anti-national forces in those territories.

The dissolution of the Soviet state provokes the dangerous tendency of restoring the same imperial structure, under another guise, forcing us to adopt a similar decision as in 1918, that is to immediately remove the occupied Romanian territories from the influence of Eastern neighbors and returning Romania within its legitimate borders.

Each Romanian should find a place in the unification movement.

Today, 130 years since the first parliamentary meeting of the United Principalities held in Bucharest on 24 January 1862, history reunites us in a meeting of the Romanian parliamentarians from Bucharest and Chisinau [Kishinev], a meeting supported by the unification forces from all Romanian territories aimed at accomplishing what the evils of a century stopped us from accomplishing.

We do not celebrate the death of an empire, but the rebirth of a nation, because this century has demonstrated once again that God makes history with the people through the agency of nations and not empires.

We will apply the biblical dictum, Do onto others as you would have them do unto you, to our co-inhabitants of other nationalities.

We are convinced that by accomplishing the wish to reunite Romania in accordance with the norms of international law, our country will become a stabilizing factor in this area of Europe.

So help us God!

Iasi, 24 January 1992

Republican Party Leader Addresses Election Rally

AU0102180692 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1717 GMT 1 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 1/2/1992—We are at the bottom of the precipice, Professor Ion Minzatu, chairman of the Republican Party told an election rally in the southern city of Alexandria. On Romania's current social and political crisis he said: "The Roman government has pursued a devaluation of national assets. The potential of agriculture was lowered intentionally, on request from the European Community. Romania stands the best chances for a swift recovery, ahead of other East European countries because it has resources."

Showing that the Republican Party is a centrist political faction with a social liberal doctrine which relies on the strength of argument, Mr. Minzatu announced that lesser political factions would be absorbed into his party. The first will be the Independent Democratic Party with a membership largely made [up] of education and research workers, he said.

Opposition Urged To Spur Campaign Against FSN

AU0402111192 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 30 Jan 92 p 1

[Romulus Brincoveanu article: "Hidden (Electoral) Meanings"]

[Text] Although there are only a few days left before the local elections, the election campaign is far from being filled with the political fervor we expected. On the contrary, the few posters here and there in some towns and the gossip about the names on the candidate lists in small towns have not succeeded in cheering up the atmosphere. This is the situation despite the fact that in addition to this, certain gentlemen mumble or recite promises on television—sometimes timidly and sometimes in a quarrelsome manner—many of the promises being similar to the old communist pledges. One could even say that the local elections have become a matter of routine, a play that politicians—since they have assumed this role—must play in order to receive the appropriate applause.

It is obvious that most of the parties and coalitions participating in the elections have only now started to organize their election strategy. This becomes clear from listening to the subjects discussed, which are a mixture of promises to ensure warm water and do something about the garbage piling up around apartment blocks and the issue of the need to destroy communist structures; and all this is mixed up with the situation of daily price increases. Not even the political assessment accepted by everyone as valid, that is, that victory in the 9 February elections will ensure certain victory in the next parliamentary elections, seems to have induced the political parties even at the last hour to organize their political platforms better.

There is the same old pottering about with pretentious expressions...when winning the local elections could ensure not only advantages in the parliamentary and presidential elections but also an immediate change in the course of our political life. Furthermore, these elections should be regarded not simply as a means—though certainly an important one—of gaining political power, but as an end in itself, on which the democratization of Romanian society ultimately depends.

However, a victory for the National Salvation Front [FSN] would lead to a massive regrouping of conservative forces both within and around this political group; just like the principle that one doesn't change a winning time, even if it does not perform brilliantly, following an election victory of the FSN, the outcome of the Iliescu-Roman conflict would be delayed and why not? It might even peter out by itself, to the benefit of the vested interests that the two defend, something that would have unforeseeable consequences for the democratic reconstruction of our country. On the other hand, a failure would most probably lead to the loss of power by the FSN, even before the parliamentary elections, subsequently accelerating the Iliescu-Roman divorce and making it irreversible.

The FSN has realized the danger. The fact that the parliament has not voted the law on financing the election campaign is proof of it. The interpretation that this is an action of those faithful to the president against the group that supports Roman is only one of many interpretations. The aforementioned group and—together with it—the entire Front are in charge of the entire administration and as long as the newspaper AZI becomes more and more colorful with every passing day we are justified in believing that they have enough financial resources. On the other hand the democratic opposition and, above all, the Democratic Convention lack the means for a sustained campaign, a situation that well suits the Front's defensive political situation.

The FSN does not have anything else to promise and, if it does so nevertheless, people have great difficulty believing it. That is the core of its great interest in having a boring election campaign that does not broach the great problems of society and conveys to the electorate the feeling that the whole thing is a struggle to capitalize on one's position in the administration, or, better said, to divide up the pie. This is the effect, for example, of the countless number of independents that have joined the large number of parties in these elections. The multiplication of alternatives might give the voters the idea that in fact no serious alternative to the Front exists. This seems also to be the sense of the Front's strategy during this election campaign: to make it appear that the electorate does not have any real alternative and that the misfortune that has befallen the people as a result of its policy in inevitable and unsolvable. There is much hope in the electorate's tendency to vote for those already in power and in the inertia of those who, one year ago, believed that the leaders of the opposition were distributing blue jeans and dollars in University Square and today believe that all are parties are the same, that everybody is lying, and that nothing will change anyway.

Therefore, an invigoration of the election campaign of the Democratic Convention and of the entire democratic opposition—even under the current financial conditions and with all the difficulties—is even more desirable. Otherwise, one more chance will be wasted and it cannot be excluded that many of those who have not yet given up the belief that it is still possible for things to change will swell the ranks of those who are only interested in immediate benefits.

Pro-Bessarabia Council Issues Election Appeal

AU0302220192 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 28 Jan 92 p 1

["Appeal to the Opposition Parties in Romania by the Pro-Bessarabia and Bukovina Romanian National Council" issued in Bucharest on 25 January]

[Text] The "Pro-Bessarabia and Bukovina" World Association has been struggling for 18 years for the reunification of the Romanian nation within its natural borders.

Unfortunately, after the December 1989 events, our struggle for recovering the territories seized by Moscow did not have any support from the central authorities in Bucharest.

Thus, after two years of neocommunist rule, once again we have arrived at the conclusion that only the opposition political formations are able to free Romania from the apathy of communism.

Therefore, it is necessary now more than ever to achieve what is called unity within the framework of diversity in view of the coming local and parliamentary elections in Romania.

We are convinced that only a united opposition will be able to restore—in the coming elections—the Romanian people's credibility of former days.

The "Pro-Bessarabia and Bukovina" association calls upon the Romanian electorate everywhere to rally their ranks around the opposition with the aim of returning Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Herta area to their motherland—Romania.

Bucharest, 25 January 1992

Candidates Warned Against Destabilizing Army

AU0202181892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1637 GMT 2 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 2/2/1992—In order to allow for the right to vote to be exercised, the Army staff gave orders that the ongoing electoral campaign be held in military units, military education institutions, command headquarters, at all levels of the Army structure, reads a communique of the Ministry of National Defence, sent to ROMPRES to be released.

All candidates, irrespective of their party were offered the opportunity to meet the military. The parties participating in the elections were given access to posting boards. Most electoral actions were carried out in normal conditions.

Unfortunately, in places (Mangalia, Lugoj) some of the candidates, disregarding the principles of the equal distance of the Army from political parties, and proving even lack of good sense, made disparaging remarks on the leaders of the country, the heads of the Ministry of National Defence, the Army itself. When that happened, the participants showed their disapproval by walking out of the hall.

Such actions are clearly intended at weakening the command unity, the order and discipline of the military, the combat capacity of the Army.

We feel the need to tell the candidates that the present electoral campaign within the ranks of the Army must not be a cause for destabilisation, for weakening the unity of the Army. Such actions, with minor political ends in view, aren't and will not be well received by the military. They can only compromise the political parties the respective candidates represent.

International

EC Lifts Sanctions; Serbia Excluded

LD0302192592 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1830 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Brussels, February 3 (TANJUG)—The European Community's foreign ministers adopted concrete measures in Brussels today, exempting the Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro from sanctions introduced against Yugoslavia on November 8, 1991.

This leaves Serbia as the only Yugoslav republic to which the sanctions still apply. It is being indicated that the matter could be discussed at a new, informal meeting of EC foreign ministers in Lisbon on February 17, depending on the outcome of the latest strains in political relations between Serbian leaders over the deployment of the Blue Helmets.

Today's decision exempting Croatia from the sanctions, need not b[illegible] final. It has been learned from sources close to certain delegations that dissatisfaction has been expressed because of intimation by some officials in Zagreb that Croatia will not observe conditions regarding minorities, even though it agreed to do so before it was recognized as an independent state.

CSCE Delegate Maksic Sees Patience Waning

LD0102183192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1751 GMT 31 Jan 92

[Text] Prague, Jan 31 (TANJUG)—Milivoj Maksic, the head of the Yugoslav delegation to the CSCE ministerial meeting in Prague, said today that the meeting supported a peaceful and, what is even more important, comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. Maksic told TANJUG after returning from Prague that the ministers had invited all sides in Yugoslavia, "without specifically mentioning any one", to respect international law, and supported the United Nations peace initiative and the resumption of the Yugoslavia Conference.

Maksic recalled that during the preparatory stage of the meeting, "some countries" attempted to remove the name of Yugoslavia from the documents. "I think that the ceasefire, which is holding, the forthcoming deployment of Blue Helmets and indications of a positive turn towards a democratic settlement of the Yugoslav crisis have resulted in the prevalence of a somewhat more conciliatory tone regarding the Yugoslav crisis", he said.

However, Maksic went on to say, there is a powerful impression that "time is short" for the Yugoslavs to themselves find "honourable and just" solutions which would be endorsed by the Yugoslavia Conference. "If we do not take adequate decisions about ourselves and our future, we will face a risk of having our fate decided by others", said Maksic.

NATO Parliamentary Delegation Arrives

LD0202230692 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2218 GMT 2 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 2 (TANJUG)—A ten-member delegation of the under-committee for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a committee for civilian questions of the NATO parliament, arrived Sunday evening in Belgrade as part of a four-day visit to Yugoslavia.

The delegation, headed by Javier Ruperez will on Monday meet with the top representatives of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, the State Presidency, the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs and the Federal Secretariat for National Defence. The talks will focus on issues of national minorities and ethnic groups, i.e. national and ethnic problems in Europe. After its visit to Yugoslavia, the delegation will make its customary report which is not published but is distributed to interested parliaments of the NATO treaty for internal use.

Interrepublic

Babic States Reasons for Peace Plan Refusal

LD0302200792 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1657 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, 3 Feb (TANJUG)—In connection with last night's acceptance of the UN peace plan, President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Dr Milan Babic stated at a press conference in the international press center in Belgrade today that "the three-day session of the Presidency of the remnants of Yugoslavia consisted of threats and pressures to accept by will or by force Cyrus Vance's peace plan; the Presidency threatened it would stage a a military coup, and Serbia threatened it would impose a total blockade on Krajina."

According to Babic, Krajina Assembly President Mile Paspalj was not authorized to sign an agreement on the plan. It is only the president of the Republic who has the right to do that. "Given the fact that after 40 hours of uninterrupted participation in the Presidency's work, I had to have some rest, Paspalj's position was abused, and I learned about his signature from the television. Since then I have neither seen him nor heard from him, but I would like to stress that his task was only to convey to the SFRY Presidency Krajina's demands, which should be included in Vance's plan," Babic said.

"Our demands are: There should not be any political, geopolitical, or state connections between the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Croatia. Then, the Territorial Defense of Krajina should not be disarmed and Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] units should not withdraw before the crisis has been settled. The peacekeeping forces should be deployed along the contact line between the Croatian aggressor army and the Serbian Territorial Defense," Babic said.

To illustrate the atmosphere at the session, Babic stressed that Krajina representatives were under constant pressure outside and in the hall, coming from the Federal Executive Council representatives, the JNA, representatives of the Republic of Serbia, and leaders of the Serb people from Bosnia-Hercegovina.

"The Presidency planned to initiate a military coup in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, through an order that should have been adopted today," Babic, said adding that the Serbian prime minister threatened Serbia would impose a total blockade of Krajina.

Babic emphasized that the people of Krajina have never entirely rejected Cyrus Vance's plan. We are for a peaceful and just solution by political means. Vance's plan, however, does not offer a lasting peace. This can only be guaranteed by a complete demilitarization of the Yugoslav area, beginning with the Croatian armed forces, Babic said.

The UN guarantees offered to us are not sufficient unless they also apply to a political solution, Babic said, emphasizing that for the people of Krajina "the UN guarantees carry greater weight than the guarantees from the Presidency of a country which is disintegrating."

Replying to journalists' questions, he stated that "the moves of the so-called Presidency of so-called Yugoslavia are encouraging Franjo Tudjman. A political solution of the relations between Krajina and Croatia, however, can be only be achieved by direct contacts between the representatives of the two sides. I am ready to negotiate with the president of Croatia, above all about the borders, and the sooner the better," Babic emphasized.

Asked "whether he has the support of the local army authorities in Knin," Babic replied: "I have the support of the people in Krajina, and the army in Knin is the people. The number of people from Krajina who are in the armed forces and their patriotic attitude represent the best defense against any military surprise," he said, adding that he does not believe that the people in Serbia will allow an economic blockade of the Republic of Krajina.

Answering other questions, Babic said that he has had no contacts with Slobodan Milosevic, except for the letters which they recently exchanged.

The Serbian people of Bosnia-Hercegovina are with us and my impression is that the participants in the last session of the Yugoslav Presidency from Bosnia-Hercegovina are closer to the Serbian authorities than to the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Babic said.

"If the Presidency wishes to continue to represent Yugoslavia, it must adopt a provision under which the Republic of Serbian Krajina is part of Yugoslavia, while the Krajina representative must, as an equal member, participate in the future work of the country's Presidency," Babic emphasized.

Milan Babic also demanded the publication of the minutes of the session of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, because in his opinion it should not have been held behind closed doors.

Says Krajina Ministers 'Threatened'

AU0302211092 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Branka Mihajlovic report]

[Excerpts] At a news conference held in the Belgrade International Press Center, Dr. Milan Babic said that nobody authorized Mile Paspalj to sign and adopt Vance's plan, which means that his signature is worthless. Moreover, Babic said that for 40 hours, members of the Krajina Government were exposed to threats and police maltreatment [policijska tortura]. He said that these virtually amounted to threats of a military coup in Krajina and even a complete economic blockade, which was announced by the Serbian premier. Babic illustrated the atmosphere with the claim that [General] Blagoje Adzic [chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army] physically threatened the minister for religions of the Serbian Krajina. In reply to the question of whose support he enjoys, Babic said the following:

[Begin Babic recording] In Knin I enjoy the support of the people and in Knin the people are the army. I do not doubt the patriotism of the majority of the officers and soldiers who are now in the Yugoslav People's Army, and particularly in the units of the Territorial Defense. The majority, that is, almost all soldiers on the territory of Serbian Krajina and, as you said, of Banja Luka, are people from these very regions. I do not think they would participate in repression against themselves. [end recording]

Milan Babic reiterated his demands for changes in Vance's plan, saying that the leadership of Serbia, of the Army, and of Croatia have long since decided Krajina's destiny, that is, a solution unfavorable to the Serbian people. [passage omitted]

In reply to the question of whether he feels physically threatened, Babic said that he is not afraid, although he received threats from the very top leadership of the Belgrade authorities.

Finally, Babic demanded that the shorthand notes of the expanded SFRY Presidency session be published.

Hopes for 'Lasting Peace'

LD0302162292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1458 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 3 (TANJUG)—The aim of the policy of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and its leadership, particularly of Slobodan Milosevic, is the establishment of lasting peace in these parts, Serbian Prime Minister Radoman Bozovic said in an interview carried by the Belgrade daily POLITIKA EKSPRES today.

Bozovic underscored that "this should be a framework for the continuation of political talks on settling all controversial questions," and also that "the dialogue must be based on the single wish of the entire Serbian people."

The Serbian prime minister expressed "firm conviction" that "the engagement of the United Nations in calming the enflamed situation in Yugoslavia will prevent all partiality and injustice and that the case of the European Community (E.C.) will not be repeated, which under German pressure, negated every logic of international law and urged solutions which were directly to the detriment of the Serbian people."

"I think the policy of the leadership of the Serbian Krajinas should not view the peace plan with so much suspicion. If it fails to manifest greater cooperation, the leadership of the Serbian Krajinas risks to thwart a peaceful settlement of our crisis," the Serbian prime minister set out.

The president of the assembly of the republic of Serb Krajina last night gave his consent that he accepts the "Blue Helmets", during an enlarged session of the Yugoslav Presidency and in the absence of the president of Krajina, Milan Babic, who continues to maintain his stand that Vance's plan is unacceptable.

The republic of Serb Krajina was proclaimed by Serbs in Croatia in municipalities where they are a majority population, opposing the secessionist moves of the Croatian authorities and protecting themselves from genocide.

"The Serbian people in the Krajinas will not stand alone since Serbian fighters, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the territorial defence forces will not withdraw from the crisis regions until all conditions for the implementation of the U.N. peace plan are ensured," Bozovic said.

Jovic Says Babic's Behavior 'Uncivilized'

AU0302160692 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] The meager statement from the three-day session of the expanded SFRY Presidency does not explain all the circumstances regarding the adoption of the UN peace plan. This plan, which guarantees peace and, for the first time in history, creates conditions for the just settlement of the ethnic question of the Serbian people in Croatia, was endorsed by all participants in the meeting except for Milan Babic [president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina]. In a conversation with Belgrade Radio and Television journalists today, Dr. Borisav Jovic, member of the SFRY Presidency, spoke in more detail about many particulars regarding the session.

[Begin Jovic recording] We are talking here about a united stand at a meeting that lasted 50 hours and was attended by all representatives of the federation, the government, the Presidency, and the Yugoslav People's Army, including the commanders of all corps from area and military districts. The meeting was also attended by representatives of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro, as well as the two Krajinas. Absolutely everyone had exactly the same stand the entire time.

In a totally democratic atmosphere, without pressure and without coercion, total unity of interests was demonstrated for the survival of the country and this plan. Any possible rejection of it would mean a victory for those forces that want to destroy Yugoslavia and do not agree with the people who represent these nations, and who for 50 hours expressed the same view against one single man who did not agree with this and to whom it was very clearly said that we will adopt this plan and carry it out, either with or without him. This was made perfectly clear. The state cannot be sacrificed because of one person.

He was told this not by one person, but everyone. He behaved, without letup, in an uncivilized and arrogant way. He was late. He arrived five hours late on the first day for a meeting at which 50 people were waiting for him. On the second day, he was three hours late for a meeting at which 50 people were waiting for him. He left the meeting before we had finished, and so on and so forth.

He did not consider anything that was said and did not help anything. This only means that to all intents and purposes he did not respond to anything. He only kept quiet, listened, and coldly said that he would never accept this because it was not in the interest of the Serbian people.

It was as if all of us who were sitting there did not understand these interests at all, and as if we were all thought to have gone crazy and that he was exclusively responsible for the interests of the Serbian people.

We put to him various hypotheses. We told him, allow us this, we have all decided to adopt this plan but you go ahead and make a statement that (?you) stick to your stands, but you will respect the decisions of the state and that you will not clash but cooperate with them normally. You will then have saved yourself. If something bad happens, then it would be seen that you were right. You cannot be against the whole world and the whole state. We allow you to nicely write in the statement that you do not agree with this and that, but that you will respect the decisions of the state and you will not challenge them on the ground. We cannot bring the United Nations to the field only to be shot in the back.

He did not even want this. We asked him whether he respected the decisions of the SFRY Presidency. He said that he was not getting involved with the powers of the SFRY Presidency. Therefore, he thinks that the Krajina is under his command and that the Army is under his command and not under ours.

It suits him, therefore, to recognize us while we are sending young men to die for him and while we are sending huge amounts of food to feed the Krajina people, because they do not have anything to eat, and while we are sending ammunition and weapons, and so on, and while we are sending money so that everyone there who is fighting in the Army gets paid. However, he does not recognize us if we have to establish peace and sign a peace treaty. He does not recognize us. He does not know that people who will not fight and who want peace can stop all this. [end recording]

Kostic Considers Babic 'Irresponsible'

AU0302170492 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Interview with Branko Kostic, vice president of the SFRY Presidency, by Dragan Stavljanin on 3 February; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Stavljanin] Mile Paspalj, president of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, signed—accepted—Cyrus Vance's plan. President Milan Babic, and the [Krajina] Government are rejecting the plan. What now? What is the practical significance of signing, that is to say, rejecting it?

[Kostic] First of all, I think the nation and the organs of the Republic of Serbian Krajina should decide about this. However, this should be done on the basis of complete information and not on the basis of ad hoc gatherings and meetings or incomplete information, because this could have catastrophic consequences in this crisis area.

Bearing in mind that there is a danger of war, that we are practically in a state of war, that this region is the zone of combat activities, and so on, we could apply other legal measures that are available to us. However, we believe that this is not the right way and that this is the last measure we would resort to. By giving objective information to all Krajina citizens, we must ensure that the Krajina residents themselves realize and accept that Cyrus Vance's plan is a necessary option and that a rejection of this plan means war, which would drag us all into the abyss, all of us—the nation of Krajina and other nations that [word indistinct] on the side of the nation of Krajina.

[Stavljanin] What you have just said indirectly refutes the claims by the Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina that the SFRY Presidency wants to introduce a sort of military rule there?

[Kostic] Not at all. If we had intended to do this, we could have arrested the government and Mr. Babic here in Belgrade. We believe that this should not be done. We believe that his behavior has proven to be extremely irresponsible and not in the interest of the nation. However, if this proves to be indispensable, and if Mr. Babic does not demonstrate a sufficient degree of cooperativeness with the SFRY Presidency, which is the Supreme Command, then, I think, in the extreme case we will be in a position to thoroughly inform all Krajina residents as well as the whole nation and the public. [sentence as heard]

[Stavljanin] You said that the nation should decide about this, but does the fact that you informed the UN Security Council, that is, the UN secretary general, that Cyrus Vance's plan has been accepted, not imply that Serbian Krajina also accepted this plan?

[Kostic] Well, the very fact that the president of the Assembly [of Serbian Krajina] accepted the plan, that a great number of the communal presidents support the plan, that a certain number of the communal presidents, who have a positive attitude toward the plan, were neither informed nor invited to the session, and that some ministers in the government who bear the greatest responsibility for the implementation of this plan—for instance, the defense minister and minister of internal affairs—were also neither informed of, nor invited to attend, the session [not further specified], all this suggests that if the citizens were more completely and objectively informed, the nation and the citizens of Serbian Krajina would most certainly realize that everything that is in the interest of the citizens and the nation in eastern and western Slavonia, of the residents of Serbia and Montengro, and the Serbian nation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, is also in their interest.

So far, the situation was such this nation was given unselfish support and aid. But this nation had safe backing, primarily in Serbia, in the Serbian nation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and so forth. The rejection of Cyrus Vance's plan would most certainly mean the continuation of the war, which also means the possibility of war spreading to Bosnia-Hercegovina. All the benefits that the Serbian nation enjoyed there would suddenly disappear.

Therefore, a peaceful solution and Cyrus Vance's plan offer the opportunity and the possibility, if the peacekeeping troops are deployed, for the Serbian nation to enjoy all its liberties and have its own authority and own police on its territory until a suitable political solution is found. Whether we will be seeking the political solution for five months, five years, or 15 years—this is difficult to foresee right now.

Babic's Refusal 'Means War'

AU0402124092 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Branka Mihajlovic report]

[Text] Dr. Branko Kostic, vice president of the SFRY Presidency, explained in great detail the proceedings of the talks. He accused Dr. Milan Babic [president of the Republic of Krajina] of leaving the [SFRY Presidency] session and taking away the representatives of Serbian Krajina.

Kostic told reporters that [Mile] Paspalj [president of the Serbian Krajina Assembly] came on his own initiative and offered his signature, after—as Paspalj informed the SFRY Presidency—holding consultations with the communal presidents.

Kostic then said that Babic's demand to change Cyrus Vance's plan practically means the rejection of the plan and that there is no justification for the demand to return to political topics, because Vance's plan does not prejudice the solution on the Krajinas' status. [sentence as heard]

Kostic rebuffed claims about the possibility of a military coup in Krajina. He explained that a decree on ways of organizing life in the territories where the Army is present is being drafted.

He explained that nobody had physically threatened anybody else at the session, as Babic claimed, and that [acting Federal Defense Secretary] Blagoje Adzic apologized to all present for his nervous behavior.

Kostic said it is now crucial that the people in Krajina are properly informed and told that Vance's plan does not mean a betrayal of the Krajinas.

[Begin Kostic recording] If the people of Krajina nevertheless accept Mr. Babic's option, this means opting for war. This is absolutely certain. It would mean that the people of Krajina are willing neither to share its future with the rest of Yugoslavia nor adhere to its federal bodies. This is only my personal interpretation. It would practically mean a cancellation of participation in the work of the federal organs and non-adherence to decrees issued by the federal organs, including the SFRY Presidency, which is the Supreme Command, just like [Croatian President] Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Kucman [Kostic corrects himself] Mr. Kucan [president of Slovene Presidency] did. This would practically mean an act of secession of this territory. I find it difficult to believe that this could happen.... [end recording]

When asked whether Babic's claim that he is backed by the command and the Army in the field is true, Kostic replied that this is not correct and that the information supplied by the generals in these regions is different.

Kostic deemed today's appeals by Radio Knin to attend the meeting of support to Milan Babic fatal. Branko Kostic announced that the Krajina Assembly and the local authorities would also take a stand regarding the Vance plan. If need be, the Assemblies of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and of all Krajinas, will also take a stand on Vance's plan.

Babic's option means war, Kostic said, and concerns all those who had risen up in defense of the Krajinas. The Presidency will make a decision on publishing a part of the shorthand notes from the session and the film footage, Dr. Branko Kostic said.

Slovene, Croatian Trade Accord Under Way

LD0302230692 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] The Main Committee of the [Slovenia] Liberal Party has issued a statement for the public, which says that the Slovene Government and the department headed by Deputy Premier Andrej Ocvirk are secretly preparing a customs and trade agreement between Slovenia and Croatia, as well as with Bosnia-Hercegovina and others, although the state parliament has not discussed even the theses of such negotiations.

The statement also says that the agreement is introducing a customs union with Croatia, thus preventing any independent regulation of the flow of trade. The Main Committee of the Liberal Party says that we could only start thinking about a free customs zone or a customs union once Croatia controls its territory and its economy is at the same level as Slovenia's. According to the said agreement, the difference in the mutual payment demands, which favors Slovenia, would be transformed into a three-year loan to Croatia. This would be the first time that the Slovene state would finance another country, the statement of the Main Committee of the Liberal Party says in conclusion.

Croatian-Slovene Relations 'Complicated'

LD0102131692 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1200 GMT 1 Feb 92

[Text] Zagreb, February 1 (TANJUG)—Relations between the secessionist Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia which at one time thought of uniting, are becoming complicated. A debate is being conducted via the Croatian and Slovenian press, with the Ljubljana-based daily DELO bringing an article entitled "Cold Neighbourhood," while the Zagreb daily VJESNIK asks "How Far Apart are Zagreb and Ljubljana."

Reasons for the growing number of misunderstandings should be sought in economic relations, even though political ones are not far behind.

Dust is also being raised over the Krsko nuclear power plant, which the two republics built jointly. Croatia has sharply condemned Slovenia for calling a referendum on the closing down of Krsko. Croatia's Assistant Energy Minister Roman Nota has said that in the event of Krsko being closed down, Slovenia will have to pay Croatia half the value of the nuclear power plant, including compensation for loss of electrical energy.

The press is also suspicious over Austria's role in the Krsko affair. Namely, there are staunch advocates for the closing down of Krsko in Austria. The press writes that the Austrian ecological fund has earmarked 45 million schillings in aid for the restructuring of Slovenia's power system.

Seperation between these two republics is another sensitive political issue. When border crossings were set up,

many citizens complained over the behaviour of the Slovenian state authorities. This was particularly the case in the Istrian border areas.

Apart from these facts, which are not being swept under the carpet, the Croatian press has of late started bringing articles blunting the edge of quarrels and problems, and describing the matter as a "media-created chill in relations."

Obviously, Slovenia and Croatia are entering a new phase, which according to biased estimates, will not be rosy and which will witness a confrontation of concrete interests. It seems that economic interests are tipping the balance and that a time of squared accounts, notwithstanding political closeness or differences is coming.

Gligorijevic on Serbian-Croatian Conflict

92BA0427A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18-19 Jan 92 p VII

[Interview with Dr. Branislav Gligorijevic, scientific adviser in the Institute for Contemporary History, by Momcilo Pavlovic; place and date not given: "The Interests of a Fragmented Intelligence"]

[Excerpts] [Pavlovic] Yugoslavia is disintegrating tragically and definitively. Over the more than 70 years of its existence, models and forms of the state and of society have not been found that could make of it a peaceful, modern, and effective state. What, on the basis of your knowledge, is involved here, and why were both the first and second Yugoslavia mainly unstable and noncohesive states? Why in the end did they fall apart so quickly?

[Gligorijevic] I can answer you as a historian that neither in our country nor elsewhere has any serious work been published which did not foresee a future for Yugoslavia. The first Yugoslavia did not fall apart as a bourgeois society, it was partitioned during the war by means of external aggression. The second, communist, Yugoslavia, is falling apart before our eyes in peacetime, mainly because of ethnic contradictions from within. That means that with the disintegration of the socialist system the state is also disintegrating (not only in our country, but also in the USSR, for example). That class unity which the Communists incorporated into the new state in the form of certain links broke down long ago. [passage omitted]

[Pavlovic] The essence of Yugoslavia lies in Serbo-Croatian relations. What is your comment on those two peoples, which are so close, which aside from religion are divided and separated by little else, yet they are unable to find a common language and build the solid framework of a state for their life together?

[Gligorijevic] The essence of the dispute between the Serbs and Croats is that the former want a joint state, and the latter aspire to creation of an altogether separate national state. The Serbs want that joint state in order to protect the Serbs outside Serbia, above all, those in Croatia; the Croats, on the other hand, would like to eliminate those Serbs as a "disruptive" factor through assimilation or emigration and in that way realize their millennial dream of a Croatian state. It is evident from that that the key to resolving that dispute is precisely a solution concerning the status of the Serbs in Croatia.

A Difference Only in Weapons

[Pavlovic] What was the status of the Serbs before the war in Croatia, and wasn't this issue raised through the creation of the Croatian Banovina?

[Gligorijevic] The position of the Serbs in Croatia was protected right up until creation of the Croatian Banovina in 1939. An entire movement of Serbs from Knin Krajina, Lika, Banija, and Srem rose up as a reaction to that act, and in that movement they tried through petitions and resolutions to have their territories attached to the remainder of Yugoslavia. I can quote for you one such declaration of the Serbs from the Croatian Banovina in which one passage reads like this: "We do not accept, and we never will accept a governmental arrangement in which the Serbs in any part of the state would be separated from the Serbs in Serbia. In all ages, we have remained solely with Serbia as a nationality and with respect to the state."

We also learn from archive sources how general that movement of Serbs in Croatia was in 1939. Thus, a resolution signed by 4,587 heads of households from 23 opstinas in Knin Krajina called for separation of those areas from the Croatian Banovina and "annexation to the Vrbas Banovina, that is, to Serbia." The resolution of the Serbs from the Vukovar region, signed by the presidents of the church parishes in Vukovar, Borovo, Gabos, Trpinja, Markusica, Vera, Negoslavica, Bobota, Pacetina, Brsadin, Miklosljev-Sotin, and Palaca also called for separation from the Croatian Banovina and "annexation to the Danube Banovina, that is, Serbia." There was also an initiative from the Serbian people in the Bosnian Krajina, that is, the Vrbas Banovina. The declaration of the Serbs in the Vrbas Banovina expressed a demand for the Serbs in that region "to govern themselves, relying directly on Belgrade without any mediation through Zagreb and Sarajevo." That was the beginning of the idea of creating the new region "Krajina" which would include the Serbs from Croatia and western Bosnia.

When it comes to the Serbs in Croatia and western Bosnia, I would also call attention to the phenomenon of their degree of self-organization and military preparedness. We read in a report from the district chief in Banja Luka how at the news of a massacre of distinguished Serbs between 15,000 and 20,000 Serbs gathered in just one night on the territory of the Novska Srez between Dobrljin and Kostajnica. All those people immediately organized into military columns: In the front ranks were the grenade-throwers, in the second ranks were fighters with modern firearms, behind them came the ones with hunting rifles and revolvers, then came the fighters with

cold steel, and finally the medical detachment and the column with food consisting of the elderly and the women. In front of them all were the cavalry detachments divided into small patrol units.

[Pavlovic] History is repeating itself in the most tragic way. What is to be done for us to extricate ourselves once and for all from that circle and begin a life of the nationality, the state, and personal life without repeating the misfortunes of our predecessors?

[Gligorijevic] All of that is repeating itself today with the difference that the Serbs in Croatia are seeking that right to live in Yugoslavia with arms in their hands. It is difficult at this point to seek any fair solutions when history is putting such pressure on our minds. If the tardy creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 (instead of being created in the 19th century) is the main reason for the aspirations to create separate national states on our soil, then it can be said that the creation of those national states on the threshold of the 21st century is also an anachronism. The spirit of our times ought to be democracy and tolerance. And that is what offers hope that the separate national interests, which are now so preoccupied with dreams about creating sovereign states, can be reconciled.

Serbian-Slovene Talks 'Beginning To Thaw'

92BA0433C Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 23 Jan 92 p 1

[Article including interview with Deputy Prime Minister Andrej Ocvirk by Ivanka Mihelcic; place and date not given: "The Beginning of a 'Thaw' in Relations"—first paragraph is DNEVNIK introduction]

[Text] Dr. Andrej Ocvirk on the Serbian offer for talks with Slovenia on a settlement of accounts: "A solution to the problems within the former Yugoslavia is crucial for regulating our relations with the world."

Ljubljana, 23 Jan—"I have been convinced the whole time that the dispute with Serbia that arose in Cankar House at the time of the strike by the Stari Trg miners could not be a permanent one, and that a solution had to be reached after all the urgent messages and talks with the Serbian government. I consider the initiative the day before yesterday from the Serbian government, and in part from Serbian political circles as well, that they are prepared to negotiate with us, to be an official signal indicating that things are nevertheless beginning to 'thaw.'"

That was how Slovene Deputy Prime Minister Andrej Ocvirk commented yesterday on the Serbian government's initiative to start talks on a settlement of accounts with Slovenia, adding, furthermore, that this is likewise a crucial matter for regulating our relations with the world. "All the world financial organizations with which we have spoken to date, in fact, have made cooperation conditional upon our settlement of the debts, the accounts, and thus our relations. They all expect us to do these things ourselves, and not have them regulated by others, at the Hague Conference. If the Serbian initiative is essentially aimed at regulating our relations, then I think that this is real progress, which will be to everyone's satisfaction."

[Mihelcic] Do you view this initiative more as a political one or an economic one?

[Ocvirk] It is essentially a political initiative, which will yield results in the economic area.

[Mihelcic] Will the fulfillment of this initiative essentially mean the legalization of economic flows between Slovenia and Serbia, which have never been completely interrupted?

[Ocvirk] Certainly, we have to legalize economic flows, since both the Serbian and the Slovene economies are advocating this. An initiative was actually made by Slovenia some time ago, but a blockade occurred at the government level. They insisted that first of all it was necessary to establish a political platform, and only then talk about the economy. The situation is different now.

Federal

Government Accuses Croatia of 'Genocide'

LD3101172292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1147 GMT 31 Jan 92

["Text" of memorandum issued by the Yugoslav Government to the United Nations and other international organizations "on genocide in Croatia"; issued 31 January]

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 31 Jan (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government believes there are sufficient elements for the United Nations and other international organizations to identify and qualify as genocide acts being committed by the Croatian government. We are therefore proposing that the United Nations become involved in establishing the real truth about the genocide being committed and should condemn it in the appropriate manner—this is stressed in a memorandum issued by the Yugoslav Government on genocide in Croatia and on the desecration of the Jasenovac memorial area (Nazi concentration camp in Croatia during World War II).

The memorandum was sent today via the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs to UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali; the chairman of the UN Security Council and all representatives of the UN Security Council member countries; the UN Secretary General's special envoy Cyrus Vance; the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Joao Pinheiro, president of the EC Council of Ministers; Lord Carrington, the chairman of the conference on Yugoslavia; the ambassadors of the United States, Russia, China, France, Great Britain, Spain, Greece, and Portugal accredited in Yugoslavia; the chairman of the CSCE; and others.

The text of the memorandum reads:

Aware of the heightened responsibility and concern for the further development of events, not only in Yugoslavia, we are informing the United Nations; international organizations, institutions and associations; eminent scientists, cultural and public workers; champions of peace and democracy; genuine fighters for human rights and freedoms; and the world public, that Croatian government bodies and their paramilitary and outlaw armed formations have, in the course of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, for the second time in half a century, committed genocide against the Serbian people in Croatia and other serious criminal acts.

In addition to the physical liquidation of members of, above all, the Serbian nation, the population is being moved out of Croatia, through terror and on the order of the Croatian authorities, with the aim of creating an ethnically pure region. The material and cultural wealth and assets of the Serbian population, their cultural and historical monuments, religious buildings, national, and cultural institutions are being destroyed. The Serbian nation in Croatia has gone from being a constitutive nation to being proclaimed a national minority, deprived of its rights and degraded, which is the basis of the conflict in Croatia and Yugoslavia.

The facts cited in Annex I, II, and III of this memorandum, which are examples of the flagrant violation of international law, also are characteristic of crimes of genocide in accordance with international law, on the basis of a convention of the UN General Assembly of 1948. This convention defines the crime of genocide as: the intention to destroy completely or partially any national, ethnic, racial, or religious group; the murder of members of the group; serious violations of the physical and psychological integrity of members of the group; and the intentional subjecting of the group to inhumane living conditions. According to this, as well as other international norms, the crime of genocide does not diminish with the passage of time, regardless of whether it was committed in war or in peace.

We also point out that the Jasenovac memorial complex that encompasses the area of the former Ustasha (concentration) camp on both sides of the Sava River for approximately 50 km, in the framework of which the Memorial Museum and a series of monuments with symbolic memorials etched with flowers carved in stone is located, also has been desecrated.

The desecration of the Jasenovac memorial complex and the destruction of the cultural and religious heritage of Serbs in Croatia is a gross violation of the convention on the protection of cultural heritage in the event of armed conflicts adopted at The Hague on 14 May 1954, and the Supplementary Protocol of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and Protocol II of 1977 according to which: It is forbidden to carry out any hostile acts directed against historical monuments, works of art, or temples that represent the cultural and spiritual heritage of a nation or use them in support of military actions. This is something that the Croatian armed forces have done on a massive scale.

1. Proceeding from these facts, the Yugoslav Government believes that there are sufficient grounds for the identification and qualification by the United Nations and other international organizations of the genocide committed by the Croatian authorities. We therefore propose that the United Nations become involved in efforts to establish the real truth about the genocide committed and see that it receives the condemnation it deserves.

2. The policy of genocide against the Serbs in Croatia is a flagrant violation of basic human rights and liberties. We therefore rightly expect that the appropriate UN commissions should examine threats to human rights and liberties, as well as the status of the Serbian and other nations and national minorities in the Republic of Croatia.

3. We believe that the United Nations and its specialized organizations (UNESCO, etc.) will condemn the behavior of the Croatian authorities vis-a-vis historic, cultural, and religious buildings and take measures for their protection, especially with regard to the Jasenovac memorial complex. We propose that UNESCO, in keeping with the 1972 convention on the protection of world natural and cultural heritage, should set up a commission that would be acquainted directly with the extent of damage and desecration done to the Jasenovac memorial complex.

4. We also believe that it is necessary that the participants, as well as the signs and symbols, of the antifascist struggle in Croatia be placed under the protection of appropriate international organizations and associations.

5. Federal bodies in Yugoslavia, for their part, are taking necessary measures so that criminal, moral, and political sanctions be imposed against the policy of genocide and that its victims be protected. Yugoslavia, as one of the founders of the United Nations, expects help and support in this matter from all of the world's democratic public.

6. We appeal to international institutions, organizations, and associations, as well as prominent individuals, to acquaint themselves with quotes from this memorandum and annexes I, II, and III, and do everything in their power so that the truth is established objectively, the genocide condemned, the consequences alleviated, and measures taken so that such crimes are never repeated anywhere.

Annex I

1. Repetition of physical, cultural, and spiritual genocide against the Serbian population of Croatia

A crime, which according to all the decrees of international law has the nature of genocide, is again being

committed against the Serbian population of the Republic of Croatia. We will mention only a few facts to substantiate these claims:

—At the beginning of November 1991, the authorities and armed units of the Croatian army evicted over 25,000 old people, women, and children of Serbian nationality from the western Slavonian region (Psunj, Papuk and Bilogora). This insane act was preceded by a decree of the so-called crisis headquarters of the Croatian authority in Slavonska Pozega, issued on 29 October 1991, to evict 24 Serbian villages within 48 hours (Annex 2). On this occasion, 17 Serbian villages were destroyed completely and burned. Almost 10,000 inhabitants from that area then took refuge in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

—A large sabotage and terrorist group, which massacred nine people, was infiltrated into the area of the village of Torjanci, in Baranja.

—On 16 December 1991, in the western Slavonia region (Novo Selo-Dragovic-Kusonje front), three Croatian crop dusters, adapted for war action, bombed a column of Serbian refugees from the Psunj and Papuk region. Civilians were killed and dozens were wounded.

—In the village of Divos, near Osijek, Croatian combatants in retreat killed 24 inhabitants of Serbian nationality, six of whom were massacred. They cut off Milenko Banjanin's three fingers with an axe, and cracked his head in half with an iron wedge. A stake for burning captured members of the Army and the territorial defense also was found in the village.

—On 16 December 1991, in the town of Petrinja, members of the Croatian paramilitary formations set fire to 70-year-old Ankica Konjuh, a former prisoner at Jasenovac (concentration) camp, on her doorstep.

—The arrest and subsequent liquidation of numerous Serbian citizens was carried out in Vukovar, Gospic, Daruvar, Ogulin, Pakracka Poljana, Zadar, Zagreb, and other towns.

—In Vukovar, members of the so-called National Guard and Ustasha formations worked systematically on the expulsion and annihilation of the Serbian and other non-Croatian population. There are statements on this by the expelled citizens and families of those killed, the admission of Croatian authorities in Vukovar, and other evidence (Annex III). After the liberation of Vukovar on 18 November 1991, numerous mass graves of killed and massacred civilians—including the bodies of five children under the age of seven, who had had their throats cut or who had been shot at close range—were found. A complete uncovering of the crimes of genocide and other serious criminal acts committed in Vukovar and in other settlements of Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem is under way.

—On 16 and 17 October 1991, dozens of Serbs were taken forcibly from Gospic, and over the following days dozens of other members of this nationality, including a large number of elderly and children, were taken away from their workplaces or disappeared. At the end of December and at the beginning of January, the corpses of 24 disappeared Serbs, who were killed in the most cruel way—by shots in the back of the head or in the back or by having their throats cut and in other ways, something confirmed by forensic experts—were discovered in the village of Siroka Kula and in the vicinity of Perusic.

—The Croatian authorities in Daruvar, on the eve of the new year, arrested 83 prominent representatives of the Serbian nation—intellectuals, public and educational workers, directors, etc.

—In Karlovac on 21 September 1991, having first been shot in the legs, 13 members of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) had their throats cut and were then brutally murdered [as received], and this was after they had surrendered to members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia.

—Among the 20 Orthodox priests arrested on 30 October 1991 was Bishop Lukijan of Slavonia.

Pressure is being exerted on the Serbian population in Croatia to move to other parts of Yugoslavia. According to information from the Yugoslav Red Cross, more than 250,000 citizens of Serbian nationality have been registered as refugees. According to the latest information, a large number of citizens of Serbian nationality have left Zagreb under duress. Serbs are not only losing public positions, but also their jobs. So far, some 120,000 Serbs in Croatia have been dismissed from their jobs because of their national affiliation. Some 600 of their shops have been shelled, destroyed, or damaged, and several thousand of their apartments, weekend cottages, and other buildings have been destroyed after previously being pillaged. In just one day in Zadar, 90 small businesses owned by Serbs were looted and shelled. Under a special war-time decree of Croatian President Tudjman, the police are able to enter apartments without warrants or permits, thereby allowing the callous robbery, arrest, and detention of citizens without legal basis.

According to information from the institute for the protection of cultural monuments, as of the end of October 1991 in Croatia, "71 Orthodox churches had been destroyed or damaged seriously," 27 of them in the eparchy of Slavonia, 18 in the eparchy of Zagreb and Ljubljana, 14 in the eparchy of Srem, six in the eparchy of Gornji Karlovac, and six in the eparchy of Dalmatia.

On 28 September, paramilitary formations of the Croatian army destroyed the Baroque residential seat of the eparchy of Pakrac, built in 1732, and burned down the Pakrac seminary. The iconostasis and numerous icons in the cathedral church and the eparchy library, with its 5,500 volumes and 120 books of inestimable cultural and historical value, were burned. Among the

books destroyed were 50 that dated from the 18th century. A unique copy of a (?book of scripture) [sabornik] printed in Venice in 1536 to 1538 was destroyed. The church of St. Paraskeva in Kukunjevac dating from 1782 also was destroyed.

The crimes against civilian Serbs in Croatia also continued after 3 January 1992; that is, after the 15th cease-fire and the cessation of large-scale military conflicts. On the basis of details collected in the Municipalities of Slavonska Pozega, Podravska Slatina, Daruvar, Grubisno Polje, Virovitica, Orahovica, and Slavonski Brod, various forms of terror are being carried out against the Serbian population that has not fled to Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia: killing, physical maltreatment, arrests. Houses and whole villages that were inhabited by Serbs are being destroyed by being mined or burned and are being looted. It is characteristic that all of these areas also were subjected to genocide during World War II. With its latest measures, the present Croatian government not only is continuing the practice of the Ustasha-fascist authorities of 50 years ago, but is trying to eradicate completely the Serbian national entity from these areas with the aim of creating an ethnically pure state.

2. Pogroms against Serbs and other non-Croatian peoples, following the occupation of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the quisling Ustasha independent state of Croatia on 10 April 1941, were of the broadest proportions.

Ustasha propaganda constantly repeated that Serbs and Jews "have no place in Croatia," characterized them as "a foreign element" and "a vital danger to Croats." On this basis, the previously drawn up plan of genocide was to be launched and set in motion. In its realization the Ustasha, in terms of the sadism and the pathology of the crimes, only was surpassed by the Nazis who, with their fascist ideology and terrorist experience, racial theory, and the negation of Yugoslavia, were and remained a model.

The quisling independent state of Croatia, following the model of Nazi Germany, set up several concentration and reception camps, of which the Jasenovac camp complex was the largest. This was the site of the most terrible holocaust for Serbs, Jews, Romanies, and antifascists in general. [passage omitted]

3. Desecration of Jasenovac memorial area—genocide repeated

The Jasenovac memorial area is a resting place for the dead, but also an admonition and a lesson for the living, a symbol of stormy times for all time, and for all the people dedicated to freedom, justice, and peace. This is the only memorial area in Europe that symbolizes the struggle for peace and against fascism, which has in the entire period since the World War II been desecrated ruthlessly.

Considering the lasting message of Jasenovac, its historical role in suffering and struggle against fascism, its imperishable importance, especially in the minds and feelings of the Serbian nation, Jews, Romanies, and others, we are informing with bitterness that the new Croatian authority and its armed units have desecrated badly the Jasenovac memorial area in 1991, with the use of violence and in other ways. We are providing the following relevant facts to substantiate this:

—The desecration of the Jasenovac memorial area, its facilities and grounds, began before the armed conflict. Among other things, the Ministry for Education, Culture, and Religion of the Republic of Croatia first started the de facto official abolition of the memorial area, and the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia proclaimed the "Lonjsko polje" nature park, which was to include the Jasenovac memorial area. The government of the Republic of Croatia did not provide the financial means for the work of this memorial complex in 1991. This was only an introduction and an annoucement of what was to follow, especially starting in September 1991. This act was an attempt to wipe from our memory the location of the most horrific crime of genocide.

—At the end of September 1991, armed paramilitary units of the Republic of Croatia forcibly entered the Jasenovac memorial area and stayed there until 8 October 1991, when this area was liberated. After having mined and pulled down a bridge over the Sava River, connecting two parts of this memorial complex, the memorial area was devastated and important testimony of the genocide committed 50 years ago was destroyed. A commission, formed on that occasion by the relevant bodies, established that a large number of mortar shells hit Donja Gradina, where 34 craters caused by mortar shells were found. Bones that were thrown out of the ground by the blast revealed yet another, until then unknown, mass grave of Jasenovac victims. Worse destruction was carried out on the left bank of the Sava River, which is in the Republic of Croatia. The building containing the library, the storehouse for material for memorial presentation, and the exhibition premises were demolished. Books, documents, and other memorial material have been destroyed or damaged, and a considerable portion has been taken away. Most of the 8,000 valuable museum exhibits have been destroyed, damaged, or taken away.

In reaction to this desecration, Jewish war veterans and the surviving prisoners of the Jasenovac camp sent a message to the Congress of the World Federation [name as received], which was held in Helsinki on 20 October 1991. The message says, among other things: "The Jasenovac memorial center, the slaughterhouse of Jews, Serbs, and Romanies during World War II, has been desecrated. The memorial museum with the documentation on the actual genocide has been devastated."

On 22 December 1991, Croatian paramilitary armed formations once again—despite the previously agreed cease-fire and the information supplied to the Croatian authorities about the visit of the advance group of the UN peace mission—opened artillery fire from multi-barrel missile launchers, cannons, and tanks on the Jasenovac memorial complex and the surrounding area, which lasted several hours. On this occasion the museum sustained enormous damage, and cemeteries in Donja Gradina, the camp's largest place of execution, also were bombed.

Annex II

Threats to civilians in the western part of the Slavonska Pozega municiplity by Chetnik terrorist forces and JNA [as received] units recently have increased, and to protect their lives and ensure a more successful defense of our defense forces in this area, the crisis headquarters of the Slavonska Pozega municipality has issued a decree:

1. To evacuate all citizens, their personal property (food, clothes, shoes, bed linens, articles of personal hygiene, cooking utensils, necessary articles for lighting, jewellery, and money) and cattle from the territories of: Oblakovac, Vucjak Cecavacki, Jeminovac, Snjegavic, Cecavac, Koprivna, Rasna, Pasikovci, Kujnik, Orljavac, Crljenci, Slobostina, Milivojevci, Podsrece, Vranic, Njezic, Pozeski Markovac, Klisa, Ozdakovci, Poljanska, Kantrovci, Gornji Vrhovci, Lucinci, and Oljasi within 48 (forty-eight) hours from the time this decree comes into effect.

2. The population will be evacuated to other places in Slavonska Pozega of their own choice.

The citizens who have nowhere to go are expected to turn to civil protection reception teams in order that they can be evacuated to the following reception areas: Ivandol, Dezevci, Perenci, Toranj, and Biskupci.

3. The decree comes into effect on 29 October 1991 at 1200 (local time), and will remain in effect until the situation in this area is settled.

4. Once the deadline for the evacuation of the population expires, every movement of civilians in this area will be banned.

[Signed] Slavonska Pozega Municipality Crisis Headquarters

[passage omitted]

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Mostar Attacked; Hopes of Sovereignty Questioned

LD0102172192 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 1 Feb 92

[Antonia Pehar report from Mostar, "seat of the Croatian community of Bosnia-Hercegovina"]

[Text] On the territory of the municipality of Mostar—to put it more precisely, on the territory of the village of Krusevo—an open armed conflict between the occupying reservists and the reserve police force took place today. It started this morning when 15 enemy soldiers, opening sporadic fire, set off toward the reserve police station in the village of Krivodol. The reserve police force fired warning shots, and occupying reservists withdrew. But they reappeared at 1300 GMT with reinforcements, and attempted to surround the village, thus making a 400-meter front line. They opened fire toward the village, and the defense force returned fire, repelling the attack. A truce followed, which is still holding. The army of occupation sent a helicopter for a wounded soldier. The occupiers hoped to use the opportunity to reinforce their special forces, but they did not succeed.

Our forces suffered no casualties. The EC monitors and the active police force arrived here soon after.

This incident is a sufficient illustration for the local Croats of what sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina can offer, i.e., just how big the discrepancy is between the nicely worded statements of the Bosnia-Hercegovina leadership and its ability—better to say its inability—to protect the Croatian population.

Citizens Erect Barricades, Protest JNA

LD0402095592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0919 GMT 4 Feb 92

[Text] Mostar, 4 Feb (TANJUG)—Several hundred Mostar citizens from western suburbs of the town have erected barricades out of anti-tank devices and heavy goods vehicles on the main road between Citluk and Siroki Brijeg this morning.

A protest committee of citizens from the local municipalities of Balinovac, Krusevo, and Slipcici, say in a written explanation that the barricades were erected as a sign of protest against the presence and conduct of Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] reservists on the territory of Mostar municipality, in particular in the vicinity of these three Mostar suburbs.

Several armed and other serious incidents, such as the abduction of an Air Force officer, were registered in Mostar and the vicinity.

Traffic between Mostar, Citluk, and Siroki Brijeg is at the standstill because of the barricades.

Croatian Party Leader in Bosnia Resigns

AU0202212292 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 2 Feb 92

[Text] An expanded meeting of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Hercegovina opened in the Park Hotel in Siroki Brijeg today. Here is a report by our correspondent Omer Vatric:

[Begin Vatric recording] The meeting of the central leadership of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Hercegovina which has been discussing activities concerning the coming referendum in Bosnia-Hercegovina since 1400 [1300 GMT] is still going on. The meeting, which is also attended by representatives of the Croatian Democratic Community from Zagreb, including Stipe Mesic, president of the party's executive committee, is being held behind closed doors.

While waiting for the scheduled news conference, we have learned that Stjepan Kljujic, president of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Hercegovina, has submitted his irrevocable resignation and did not want to explain the reasons for such a gesture. It is assumed that involved were conflicting concepts concerning the future of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the attitude of the Croatian Democratic Community and the Croatian people toward the coming referendum in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

We will present our listeners with more details after the news news conference, which is to be held immediately after the meeting concludes. [end recording]

Government Releases Food Reserves To Market

LD0202172292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1334 GMT 1 Feb 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 1 Feb (TANJUG)—The government of Bosnia-Hercegovina has decided to intervene on the market by releasing a certain amount of flour, oil, rice, and some other products from republican commodity reserves. At the same time, a demand will be put forward to the Federal Directorate of Commodity Reserves to place an appropriate amount of food in the market of Bosnia- Hercegovina in keeping with the criteria for the distribution of Federal commodity reserves. The appropriate ministries will be charged with distributing goods from commodity reserves in accordance with the supplies situation in the republic.

The government also decided to reintroduce Federal rates for turnover tax on commodities and services beginning today. These rates were abolished at the end of January, but according to the latest decision they will be in effect until a republican law on turnover tax is passed.

Croatia

UN Silence on Eviction of Croats Protested

LD0102190292 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0900 GMT 1 Feb 92

[Text] The government sent a note of protest to the UN and the EC concerning the latest incidents of Croats being forced to leave Vojvodina. The Croatian Government stated that it has informed both the UN and the EC of previous similar incidents happening in the occupied areas of Croatia as well as in the autonomous region of Vojvodina and that neither the UN or the EC had officially condemned this breaching of international laws by the Republic of Serbia.

Cease-Fire Violations Reportedly on Increase

AU0402085492 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 4 Feb 92

[Text] The first condition for the deployment of the UN peace-keeping forces—peace—is more and more unstable. The HINA agency reports that the Yugoslav Army yesterday stepped up its hostile activities on almost all Croatian battlefields.

More than 180 grenades landed in the Osijek area. From its positions in Bosnia, the enemy was shelling the Croatian positions on the Nova Gradiska front and in the region of Novska.

Aircraft rocketed the areas of Daruvar, Otocac, Gospic, and Karlovac. Enemy artillery attacks were reported from the Sisak region.

According to the Croatian Defense Ministry, the Yugoslav Army also attacked the wider hinterland of Zadar, Sibenik, and Ston with its aircraft.

Tudjman Holds News Conference in Zagreb

LD0302150192 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1105 GMT 3 Feb 92

[News conference by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman with foreign and domestic correspondents in Zagreb—live]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] Mirjana Saric, HINA. Mr. President, what is your comment on the delayed implementation of the peace plan? In the event of its failure, are the Croatian authorities going to embark on a liberation of Croatia's territories by deploying their armed force?

[Tudjman] This delay has been caused by the fact that UN representatives started talks after an agreement in principle had been reached between us, the Republic of Croatia, Serbia, and the Yugoslav Army. The UN representatives started talks with the rebel forces of Knin and the so-called Krajina in Croatia. Understandably, they were putting up resistance. You are probably more familiar with this than I am, since I have just come back. That is, agreement could not be reached with Serbia's representatives at their two-day meeting in Belgrade. I believe that these difficulties will nevertheless be surmounted and that a peace force will be deployed. In any case, even if this does not happen, the Republic of Croatia will have to find means and opportunities, as I have said on many occasions, to liberate every inch of Croatia's occupied territories.

[Correspondent] Could you comment on the crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina's Croatian Democratic Community? What is your view? My second question is about

the political atmosphere, which has been increasingly resembling a preelection campaign. Could you rule out, or could you not rule out, the possibility of calling a parliamentary and presidential election before the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia has been liberated? What kind of system, a proportional or first-past-the-post system, would suit you most?

[Tudjman] I believe there is no crisis in the Bosnia-Hercegovina Croatian Democratic Community. Just as in any other political party, in this one, too, there may be some slight differences regarding current political issues. Given the fact that the brunt of the crisis has shifted to Bosnia-Hercegovina, and given the fact that relations in Bosnia-Hercegovina are very complicated—particularly with regard to the concentration of almost the entire Yugoslav Army in Bosnia-Hercegovina's territory—it is no surprise that a lively debate is going on there as to what attitude should be assumed toward the other integral factors of Bosnia-Hercegovina's life; that is, the Cyrillic script, the fact that Serbian policy has in effect removed those areas where the Serbs are in the majority from under the authority of the Bosnia-Hercegovina government, as a result of the policies carried out by the presidency headed by Mr. Izetbegovic and as a result of the fact that the Croatian part of the population may feel very anxious about how to make their future safe, in light of all that has been happening in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Hence, this is a matter of considering these current issues. By no means is it any kind of crisis, because both the election and the entire situation that ensued have demonstrated that the Croatian population of Bosnia-Hercegovina are united in their effort to provide for their future.

Yes, in a sense it seems as if an election campaign has been launched. We, however, announced elections, something we are duty-bound to do by our Constitution, which are to be called immediately after the definitive liberation of all Croatia's areas, and we still persevere in this stand. This is not a matter of which system suits an individual party; it is rather a matter of finding out, through debate, as to how, by which methods and system, the democratic will of all Croatia's citizens can be truly expressed. It seems to us that in the course of our debates so far the view has prevailed that this should be a system combining proportionially and first-past-the-post systems. This would suit the stability of the Croatian Assembly, the stability of the Croatian Government, while at the same time the political will of the population would be fully articulated.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, could you please comment on plans and even maps indicating the partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Then I would like to ask you to comment on a statement Borisav Jovic made to Hamburg television, where he claimed that Marrack Goulding was not speaking the truth and that it was not Babic who objected to the UN peace plan, but the Croatian side. He also said that the Serbian side naturally accepted the peace plan because Serbia drafted the plan and Vance only developed it. This was the second question. The third question is about an increasing number of cease-fire violations. When and how will Croatia react to them?

[Tudjman] Well, I must admit that I do not follow all those plans and maps that are being published on the partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina. I think that it is important to find a political solution to the crisis, to ensure that the bloodshed and destruction of war are prevented from coming to Bosnia-Hercegovina. Apart from this, the overall history of that problem ought to be taken into account. [passage omitted]

It is important today to find a solution which would satisfy all three constitutive nations of Bosnia-Hercegovina; that is, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. [passage omitted]

About the question of who is making trouble, we have agreed to the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia and Yugoslavia on the basis of the European proposal and draft— first that of The Hague and now the Brussels conference —on the resolution of the Yugoslav state crisis and the ending of the war in Croatia. These plans explicitly state that the existing borders cannot be changed by force; second, that the Yugoslav Army must leave the entire territory of Croatia; third, that all irregular, Chetnik, volunteer, and territorial troops in Croatia should leave together with the Yugoslav Army; that is, they should be disarmed. Silmutaneously with the army withdrawal and the disarming of these irregular troops, peacekeeping forces would go to the crisis areas, so that democratically elected authorities, which would reflect the national composition of the population in those areas, could be set up. This was... [changes thought] On this basis we took part in the drafting of the deployment plan and we accepted it, and this is something on which the UN Security Council based its program on the deployment of peacekeeping troops.

We are not creating any problems in this respect; on the contrary, the problems were created when first some representatives in Belgrade in that rump former Presidency of the former Yugoslavia, which is now obviously only the Presidency of Serbia, opposed the plan, and when both Hadzic [prime minister of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Baranja, Banija and Western Slavonija] and Babic were opposing the plan. Now just Babic... [changes thought] I do not know, allegedly they yesterday accepted the deployment plan, despite a report that Babic is against it. It is known who is opposed to (?the plan).

[Correspondent] According to all the European documents, the Army must leave Croatia. In spite of this, the Army is digging trenches and building bunkers in Baranja and Cetinska Krajina; can you please comment on this. My second question is when will you call elections for the Assembly—in the spring, summer, or autumn. My third question: It seems you suggested to

Mr. Goulding the formation of temporary councils in Krajina, what does this mean in concrete terms? Thank you.

[Tudjman] Yes, all documents say this and this will have to be done.

As for the Army digging trenches, it is obviously trying to ensure its survival. This shows there are hawks and those who want to continue the war against Croatia among them. I think they have learned their lesson that they cannot win that war, even if Croatia was on its own, because we were alone and unarmed at the beginning, but we prevented the conquest of Croatian territories all the way to the Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag front. So today they have even less strength and we have even more, because we have created stronger defense forces, a Croatian army that is better equipped than a few months ago when we were without arms. Apart from this, today this is a war against an independent and internationally recognized Croatia, and hence Croatia would be in a much better position regarding foreign aggression or an attempt to preserve the occupied territories. I think they will be forced to leave Croatian territory peacefully. We hope to achieve this with the assistance of peace-keeping forces. But, clearly, we shall not reconcile ourselves with any occupation of any Croatian soil.

The decision on the elections will be made in due time, when political and security circumstances allow it.

As far as the proposal on temporary councils in Krajina is concerned, our view—which we presented to representatives of the UN Security Council—is that they are irregular forces that started the uprising against a sovereign Croatia, against democratic authorities in Croatia, that toppled democratically elected local authorities. We have suggested that the original authorities—which were toppled by insurgent forces, Chetniks, volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro, extremists from those areas—be reinstated. This proved to be impossible. We then suggested that one UN representative, one representative of the Croatian authorities, and one representative of the Serbs in the affected municipalities form a temporary local administration that would carry out tasks in accordance with the Croatian constitutional and legal system until elections are called and until new local authorities are elected in accordance with the constitutional and legal system; that is, the Croatian constitution and the constitutional law that prescribes civil and national rights for ethnic communities and national minorities in Croatia.

[(?Davor Stir) of Buenos Aires] According to the UN deployment plan, the Army must leave those territories and the Croatian Army cannot enter them, but the Croatian police will go there. The police will reflect the ethnic composition of that area. Who will appoint these policemen, Zagreb or local authorities?

[Tudjman] It is envisaged that the legal local police force will be responsible to the local authorities, but within the framework of the constitutional and legal system of Croatia and, clearly, what is envisaged to be under the republican bodies, in this sense the local police will have to be composed of that. [sentence as heard] In any case, we cannot agree with proposals aiming at disrupting even for a moment the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia with respect to the police force or other bodies.

[Kosutic of Radio Slovenia] Did you have concrete talks during your visit to Davos and in your meeting with Slovene Presdent Kucan? Can you tell us what they were about?

[Tudjman] Yes, I had talks with President Kucan and Prime Minister Peterle and with Mr. Drnovsek. We have agreed with President Kucan and Prime Minister Peterle to hold a meeting of Croatian and Slovene delegations this week. At the meeting we are scheduled to sign an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations and other issue, like a trade protocol, and we shall talk about border customs. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Mr. President, I think the question of coexistence with the Serbian population presents not just a legal problem, but also a psychological one. Could you please tell us what the Croatian goverment and you personally are doing to create preconditions for future coexistence? I have in mind the problems of Serb refugees who are returning, about which a lot has been written [words indistinct]. Second, yesterday I was passing through the village of Srpske Moravice on my way from Rijeka to Zagreb. I noticed there was not a single sign to mark the beginning or end of this big village and that there were no signs with the village name. Aren't you afraid that a movement similar to what occurred in the occupied territories will occur here? Aren't you changing names in that area? Thank you.

[Tudjman] I agree with you that there is a psychological problem on how to overcome the legacy of the socialist system and, above all, of that aggressive, criminal war imposed upon Croatia on Croatian soil, which destroyed dozens of Croatian settlements, including large settlements and even towns, and even a historical town like Dubrovnik, which is of world importance; a war that aimed at destroying everything from the Croatian past and our national history, at destroying churches—our church history; a war that destroyed more than 500 monuments; a war that resulted in hundreds of thousands of Croatians being expelled from Croatian soil; a war that inflicted harm on almost all every place from eastern Slavonia to western Slavonia; a war that left deep traces, deep wounds, on the spiritual being of the Croatian nation, and which will clearly need great efforts to cure those wounds, to create preconditions for coexistence with Serbs who will remain in Croatia and for normal coexistence between Serbia and Croatia. [passage omitted]

For our part we shall—as we have demonstrated in our constitution, as we have proved with a special constitutional law on the civil, human, and minority rights of ethnic communities and national minorities, and all this

is in the spirit of our overall aim to develop a democratic society and to use all our efforts to guarantee this—we shall do everything to create preconditions for a normal coexistence with Serbs in Croatia who will remain here and for normal coexistence between Croatia and Slovenia. We know nothing good can be built on hatred, war, or animosity by any nation. [passage omitted]

I personally believe that the Croatian democratic authorities will do everything to ensure that reason prevails in Southeast Europe, and even in that part of the Balkans to which Croatia has never belonged. Croatia wants to be not just a country that will cooperate, which will offer reconciliation even to those who wage war aginst it. But Croatia will never give up its right to sovereignty. As an independent and sovereign state it will offer reconciliation and cooperation to Serbia and all other states emerging from the former Yugoslavia and from territories of Southeast, Central, and all of Europe.

As far as your question is concerned, I really do not know whether there are signs around the village of Srpske Moravice. But, my dear friend, I ask you: Shouldn't we have understanding for the fact that in Croatia no mass revenge emerged against Serbs because they caused that war, because they tried to separate Knin Krajina and even eastern and western Slavonia? Serbs in Zagreb live as if nothing has happened in Zagreb and other areas. Isn't this proof of the humanistic attitude of the Croatian population as a whole and of the efforts by the Croatian authorities to prevent arbitrary actions by those people whose parents were killed or houses destroyed?

Objectively, the Croatian people are in a situation where it is difficult to restrain pain and regret for the dead and destroyed homes in their own country. Do not forget that the war was imposed on Croatian soil that was never part of Serbia. Croatia accepted Serbs when they were fleeing the Turks. The soil cannot be left at the mercy of someone's arbitrary actions and of a genocidial policy that tried to expel everyone who was not a Serb. The proof that the plan is not just a Greater Serbian plan but also genocidial is that not just Croatians, but also Hungarians, Germans, Slovaks, and anyone else who was in the way were expelled.

I repeat: We shall do everything on our part to heal the wounds and to create preconditions for normal coexistence in Croatia and between Croatia and Serbia and other countries in this part of the world. [passage omitted]

[Leric of (word indistinct) Argentine] Mr. President, can you tell us how the arbitration commission that deals with the problems of the former Yugoslavia is working at the moment, particularly with regard to the dissociation of Yugoslavia, distribution of the federation's property—how it will be distributed—the rights of Croatians and other minorities in the eastern part of Yugoslavia, and the Croatian citizens who are being forced to remain in the Yugoslav Army.

[Tudjman] I do not know whether the arbitration commission is dealing with these matters. In any case, at that meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, which has representatives of political, economic, and state life from all over the world, it was stated that Yugoslavia no longer exists. Hence, relations should reflect the definitive vanishing of that state as one should fully deal with the questions of dissociation and succession of that state. At that meeting it was also said—something both we and representatives of the other republics, except Serbia, advocated at The Hague and Brussels conferences—that Serbia could not count on the assumption that it might play the role Russia was playing in the demise of the Soviet Union, when Russia automatically became heir to the Soviet Union.

Therefore, the problem of dissociation, from the Army to all other legal and property-related matters, is a pressing one, and it is obvious that this will be the main task of the continuation of the peace conference on Yugoslavia. It is understandable in this context that the question is also raised of retaining citizens of the Republic of Croatia in the army of occupation, the Yugoslav Army. Is that all you asked me?

[Leric] I would like to ask about minority rights in the eastern part of the former Yugoslavia.

[Tudjman] While we have not only given guarantees for the protection of civil and national rights of all ethnic communities, and—within the framework of the EC conference on Yugoslavia—we have adopted a special constitutional law in order to meet demands of the international community, the eastern part knows of no such laws and guarantees. But it is very interesting that Serbia is deaf to demands by the EC, and I believe the U.S. Government, in its statement on problems in Yugoslavia, said explicitly that Serbia must guarantee the same rights to ethnic communities and national minorities in its territory as it is asking for the Serbs in Croatia and other areas. This is a topical issue, and there cannot be double standards. The international community—especially we—cannot agree to this, and Croatia will do everything on its part—precisely because it is guaranteeing rights for Serbs—to demand equal rights for Croats in Serbia and Vojvodina, and Bosnia, and even in Montenegro where there are.... [sentence as heard]

[Moderator] Are there any other questions? If there are no further questions Mr. President I thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you and goodbye.

[Tudjman] Thank you and goodbye.

Babic on Plan To Unite All Serbian People

92BA0417B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jan 92 pp 14-15

[Interview with Dr. Milan Babic, president of the Serbian Republic Krajina, by Snjezana Pokrajac Stamatovic in Belgrade on 18 January 1992: "There Will Be No Letting Go"]

[Text] The second Yugoslavia no longer exists. Slovenia and especially Croatia are now euphorically celebrating their independence. At the same time, resignation, depression, and resentment prevail in the Serbian Republic Krajina [RSK]; many even think that now it is clear that the Krajina has been sold out, that its interests have been traded off and betrayed. Especially in view of these facts, in the interview for BORBA to which Dr. Milan Babic, RSK president, agreed, saying "I will gladly give an interview to BORBA," we asked the Krajina leader what its future destiny would be. We did the interview the day before yesterday in the Belgrade office of the RSK.

[Babic] It is certain that there is the resentment and disappointment that meet the case, and also sadness on the part of many people who thought that the Serbian Republic Krajina and the Serbian people have been abandoned by the Republic of Serbia and the Serbian people in Serbia. It seems to me that this is nevertheless an appearance, and that the disposition of the Serbian people in Serbia is not as represented in Milosevic's letter sent to us in the Krajina. However, in the Krajina there continues to be resolve, the disposition, and also sufficient strength for us to continue to resist all assaults on our territory, on our people, and on the RSK by the Croatian aggressors. There will be no letting go, but there are also expectations that political initiatives will accelerate and be achieved concerning unification of the entire Serbian space.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] So, you do not think it is a case of betrayal of the Krajina and its interests?

[Babic] There probably are and have been bad political estimates and poor political moves in the Republic of Serbia when it comes to the manner and pace of arriving at our common goal, but I would not describe it that way.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] Even Goran Hadzic, president of the SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem has declared that the krajinas were "sold out," and that they were used as small coin in a deal concerning Serbo-Croatian relations.

[Babic] It is not really possible for an individual to trade in peoples and countries. That time passed long ago. In the feudal age, the feudal lords were able to do that. But that is another age, and possible political deceptions are exposed very quickly.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] How do you see the future fate of the Krajina in view of Vance's plan and the fact that you are not backing "even a millimeter" from the position that UN peacekeeping forces can come only to the line of fire, which at this point is contrary to the position of the Yugoslav Presidency and the official Serbian policy?

Linked Destinies

[Babic] The fate of the Krajina is closely bound up with the fate of the rest of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia, above all with the destiny of the Serbian people in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina]. That is why our original project was first to unify the territory of the RSK and the Bosnian Krajina to form one region, one federal unit, and in the second phase to link up with the other Serbian regions, that is, federal units. From the way events have developed up to now in Yugoslavia, from the pace of its disintegration and the recognition of various republics by the EC and others, following the positions taken by the Arbitration Commission of the EC, and let me say, incidentally, unnecessary arbitration which defines the Serbian people in B-H as a minority, and the announcement of recognition of the independence of B-H, from all of that it precisely follows that our first need is unification of the Serbian krajinas—the Serbian Republic Krajina and the region Bosnian Krajina.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] What does that happening soon depend on?

[Babic] It depends, above all, on the assessment of the political leadership of the Serbian people in B-H. I think that they are close to the position that they will not be able to prevent the decision of the coalition of Croats and Muslims in B-H to bring about the independence of B-H, that they will not be able with that kind of policy to prevent their departure, and that this commitment of ours to unification of the RSK and Serbian territories in B-H must be carried out, and then the next phase of unification with Serbia and Montenegro to form a new Yugoslavia and alliance of Serbian states and Montenegro.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] Now that we are talking about a new Yugoslavia, what do you think about the concept, if it can be said that it has been defined at all, which was offered at the Convention on Yugoslavia in the SFRY Assembly?

[Babic] My opinion is that the convention on a new Yugoslavia did no harm. However, it did not make the contribution it should have and did not constitute a political agreement of representatives of those peoples which want to preserve Yugoslavia. People said all kinds of things there.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] What comes after a possible political agreement of that kind?

[Babic] After that political agreement, we should move on to creating the constituents of a constitutional assembly, and then a joint government and the institutions of that state. That is what is indispensable now and the only thing possible if the Serbs are not to find themselves in a situation of becoming ethnic minorities within the newly formed independent states on the soil of Yugoslavia.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] A passage in the report of the EC Arbitration Commission in fact places the Serbs in the position of an ethnic minority within the administrative borders of Croatia.

[Babic] The Arbitration Commission formed by the EC, which has its clearly defined goal of taking Yugoslavia

apart and of making several independent states from Yugoslavia at the expense of the Serbian people, was not really necessary. This is the basic shortcoming of all the talks on Yugoslavia so far at the conference in the Hague and concerning the Hague. In my opinion, we should never have consented to the pressure of the EC to resolve the Yugoslav crisis in this way. Incidentally, the representatives of the Serbian Krajina have never consented to the status defined for them by that conference, as a special status within the independence of the Republic of Croatia with a maximum autonomous content, after the pattern of the Tyrol.

We Must Be Recognized

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] The Serbian Republic Krajina, then, exists de facto, but not de jure. No one has officially recognized it. The government of Serbia and the Assembly of Serbia have merely adopted a declaration on the right of peoples to self-determination, but without decidedly recognizing the Krajina as a new republic. What is your comment?

[Babic] Two factors are adversely affecting the status of the RSK: The first is the state of affairs that has come about through the creation and recognition of the independent Republic of Croatia, and the second is that the Yugoslav Presidency is insisting on the formalities of the earlier Constitution of Yugoslavia, in which the RSK is not mentioned. Both these approaches are troublesome for us. Even the actual situation of the existence of the independent state of Croatia is less of a burden for us, except for our obligation to defend our territory against their aggression, and a greater burden for us is this insistence of the Presidency, which, I would say, incidentally, does not even include representatives of the RSK and B-H. Progress must be made in that direction regardless of how important it is to the Presidency to continue to insist on its legality. This is necessary in this phase, before a political agreement is reached, before a constitutional assembly is officially convened, before formation of the new government of the state which will constitute the future new state, including in its membership representatives of both the RSK and the Serbian people in B-H, because further insistence on the formality of the Constitution of Yugoslavia, when it has been violated by everyone, only does us harm. I think that the Assembly and government of Serbia could adopt a more specific decision concerning recognition of the RSK and statements concerning its existence. The declaration would be a statement indirectly confirming the consent of the Assembly of Serbia that the Serbian Republic Krajina does exist, but it is insufficient for establishment of firmer relations. To be sure, it affords the possibility to the government of Serbia to take more specific steps concerning recognition, which, however, is less important, and establishment of firmer relations is more essential.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] Will those measures on recognition of the Krajina by Serbia and Montenegro be forthcoming?

[Babic] If the administration in power in the Republic of Serbia really examines resolution of the Serbian nationality question as a whole, that relation toward the Serbian Krajina must be established.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] In many respects, it seems that Serbia is not against the RSK obtaining special status within Croatia.

[Babic] That has not been explicitly stated anywhere as yet by representatives of the Republic of Serbia. However, insistence and persuasion that we accept special status as envisaged by the Hague Conference is nothing other than accepting autonomy with local home rule within the Republic of Croatia, and acceptance of the involvement of the UN peacekeeping forces in the manner in which Tudjman, Kadijevic, and Milosevic agreed, which amounts to the imposition of a political solution for the RSK in advance, one that is close to or the same as the proposal of the Hague Conference concerning our special status within the framework of the Republic of Croatia. That is why such a concept is unacceptable for us from the start. Even in the content of that document which elaborates that concept it says at the very outset that the territories of Krajina, eastern and western Slavonia are regions of the Republic of Croatia under protection of the United Nations. In and of itself, this says almost everything.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] You recently described that view of Serbia in connection with Vance's plan as usurpation of the right of decisionmaking concerning the Serbian people in the Krajina.

[Babic] We have not given anyone a mandate to speak in our name, but we have called for representatives of the RSK, beginning with the Hague and ever since, to participate in all conferences, meetings, and agreements related to resolving the political crisis.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] That request of yours has not, however, been met.

[Babic] Not only has it not been met, but our positions have not been adopted either. Not only have they not been adopted by Croatia, which lays claim to our territory, but they have not been adopted even by representatives of Serbia participating in those negotiations and acting not only in the name of Serbia, but also in our name, which we never agreed to, nor can we now consent to this, especially after this experience when action was taken in our name against our interests.

Tudjman's Claims

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] After recognition of the Croatian state, President Tudjman has announced that he has now definitively put an end to the war. Do you think that the war has been ended?

[Babic] If Tudjman and his Supreme Command of what is now already the state of Croatia accept the reality that the Croats are not the only ones who have decided to

create a state, but so have the Serbs on their ethnic and historical territories also decided to create their state, and tomorrow form a community of Serbian states, then the war really has been brought to a full stop.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] It is obvious that Croatia does not accept the reality of which you speak.

[Babic] The recent statements of Tudjman and ministers in Tudjman's government indicate that they continue to lay claim to Serbian territories. Even today they have announced yet another provocation by publishing the names of commissioners for the Serbian opstinas on the territory of the RSK—which is a further burden on our mutual relations, heats up the crisis, and constitutes a potential source of further conflicts.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] Josko Moric, Croatian assistant minister of internal affairs, says: "Our police will be in Knin." What is your comment on that statement?

[Babic] If the point of that were not provocation, there would be no reason to make such statements. In the RSK, there is the local police and there is the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the Krajina, and they make statements that this will be a local police under the administration of the Croatian MUP. That is really a provocation of the first order.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] Do you think that such statements and possible specific efforts could result in further military conflicts?

[Babic] Such statements need not mean anything as to realization, but if realization is undertaken, that certainly would heat up the war.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] You, however, from everything you have said this far, continue to stick by your position, which, judging by the atmosphere in the Krajina, is shared by most of its population.

[Babic] There has to be a modification of the conception accepted by Tudjman, Kadijevic, and Milosevic in the sense of backing off on demilitarization of the entire territory of the RSK (and exclusively the territory of the RSK) and also from defining the RSK as a zone of Croatia under protection of the United Nations. After all, that would be not only a precedent in the way peacekeeping forces are used to establish peace, but it would also amount to imposing a political solution that is unacceptable. The citizens of the Serbian Krajina have not voted for it, and that is the basis of the conflict. However, the customary commitment of peacekeeping forces up to now to establish a permanent peace, without bias or imposition of political solutions, is always welcome. The peacekeeping forces should come to that part of the Krajina which represents the line of fire with the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia. In that case, they would not be occupiers.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] And if that does not happen?

[Babic] It is certain that the UN Security Council and, above all, the secretary general will not commit a precedent of sending peacekeeping forces to our territory without our consent in order to disarm the armed forces of the RSK. Such a mission is condemned to failure without our consent.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] Are there differing views in the Krajina on whether the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] should stay? What is your opinion on this?

[Babic] The JNA has become the army of those parts of Yugoslavia which are maintaining the continuity of the state of Yugoslavia and of those peoples which have committed themselves to preserving the common state. The RSK and Serbian people voted in a referendum to stay in the common state; accordingly, there is no reason whatsoever why the JNA, as the joint army of all four countries, should not remain in the RSK. For the Army to depart and to leave our territory would not only weaken the defensive capability of the RSK and joint Serbian states, but it would also constitute an indirect recognition that this is not the territory of the remainder of Yugoslavia, that is, of that new governmental community.

For Good Relations With All

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] You have spent three days in Belgrade. Have you had official contacts, and with whom?

[Babic] The main reason for my visit to Belgrade is for us to agree with the Yugoslav Presidency and representatives of the FEC [Federal Executive Council] on a meeting of government experts, the government of the RSK, and representatives of the FEC on including systems from systems in the RSK in the systems of Yugoslavia. First of all, with respect to payments, transportation, and other services that must function in Yugoslavia's unified system. I have also had meetings with several important representatives of the political life of the Republic of Serbia, above all, from the democratic opposition, with whom I exchanged opinions on overall relations in which Yugoslavia has found itself following recognition of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. Representatives of the Democratic Party and representatives of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] of B-H whom I have contacted, that is, their presidents, Micunovic and Karadzic, agreed to give us support in our demands seeking additional guarantees to ensure peace and exercise of the Serbian people's right to self-determination in the Serbian Republic Krajina. I also had a visit, I was invited to the Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church to expound on the situation in the RSK and on relations in resolving its status in the Serbian, Yugoslav, and world community.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] When you speak about a meeting with the Democrats, it would be interesting to hear what your present relations are with the Serbian opposition in general.

[Babic] As for our relation toward all political factors in the Republic of Serbia, in essence it has not changed. We have always tried to have good relations with all the political parties—both the party in power and the opposition. Unfortunately, nearly a year ago we were to some extent drawn into interparty conflicts here in Serbia, partly not by our choice, nor by our desire. This was more because of our distance and unfamiliarity with the situation and a bit because of misuse of our statements and insistence on Serbian unity. Some parties took that as bias and support for only one party. Because our relations and the interests of the RSK must be pursued through frequent contacts with the administration in power in Serbia and the institutions of the Republic of Serbia above all, regardless of who is in power, this is sometimes interpreted as our close relationship with the Socialist Party. However, we have been trying to maintain a good relationship with all political parties in Serbia. At this moment, most of the opposition parties understand the position of the RSK and stick to principle in their position on our demands and on resolving our status and the involving of the peacekeeping forces. In addition to the Democratic Party, we already have been maintaining good relations and close contacts with the People's Party and with Serbian National Renewal. We have not before had problems in relations with the Serbian Radical Party. However, during these days we have had consultations only with the Democratic Party and the SDS of B-H.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] Did you meet with representatives of the party in power, because many people feel that after the letter of President Milosevic the Belgrade door is closed to you as far as the ruling party is concerned? How would you describe your relation with the president of the Republic of Serbia after the exchange of letters?

[Babic] I thought it was unusual that methods long ago superseded should still be in use in this society, such as statements which I have read in newspapers from various committees and sections of the Socialist Party. That is reminiscent of certain earlier times when support was furnished through some sort of letters or messages that arrived from some kind of committees, politbureaus, and so on. We have not had an institutional relationship between the RSK or the Krajina SDS with the Socialists—if we ignore the fact that the president of the Socialist Party of Serbia happens to be a member of the Yugoslav Presidency, and the president of Serbia is also from that party, and we have maintained certain contacts with them.

Initiatives Have Subsided

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] You still have not answered my question. What are those contacts now, if there are any?

[Babic] Well, this has been a short period of time since the exchange of letters between Milosevic and me. Our position in the Krajina and my personal position has been that this is not the right way to communicate. This is not the way we want it, and we continue to think that it could be harmful to everyone, both to the Serbian people in the Krajina and to the Serbian people in Serbia, and as a whole. That is why we would like constructive contacts and cooperation, because the entire Serbian people finds itself now in a difficult position, and we must overlook all our possible disagreements, ideological, above all, and seek joint solutions to the issue of the Serbian state. With all the parties in the opposition, but also with the administration that is in power in the Republic of Serbia.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] What do you expect in that sense?

[Babic] We expect an appropriate initiative right from the Republic of Serbia to resolve these issues. It is my impression that as far as the government in Serbia is concerned, that initiative to resolve the Serbian nationality question in Yugoslavia has subsided a bit and is no longer defined. For our part, we have stuck by our program—unification of all the Serbian lands. At the same time, the initiatives that have come from Belgrade to preserve Yugoslavia, the remainder of Yugoslavia, truncated Yugoslavia, have become undefined and vague. I expect that we will all meet again, both representatives of the government and opposition in Serbia and Montenegro, and representatives of the SDS of B-H and of RSK, so that we can specifically agree on realizing our common interest, which is for the Serbian people to remain in one state.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] Recently, contacts have mainly been maintained between the leaderships of Serbia and Montenegro, to be sure, with the definition of the future community still unclear. Did you attend those talks?

[Babic] Not only were we from the RSK excluded from those talks, but so were representatives of the Serbian people in B-H, which I consider impermissible. The representatives of Serbia and Montenegro must include in those talks the Serbian Republic Krajina and the Serbian people in B-H, so that together we define the objective and the way of attaining that objective.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] Do you believe that that passage in Slobodan Milosevic's letter to the effect that you have lost all confidence will have an impact on your political activity and realization of your options?

[Babic] You know what, no one's personal attitudes, especially momentary personal attitudes, should adversely affect achievement of the strategic Serbian objective, and that is Serbian unity. I feel that neither he personally nor the Serbs needed that passage in S. Milosevic's letter. As for the other themes, they could also be exchanged in the appropriate way, not this way, and that should not happen anymore and must not influence our relations, because those are not personal relations between Milosevic and Babic, but relations which could have great importance to the future of the Serbian people.

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] What will you undertake in the future so that things take that political course you are advocating?

[Babic] The most suitable thing would be for the UN General Assembly to concern itself with our problem, and we have communicated that to the secretary general, but we will also renew our petition to the new UN secretary general. We have already called upon Mr. Boutros Ghali to have the powers that were the victors in World War II (United States, Russian Federation, Great Britain, and France) organize a conference on Yugoslavia, because we believe that the present situation in Yugoslavia is a repetition of relations and conditions that remained unresolved following World War II. We anticipate that this will be a form of higher quality and less bias, one that will respect the right of every people to self-determination. This is a right guaranteed by the UN Charter and the Constitution of the state of Yugoslavia. It is not possible for one Yugoslav nationality to exercise the right to self-determination and create an independent state and deny it to another nationality.

[Box, p 15]

For Me To Change My Position

[Pokrajac Stamatovic] There was an initiative the other day from Benkovac to convene the Krajina parliament and for members of the Yugoslav Presidency and Serbian leadership to take part in the proceedings.

[Babic] That offer also came from members of the Yugoslav Presidency, but the way it came is very curious. That is, at the last meeting with some of the members of the Presidency I was told personally that it would be good to convene the RSK Assembly and for members of the Presidency to come to the session, but provided that I first change my position on commitment of UN peacekeeping forces, that is, that I accept Cyrus Vance's conception, and the members of the Presidency would come to support me and explain my position, with this significant sentence appended: "We would not come if you had a different position from us, so that the Assembly might 'boo' us down or whistle at us."

Macedonia

Turkish Envoy Sides With Republic, Recalled

LD0102142192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1348 GMT 1 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, February 1 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav ambassador to Turkey Trajan Petrovski has been recalled, TANJUG learned in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry today. The Yugoslav State Presidency ordered Petrovski's recall because he disregarded instructions received from the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and acted against the norms of a single Yugoslav policy.

Petrovski, a representative from Macedonia, expressed loyalty to the Macedonian Government and placed himself at its disposal. In a letter to the Macedonian Foreign Minister, Petrovski said he had been informed of the republic's decision to withdraw its representatives from the Federal Foreign Ministry and embassies, adding he completely agreed with it and acted accordingly. The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared independence late last year. It requested recognition from the European Community, but has not yet received it.

Republic Prepares Defense Concept

LD0102212392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1518 GMT 31 Jan 92

[Text] Skopje, Jan 31 (TANJUG)—The Defence Minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trajan Gocevski, said Friday that this Republic has prepared a defence concept which is based on an analysis of potential aggressors.

Gocevski told a regular press conference that the Macedonian Parliament [Sobranje] will, at its next session, review and shortly adopt a draft law on national defence, approved yesterday by the Republican Government.

The defence budget, Gocevski said, will not exceed the Republic's contribution for the Federal Army until now.

He said that Macedonia's Army will not sign a pact with anyone, nor does it harbour ambitions to become, as he said, a regional power.

Gocevski added that Macedonia, if Yugoslavia's assets and liabilities are divided justly, will have more weapons than provided under the draft law. He underscored that the Republican Defence Ministry has prepared a reaction concept in case the Yugoslav People's Army tries to appropriate weapons held by the territorial defence.

Controversial Referendum of Macedonia's Albanians

92BA0394B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Dragan Nikolic: "Repetition of the Krajinas?"]

[Text] The Macedonian press has been restrained in recording events at polling places, where mainly there has been no euphoria except that the drums have resounded in certain villages. In Tetovo, Gostivar, and Kicevo, the main Albanian centers in western Macedonia, there was hardly any evidence to be seen of a referendum being held. The streets are lively as usual, it is only in the restaurants that there is a bit more talk about the referendum.

Several things have remained unclarified to this day. It is not clear what the autonomy being voted for means, to what territories it extends, and what the relations will be between the autonomous authority and the republic, nor from what sources that autonomy will be financed. It is

said that the Albanians in Macedonia are this time really voting for their "special status" in Macedonia, and that they are also counting on an "autonomous administration," including even creation of their own police forces. Some commentators say that an "autonomous Albanian enclave in Macedonia would be pronouncedly authoritarian in nature." However, what is certain is that the Macedonian government will not recognize a referendum nor allow creation of an autonomous territory of Albanians in Macedonia. So that there are no bloody conflicts between republic authorities and the supporters of Albanian autonomy, the Macedonian government is proposing dialogue and regulation of the rights of Albanians in Macedonia on the foundations of the new civil constitution. Albanian deputies in the parliament have also declared that the referendum could be relativized through dialogue.

The referendum of the Albanians has caused concern, but then also bitterness on the part of Macedonians.

"Dishonorable Action"

"After the boycott of the census (which is an obligation that is part of civilization and an unavoidable necessity in order to plan society's development), after the boycott of the referendum on an independent and sovereign Republic of Macedonia, after the Albanian political parties refused to vote for the new democratic constitution of the republic, yet another commando operation with far-reaching consequences has been prepared in Macedonia (the PDP [Democratic Prosperity Party] and NDP [People's Democratic Party]). A referendum of the Albanian nationality for political-territorial autonomy is being secretly organized and is now being loudly announced. Along with everything else, the leaders of these parties are involved in an inappropriate and excessive propaganda campaign first promoted over TV Tirana and aimed at making a lot of noise for Europe to hear so that the sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia would not be recognized, because, as they see it, it does not fulfill the conditions ('The Albanians are disenfranchised in Macedonia'). After the open propaganda campaign of official Athens against recognition of our republic until its name is changed, now two Albanian parties in Macedonia, the PDP and NDP, have also joined this inappropriate and dishonorable action against Macedonia," Krste Crvenkovski declared on the eve of the referendum.

Representatives of the most ethnic party—the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity]—are declaring that everything has been prepared in the "Belgrade kitchen," that Macedonia would remain in "Serboslavia." Those who are more moderate say only that the "Belgrade formula" is being applied, meaning that Albania is everywhere where there is an Albanian minority. On the geographic map being distributed these days, more than half of Macedonia represents "expanded Albania." As for the "Belgrade kitchen," both the more moderate and the more extreme use as an argument the appointment of General Uzelac, commander of the 3d Army District, a man "who has extensive experience with the war in Croatia" and who could be a "savior and defender" in Macedonia.

"I am certain that the Albanian population in Macedonia will not accept this dirty game by which their leaders have been taken in, men who when the present situation becomes acute will be the first to buy airplane tickets and leave the Albanian people and us here alone," Petar Trajkovski said in the parliament. "Macedonia has been enslaved and divided many times. Two parts of Macedonia are enslaved now, but we will not give up the third part."

The "most ethnic" even blame the referendum on the present Macedonian government. It is not effective and democratic. They say that it "deliberately suspended parliament," that it did not put interethnic relations and the political-security situation on the agenda, that power is concentrated in the hands of "two or three people" who "deprecate the parliament," that a "secret coalition of the leftwing bloc" has been created in order to outvote the most numerous group of deputies (of the VMRO-DPMNE), and, most important, that that government has not taken any legal steps against leaders of Albanian nationality.

Dr. Nikola Kljusev met with representatives of the PDP and NDP and on that occasion issued them a stern warning that "they are assuming historical responsibility" if what has happened "in various wildcat krajinas" in the country should be repeated in Macedonia and that the Macedonian people does not want to accept that responsibility. "If you assume that historical responsibility, then you have to expect the price to be too high," they were told by the Macedonian prime minister.

Dr. Nikola Kljusev said in the Macedonian parliament:

"It is the assessment of the government that the 'referendum' and 'census' and all the related activity to date have been contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, its laws, and the declaration on international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign and independent state. The government will take every step within its authorization to secure the peace, to protect citizens, and to prevent interethnic conflicts."

The Albanian deputies in the parliament mainly said, "You wanted it, now look" and "The child is born, and now someone has to handle it and nurse it."

It Is Not All So Black as That

When the strictly confidential document of the government on the political-security situation in Macedonia was being debated in the Macedonian parliament, Djeladin Murati, vice president of the Assembly, said that relations between the Albanians and Macedonians in western Macedonia are not as black as the government portrays them. There are constructive examples which

should be commended, he said. He said that the Albanians are seeking only to be an "active factor in building democracy and a common state." He also said that Macedonianism cannot be built on an anti-Albanian basis, and vice versa. As he put it, the formula for life together is "complete equality," and he said that Albanian-language programming amounts to only 0.5 percent of all the programming of TV Skopje. He said that about 7,000 Albanian pupils have finished elementary school and only 500 go on to secondary education because instruction is not given in the Albanian language in secondary schools. He called for Dime Kostovski, editor of TV Skopje's Third Program, to apologize to the Albanians for having proposed on a program on the eve of the referendum that the picture on the screen be blackened when Albanian deputies spoke in the Macedonian parliament.

"The government has not convinced us with specific moves that we will be equal in Macedonia. It is constantly talking about our minority rights, but not about our equality. Representatives of the government use in what they write such phrases as the 'Macedonian Constitution,' 'Macedonian president,' 'Macedonian government,' 'Macedonian television,' 'Macedonian highways,' which means that everything is Macedonian, and we have nothing. This shows that the government has committed itself to conducting an ethnic policy, and whoever commits himself to an ethnic policy has committed himself to nationalism," said Abdulrahman Aliti in the Macedonian parliament.

The mutual accusations of the deputies (according to some, the Albanians have too few and, according to others, too many rights) were interrupted in the Assembly on the proposal of Mersim Polozani, Albanian deputy, so that interethnic passions do not become inflamed, and it was resolved that within a month's time the government would make an analysis of interethnic relations in the republic and then open an interethnic dialogue in the Macedonian parliament and that—as certain Albanian deputies said—"the referendum and autonomy would be relativized."

At polling places, the Albanians who are voting usually respond to newsmen that they expect equality of Albanians from the creation of autonomy. However, reporters encounter quite a few Albanians who declare that they do not want to vote for the dirty games of Nezvat Halili, leader of the Albanian party PDP.

It was noted that the 53 foreign observers announced did not come, but only Dzoze Diogardi, the well-known "Albanian lobbyist" in the United States, and the American congressman Robert Dole, who arrived in Macedonia from Tirana.

Serbia

Economic Cooperation Discussed With ROK

LD0402095892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2008 GMT 31 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, 31 Jan (TANJUG)—In the framework of intensifying contacts with countries—high priority economic partners— Srdjan Savic, Minister for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries and Serbia's Economic Development, has received, on two separate occasions, the Daewoo Corporation Director of the Yun and Vice President Hyundai in Belgrade, the Serbian Ministry of Information announced today.

In the course of their talks significance was stressed in intensifying co-operation between the two countries, particularly in the field of car manufacturing, electronics, investments, and agricultural production.

The talks were also attended by Sin Tu-pyong, the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, who expressed satisfaction with the fact that co-operation and contacts had improved and deepened as well as the willingness for the implementation of projects in the interest of the economies of the two countries, the announcement says.

Tudjman's Aims 'Charm Campaign' at U.S.

LD0102211292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1111 GMT 31 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, January 31 (TANJUG)—"I condemn with the strongest possible words the infernal genocide committed by the Nazis and their puppet collaborators in Croatia and other countries against Jews, Romanies, Croats, Serbs and other groups." These words were written by none other than Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in a letter to U.S. congressmen some ten days ago.

The letter is part of Croatia's 'charm campaign', aimed at neutralizing an increasing number of articles in the U.S. media pointing to anti-Semitism amd other rascist stands held by President Tudjman, including his public statement thanking God that his wife was neither Serbian nor Jewish.

In his letter to the U.S. congressmen, Tudjman claims that in 1941, "a prominent Jewish doctor who had fled Croatia, had enough confidence to leave his son in Tudjman's care." Another argument put forth by Tito's former general, is that "the Communists killed his father and mother in 1946." However, those familiar with Tudjman's biography say that this is not true, and recall that Tudjman had for several years after the war held important posts in the Communist military intelligence personnel office.

In the letter, President Tudjman warns that his anti-semitic image is part of "Communist-based propaganda and their agents." However, he does not mention his

book 'Wastelands of Historical Reality,' in which he claims that the Nazis killed fewer Jews worldwide than is claimed officially today.

President Tudjman, who remains responsible for the pogroms committed against Serbs living in areas controlled by Croatia in the last few months, counts among his merits, his attendance of a recently held meeting protesting the blowing up of the Jewish community centre in Zagreb. Tudjman also says that he made appeals for money in order that the demolished synagogue in the Croatian capital might be restored.

"As soon as the situation allows, I seriously consider travelling to Israel...to visit the Yad Vashem Memorial," says Tudjman in the letter to U.S. congressmen, and adds further that "twelve Jews hold high government posts in Croatia." Tudjman also promises that one of the bigger streets in Zagreb will be dedicated to the memory of the Jews who were persecuted in Croatia during World War Two.

Tudjman is described as a follower of Ustasha policies—the pro-Nazi regime under German control during World War Two. After coming to power, Tudjman changed the name of a large square in central Zagreb. Its name was 'Victims of Fascism Square.'

In another letter to President of the World Jewish Congress Edgar Bronfman, Franjo Tudjman asks for help and support for Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia. He uses sharp words in condemning the Ustasha regime and "admits" that this Croatian pro-Nazi regime is responsible for the death of 300,000 people, but instead of Serbs and Jews, Tudjman mentions Croats as the main victims. This number is three times less than official historical data, but ten times more than Tudjman's earlier estimates.

Bearing in mind what he had written in 'Wastelands of Historical Reality,' Tudjman claims that parts of his book have been misinterpreted "either as historical revanchism or as anti-Semitism."

Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia with the strong support of Germany, which left many observers with the firm belief that the issue pertains to cooperation between former World War Two collaborators. Such suspicions were earlier bolstered by the political moves made by Tudjman's regime, such as the anulling of many rights enjoyed by the Serb community in Croatia including the right to use their language, and the degradation of the Serbs to a national minority, including open cooperation with advocates of the old Ustasha regime.

The persecution of citizens of Serbian nationality in Croatia increased in the last phase of Croatia's secessionism, when serious conflicts erupted between the Yugoslav Federal Army and the Croatian paramilitary units. Reports abounded of many war crimes which recalled the genocide committed against the Serbs in Croatia during World War Two.

Under German pressure, the European Community was the first to recognize Croatia's independence. However, the United States have not yet recognized Croatia because of reservations about the nature of President Tudjman's regime, and the way in which secession was carried out. Observers believe that President Tudjman's current 'charm campaign' is aimed at receiving U.S. recognition, and than that of the United Nations.

Smuggled Arms Shipment Discovered in Priboj

LD0402094892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1934 GMT 31 Jan 92

[Text] Priboj, 31 Jan (TANJUG)—On the Uvac river near the town of Priboj, where the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina runs, Priboj policemen uncovered a large amount of smuggled arms.

It has been learned from unofficial sources that 80 tonnes of automatic rifles, Scorpion submachine guns, and other arms, ammunition, and drugs, were uncovered in bags with coffee in semi trucks and refrigerator trucks. The trucks, had svetozarevo [in Serbia] registration plates in the front and Netherlands registration plates in the back.

The Priboj police station refused to disclose drivers' identity and other details. It is, however, known that three people have been detained.

Croatian 'Terrorists' Reported Near Sombor

LD0302120792 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1049 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Sombor, 3 Feb (TANJUG)—TANJUG has learned from the appropriate authorities that a group of about 20 Croatian terrorists was detected yesterday afternoon in marshes between Kolut and Bezdan.

In a clash that is still going on, Damir Kokotovic, a policeman from the Sombor Secretariat for Internal Affairs, was killed, two guardsmen were wounded and taken to the Sombor hospital, and several terrorists were captured. The rest are being sought in marshy woods along the left bank of the Danube.

The attackers arrived in an armored vehicle, probably an amphibious vehicle, from Baranja or Hungary. They are believed to be terrorists whose aim is to blow up the only bridge between Bezdan and Batina, which is the sole road link between Baranja and Vojvodina.

Draskovic Predicts Monarchy in Serbia

AU0302151192 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 3 Feb 92 p 174

[Interview with Serbian opposition leader Vuk Draskovic by an unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "We Are Tired of the Madness"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] The UN peace plan for Yugoslavia threatens to fail because of the resistance of the Serbian leaders in Croatia. Will the war flare up again?

[Draskovic] This cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, I believe that reason will prevail. It is said: The path to reason leads via madness. We, Serbs and Croats, are tired of the madness.

[DER SPIEGEL] But Milan Babic, the self-proclaimed president of the Serbian Krajina in Croatia, rejects the stationing of Blue Helmets in his area.

[Draskovic] Babic demands immediate guarantees for Serbs in Croatia. However, there is still enough time to modify the peace plan as soon as the Blue Helmets are here.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Serbian-Orthodox Church is also against the peace plan.

[Draskovic] For the third time in this century part of the church leadership is trying to drive the Serbs into collective death in the name of the Kosovo myth. In the battle of Kosovo 600 years ago, this allegedly "greatest historical glory" of our history, Serbia's best sons died. After the genocide committed against the Serbs during the two world wars, the patriarch is now again calling for a total war, in which 2 to 3 million people would die within just a few months.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why did Serbia start this war in the first place?

[Draskovic] Serbian nationalism provoked Croatian nationalism. Croatia's President Tudjman is like an illegitimate son of Serbia's President Milosevic. Now both peoples must feel terrible shame for the brutal crimes committed during this war.

[DER SPIEGEL] Only when international isolation threatened did Serbia show reason. Until then the vision of Greater Serbia made even Belgrade's intellectuals enthusiastic.

[Draskovic] The call for national unity of the Serbs caused a drive of heroism. But this also happened to the Germans in the Third Reich.

[DER SPIEGEL] How do you envisage the new political order in the Balkans?

[Draskovic] All six republics of the former Yugoslavia are internationally recognized as sovereign states. Then, in the first phase, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina join in an association similar to the EC. This means: a common market, a common currency, an intergovernmental parliament, a Council of Ministers. Part of the armed forces would also be under a joint command. Later on, this community enters a loose alliance with Slovenia and Croatia.

[DER SPIEGEL] What remains of the slogan "All Serbs into one state"?

[Draskovic] This state was Yugoslavia. Those idiotic leaders who came to power with their medieval ideas destroyed this state. My suggestion is: The Krajina in Croatia is added to the Krajina in Bosnia. In return Croatia receives an equally large territory in western Hercegovina. Croatia will then be more homogeneous and can get rid of a hotbed of unrest.

[DER SPIEGEL] Will Bosnia's President Izetbegovic agree with this deal?

[Draskovic] Izetbegovic is a realistic politician.

[DER SPIEGEL] Germany's surging ahead in recognizing Croatia and Slovenia caused enraged protests in Serbia.

[Draskovic] For historical reasons, Germany should not have been the motive force in Croatia's secession. However, without Germany, Serbia will not get into Europe—and Germany cannot afford to have the largest group of Slav people in the Balkans as an enemy. Now the German Government is committed to advocating the national rights of the Serbs in Croatia with the same dedication that it showed to the crumbling of Yugoslavia. In the future, Germany will not have any problems with the Serbs—rather with the Croats.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why?

[Draskovic] For 45 years the Croats pretended that the crimes of the Ustashas during World War II were to be blamed on the Germans. However, it has been historically proved that the Germans were shocked by the cruel actions of the Croats. Now the Croats sing "Thank you, Germany" and make the world believe that again Germany is behind their hatred for the Serbs.

[DER SPIEGEL] You will soon meet some German politicians. What are your expectations?

[Draskovic] That the Germans help to put an end to the Tudjman era so that a moderate politician may become the leader of Croatia.

[DER SPIEGEL] Who will overthrow Serbia's President Milosevic?

[Draskovic] Democratic Serbia.

[DER SPIEGEL] In a popular uprising?

[Draskovic] All options are open—however, each one leads toward democracy. I think that Serbia will become a parliamentary monarchy before the end of the year. Under the supervision of future King Alexander II new elections could be held. We need a figure like [Spanish King] Juan Carlos.

'Myopic' Political Views Diminish Serbia

92BA0427B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18-19 Jan 92 p IV

[Article by Borislav Solesa: "The Serbs—Way Out There"]

[Text] The rebellious spirit of the Irish Republican Army [IRA] that was felt and seen so clearly through numerous graffiti in the streets of Croatian cities in the former Yugoslavia (this is now our second former Yugoslavia!) is now moving to the Serbian Republic Krajina. No extensive analyses have yet been made of the situation of Croatia and its neighboring country, the Serbian Republic Krajina, which the Croatian state does not recognize. Although recognized internationally, Croatia still cannot control the territories on which the Serbs live in a kind of reservation extending over a large area from the Danube to the Bay of Karin.

The most recent initiative of a group of individuals in Knin to sign a petition to the United Nations seeking "that a piece of land be found for the Serbs in Croatia where they could settle as far as possible from the Republic of Serbia," about which the public was informed by Marko Dobrijevic, organizational secretary of the Krajina SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], shows that a majority of the Serbs are taking the situation here hard.

Although they speak about a piece of land for the Serbs "way out there somewhere," at the same time the people in the SDS believe that the areas of the Krajina as it now stands have still not been altogether marked and established. On the seacoast, according to their plans, Skradin should also be liberated as an old Serbian town, and then Pakrac and Osijek.

One often hears that people in the parties, in power, and even those on the streets in Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Glina, and throughout the Krajina say that they will not allow the Yugoslav Army to leave them now after all that has happened. "The officers can leave, it would take only two buses, but the weapons will remain," Dr. Milan Babic, president of the Serbian Republic Krajina, has said, and he appears to be supported by many people here.

It is entirely clear what the Croatian government will think of this. Following these months of war, they would sign a petition for a piece of land where the Serbs from Croatia could settle, preferably in Greenland.

Marko Dobrijevic believes that people who will not fight for the interests of the Krajina should get out of here. "We will not allow an ideological differentiation to take place among the officers. Stevan Mirkovic of the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia talks about us citizens of Krajina as though we were Dujic's children, introducing here his ideological standards, which have caused these people many troubles. He and those like him should think over quite well what they have done to Serbia, to the Krajina, and to the world, with their myopic political views. I would ask him why the Republic of Croatia was recognized in the Brozist, communist borders of the former socialist administrative Croatia, although that state lost its sovereignty when the first log was put in place in the Krajina? The position of our fighters is that the 'Blue Helmets' can be sent to Sibenik, Zadar, and other towns and cities, but not to the Krajina, because the situation here is under the control of the bodies of government."

In the very top political leadership of that most numerous Serbian party in the Krajina, which won the last election in Croatia handily in this part of the territory settled by Serbs, they believe that similar views are held in the SDS of Serbia, which is supporting them in almost everything, along with its president, Velja Brankovic.

At the same time, the conflict, which through the letters of Slobodan Milosevic and Dr. Milan Babic instilled apathy in the citizens of the Krajina and made them think about things they thought they would never think about, has brought many to a state of disorientation.

That is why there is increasing evidence of a strange spitefulness, rebelliousness, which would like to make its point, but for the moment is still restrained. The question being asked most frequently in the Krajina is whether the situation will remain so in coming days. The Krajina circle is closed with weapons, and for the present the weapons are still aimed outward.

UN Deployment Divides Serbian Political Parties

92BA0424B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jan 92 p 13

[Article by M. Mikuljanac and I. Radovanovic: "Winter in the Middle of a Love Affair"]

[Text] The conflicts that have sprung up among the Serbs over the arrival of the "Blue Helmets" have spread these past days even to the most extreme segment of the Serbian opposition. The leaders of Serbian National Renewal [SNO] and the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], Mirko Jovic and Vojislav Seselj, have exchanged (through the press) rather serious words, in this way destroying the unity of the Serbian right that had been established on the eve of the war.

The "brothers" until yesterday (of whom the rest of the opposition says that they are in collusion with the police and the authorities) fell to arguing soon after Milan Babic calmly turned his back on Slobodan Milosevic. Jovic immediately took Babic's part, while Seselj tried to work both sides of the street, appealing for Serbian unity and calling upon the leaders at odds to negotiate.

Because this obvious difference in views between the top men of the SNO and SRS could not end without a "war on the right," the first stings were not long in coming. Jovic asserted that a large number of Seselj's volunteers

were transferring to the "Dusan, the Strong" detachment of the SNO, thereby rejecting Vance's plan and all the rest that could leave them without weapons and take them away from the battlefield.

The Story About "Infiltrated Elements"

Not waiting even a moment, Seselj, in keeping with his old custom, immediately "stuck his finger" in Jovic's eye by asserting that that "Dusan, the Strong" unit does not exist, that accordingly the Radicals are not transferring anywhere, and that the SNO is making quite a bit of noise for its "size."

Although after that they did not literally exchange blows (many believed that even that was possible), the leaders of the two rightwing parties did everything to make each other's life and continuation on the political scene miserable. And while Jovic was making a new statement to newsmen about the "Seselj case," someone who had been his close collaborator until just recently decided to turn his back on him. That is a wonder because that gentleman, Ilija Gligorijevic, vice president of the SNO, was at one time one of the main propagators of the idea of unifying the SNO and SRS and is known for his closeness to the Seseljites.

So, an "infiltrated element," someone from outside would say, but not Mirko Jovic. He reacted rather calmly to Gligorijevic's departure, stating even that all of this is proof that the "SNO is a democratic party."

Without questioning the "democratic nature" of the SNO, many observers of the situation on the Serbian opposition scene believe that Jovic's behavior is nevertheless being determined by certain other matters. Some even say that Jovic is not much bothered with all that Seselj is doing to him "behind his back" (and in the party) precisely because these days he is doing those same things to Seselj. Incidentally, at about the same time that Gligorijevic was "undermining" the SNO, another gentleman was dialing the telephone numbers of volunteers in the ranks of the Serbian Radical Party, trying to persuade them that the time had finally come to turn their backs on their chief and join the "Dusan, the Strong" unit.

What Will the Volunteers Say?

From what we have learned, invitations have been sent out by one of the commanders of the "Dusan, the Strong" unit, and Seselj's volunteers were on that occasion offered to take part in "very important" actions which, of course, contribute to preventing the ruination of Serbism.

There is evidence from all appearances that the entire story will continue to revolve on which of the two leaders manages to keep the most volunteers under his control in the events that occurred on the eve of the announced rally of volunteers in Belgrade. According to certain reports, a group of volunteers from Belgrade and Pancevo recently decided to demonstrate at the rally in the capital their readiness to continue to defend the krajinas and other Serbian interests.

The reactions of the SRS and SNO to this rally are even more interesting. And while, so we have learned, the SRS is these days trying to persuade its volunteers not to take part in the rally, because it is "being organized by the CIA, which wants unrest in Belgrade," the people from the SNO are still keeping a wise silence about everything. Nevertheless, according to certain assessments, Jovic will support the rally.

That does not mean, of course, that the conflict between him and Seselj will end there. The next installment, the real one, if one takes seriously Jovic's statements about "terrorist actions," is yet to come.

Slovenia

Slovene Envoys Recalled From Embassies Abroad

LD0302172292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1700 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, February 3 (TANJUG)—Following the Slovenian Government's decision to withdraw its cadres from the Federal adminstration, the secessionist Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia has recalled all ambassadors of Slovene nationality from Yugoslav embassies abroad.

In reply to a question by Deputy Miodrag Vukotic from Vojvodina (a northern province in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia) on the fate of ambassadors originating from the two Yugoslav republics which proclaimed independence from Yugoslavia on June 26, 1991, the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs underscores that, on June 26, 1991 when all diplomatic posts abroad were filled, Slovenia held 11 ambassadorships and Croatia 14.

As far as ambassadors of Croatian origin are concerned, two returned home after their term in office ran out (Uganda and Malaysia), and four were recalled (France, The Vatican, Chile and Austria) because their activities were contrary to the interests of the country, its foreign policy and the directives and instructions issued by the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, as set out in the answer to the deputy's question.

Another eight ambassadors of Croatian origin, despite Croatia's independence, still hold posts in the United Nations in New York, the United Arab Emirates, Denmark, Indonesia, Philippines, Argentine, Russia and Abu Dhabi.

International Business Exchange Program Starts

92BA0398B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 7 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by F.D.: "Hexagonale Will Adopt Our Information System"]

[Text] Because of the increasingly greater interest and needs of the Slovene economy, the Slovene Economic Chamber's [GZS] Information System Center has developed a new information system for seeking business partners at home and abroad. The businessmen's supply and demand exchange—the exchange, as the above-mentioned program is named—according to Marijan Stele, the GZS's information system adviser, includes all the elements that were previously handled by various computer programs, or were not included in any of the existing data bases (on patents, services, technologies, innovations, products, engineering, joint investments, finances, etc.).

In addition to domestic users, this information system of the chamber's will also be adopted by all of the members of the working group of the Hexagonale (Italy, Austria, Hungary, Poland, the Czech lands, Slovakia, and Croatia). This decision, in fact, was made in the middle of last month by the members of the working group on information systems, which operates within the framework of the Hexagonale. In neighboring Hungary, the above-mentioned information system is already available in three cities, and is likewise already in operation at the Croatian Economic Chamber; in the future, it will also be adopted by all of the above members of the above-mentioned working group.

Marijan Stele thinks that the adoption of their information system by all the member states of the above-mentioned community provides a definite possibility for promoting the Slovene economy and more equitable participation in foreign markets. It is interesting that the inclusion of supply and demand in the data base is free. A supplier only fills out a special application form at the chamber. Their experts enter the data every day into the data base, and all the information on supply or demand remains in the exchange for two months; if the supplier concludes an individual transaction before that time, he is obliged to inform the chamber, where the data is deleted from the data base ahead of time.

In fact, it is only in this way, Marijan Stele is convinced, that the users of their system can be provided really up-to-date information. Every supplier of information can decide whether his information is to be provided to the information centers in individual regions, other former Yugoslav republics, or also abroad, where the official language of the above-mentioned data base is English. Furthermore, the supplier can decide himself which foreign countries the center should provide the information to.

Government Hopes To Curb 'Hyperinflation'

92BA0397A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
8 Jan 92 p 4

[Article by Bozena Kriznik: "Social Agreement Is To Curb the Disproportionate Growth of Prices and Wages"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] The state, trade unions, employers, farmers, and food producers have to reach an agreement on a certain mutually agreed-upon change in prices and personal incomes; the agreement has to be adopted before we end up in hyperinflation.

Ljubljana, 7 Jan—The fear of social unrest is as extensive as the present deep economic recession. It is only becoming more and more serious, since at least for the short term, anti-inflationary policy, with its restrictive slant, is at odds with the satisfaction of workers and individuals. The attempt to maintain social peace can quite quickly lead such an economic policy to failure. The way out of this should be a social pact: a jointly coordinated belt-tightening, with a balanced relationship between price and wage trends.

The essence of the social agreement is that the partners, namely the state, trade unions, representatives of employers, and representatives of farmer and food producers agree on certain mutually coordinated changes in the prices controlled by the state authorities, the prices of basic food products, and changes in wages. As a rule, increases in those prices and wages are to lag behind the growth in the prices of basic necessities. This is how the government, at least, conceives of the social agreement (the foundations for it were adopted at the end of last year), whereas the trade unions' vision is somewhat broader and more long-term. The principal goal of the agreement on ensuring social stability is ensuring support for the anti-inflationary measures of monetary and budgetary policy in such a way as to reduce inflation with the least possible unfavorable consequences for economic activity, employment, and social stability.

Each of the partners in the agreement is committing itself to fulfill its part of the task: The republic government, first of all, is to hold back the growth of prices. To start with, it has designated control over the prices of infrastructural industries, namely electricity, railroad, and PTT [postal, telephone, and telegraph] services, over the prices of municipal services, rents, oil and the more important oil derivatives, and natural gas, and over the prices of basic foods (flour, bread, milk, meat, oil, and sugar). All of these prices will be governed by consent, and during the period that the agreement is in effect, they can increase by at most 80 percent of the monthly growth in the prices of basic necessities. The import-dependent part of the price of oil and its derivatives is an exception. In this regard, the government is emphasizing that this should not be an automatic price increase for the above products and services, but rather represents, as a rule, only the upper limit that is permitted. Price increases can thus be lower.

We spoke about the proposed government agreement on social partnership with the Republic Minister of Labor Jozica Puhar (the Ministry of Labor, in fact, is responsible for this project), and with Dr. Andrej Ocvirk, the vice president of the Executive Council for the economy, who will head the government negotiating group along with Vice President Dr. Matija Matesic. Both Puharjeva

and Ocvirk explained how the government arrived at its proposal, and emphasized that a considerable amount of coordination was necessary before the proposal assumed its final form. According to their assurances, this, namely the mutual consultation, persuasion, discussion in government committees, and coordination because of the complexity of the problem, is also the reason for the relative slowness. In fact, it would have been desirable and logical for the social agreement to have been in hand by the end of last year. There is no time to spare. If our present approximately 15-percent inflation approaches 25 percent, which is the approximate limit for the managability of inflation, even before the pact is adopted, then even the social pact can no longer help us....

Which Prices Should Be Controlled

There have been disagreements within the government over both prices and wages, since this is an agreement that has a crucial effect upon primary distribution. First of all, which prices should be controlled, in which phases? Economists support the thesis that the infrastructure, especially energy, should bear the main burden of stabilization.

In this regard, we know, according to Dr. Ocvirk, that energy is in the unenviable position of having to carry out certain environmental investments from expanded production, with a price that in practice does not even allow it to ensure continued production at the same level. The prices of oil and its derivatives are 80-percent dependent upon imports, and thus upon the exchange rate. Apartment rents are to begin gradually to approach economic ones, but we know that renters in the former socially owned apartments, which will not be sold, according to the housing law, are mostly the most endangered stratum of the population—and therefore they should be protected during this period.

The stormiest debates, however, were over food prices. The fundamental question was whether to control the price from the beginning, upon purchase, or at the end, with the consumer. The Agriculture Ministry did not agree to limiting purchase prices, saying that they had already shown an extremely low growth of prices so far, and that even before the preparation of the social agreement it had tried to achieve coordination. Puharjeva: "We noted that what is primarily important for social stability is the final price, which exerts pressure for an increase in wages, and thus causes an inflationary spiral." Dr. Ocvirk: "After the collapse of the Yugoslav market, we have a considerable number of monopolies in this field, but we still do not have mechanisms for breaking them up. The demand for basic foods is inelastic, and that is why the prices of these products also conceal all the other inefficiencies, for instance, in trade organizations. That is why we in the government defined the relationship among the basic price for agricultural products, the price during processing, and then also the retail consumer price. The relationships have been set, and we intend to keep them. To be sure, we will control the final prices, and we will use commodity reserves to intervene in the market and thus influence the prices of the primary agricultural crops."

The ministers have thus agreed (the talks were also attended by several outside participants, namely representatives of farmers and the chamber, and thus the positions were coordinated somewhat more broadly, not just within the government) that the prices of basic foods should also increase at a rate of at most 0.8 times the monthly growth in the prices of basic necessities.

Government Has To Control the Growth of Wages

The second part of the agreement deals with wages. The government is to monitor wages in the state administration, and those wages are not to grow faster than wages in the economy. According to the government's proposal, wages in public services and the infrastructure are to be paid in accordance with collective contracts, but the first condition is that they should first of all equalize the starting salaries.

This is to be done wherever the jobs are comparable. Then the collective contracts are to be put into effect. Thus, wages in public services, the infrastructure, and public administration would be linked to the growth of wages in the economy. "If we succeed in curbing wages in the economy, we will automatically succeed in controlling overall wages," Puharjeva stated.

In order to curb wages in the economy, the government is turning to the Chamber, which, as a cosigner of the agreement, is to propose an annex to it. The government is suggesting to it a starting salary for January 1991—13,170 tolars—and in later months wages in the economy would be increased, depending on the growth of the prices of basic necessities. For that purpose, it has drafted an escalation scale, according to which the extent to which wages lag behind the growth in the cost of living would depend upon the (lack of) success in lowering the general level of prices. As Minister Puharjeva explains, the scale is to make sure that the extent to which wages lag behind is bearable at all levels of inflation, and that even with a possible failure, a high growth in the cost of living, people will not be completely impoverished. If we succeed in radically reducing inflation (to less than 5 percent), the extent to which wages lag behind the growth in the cost of living is to be the same as that for controlled prices, i.e., by a factor of 0.8. We already have that much of a lag now, Puharjeva says.

And, not least of all, when will the social agreement finally take place, according to the government's predictions, if we do not want to drown in a hyperinflationary abyss? In spite of the delays to date, the government is again optimistic. Even though negotiations with trade unions are difficult and prolonged in all market societies, as Dr. Ocvirk is aware, an agreement is to be reached with the partners by the end of January.

[Box, p 4]

What actually is the 0.8 coefficient? A calculated magical formula, or a consensus? Dr. Ocvirk: "It is a consensus on how we should achieve a ratio between changes in prices and changes in wages." The deputy prime minister did not want to answer regarding how much of a reduction in inflation is to be achieved. We are obviously trying to minimize it with instruments like the social agreement. The deputy prime minister predicts an economic recession until sometime around the middle of the year, and then economic growth should already have begun.

[Box, p 4]

The actual concept of a social partnership was provided by Dr. Veljko Belo, transferring to our circumstances certain (successful) rules of the game, based on foreign experiences. As we were told by Jozica Puhar, simulations showed that we in Slovenia could reduce inflation even before the six months that our government set as the period for which the social agreement was to be in effect; inflation could fall to 9 percent in four months.

[Box, p 4]

We asked Dr. Ocvirk whether anyone in the government was against the limitation on prices. "All of us who are in favor of a market economy are naturally against it," he said ambiguously. "Naturally, we have to be against a limitation on prices, but for the time being we cannot smash monopolies otherwise."